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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis is about leaving the workforce at older age in the Netherlands. We study both 
the determinants and mortality effects of leaving the workforce. We aim to describe and 
explain (gradual) retirement patterns and heterogeneity of these patterns across industries. 
Gradual retirement involves a gradual transition from working in the career job to full 
retirement rather than retiring full-time at once. Insights into the determinants of (gradual) 
retirement behavior of people are vital for pension policy makers, as they allow to predict 
how changed retirement incentives affect individuals’ retirement behavior. We also study 
the way (sudden) incentive-induced retirement affects the spouse’s own retirement status. 
This is relevant, because  retirement decisions of spouses may be interrelated. Such 
interdependence may result in indirect effects of retirement incentives on spouses’ 
retirement behavior. Policy makers may want to be aware of such effects. Next, we study 
the effects of retirement transitions and involuntary job departures on older workers’ 
mortality rates. Policy makers may want to take the size and direction of these effects into 
account when conducting a cost and benefit analysis on policy measures that may be 
introduced to avoid involuntary job departures or to discourage or promote retirement. All 
chapters in this thesis are based on Dutch administrative micro data on older workers with 
strong labor force attachment. These data have valuable features such as that they are panel 
data, provide objective and verified information, do not suffer from measurement error and 
contain large numbers of observations. The latter is in particular useful for studying low 
probability events such as mortality, gradual retirement and joint retirement of couples.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 considers gradual retirement in the 
Netherlands. Gradual retirement may involve (i) a switch from the career job to a less 
demanding bridge job (we call this partial retirement), or (ii) working fewer hours within 
the career job (this we call phased retirement). Partial retirement by which individuals 
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leave their career jobs and withdraw incrementally from the labor force is widespread in 
the United States. Phased retirement is less frequent in the United States. We analyze the 
current state of gradual retirement in the Netherlands using administrative data that allow 
much more precise tracking of labor market transitions than most survey panel data. We 
find that there was a large heterogeneity in (gradual) retirement rates across industries. A 
large share of partial retirement transitions involved switches from career jobs to bridge 
jobs in industries other than the industries career jobs were in, indicating that job mobility 
across industries was high. We discuss institutional aspects that limit the scope of gradual 
retirement, such as financial incentives to retire early.  
It is important to note that there are interdependencies of retirement decisions within 
couples. Spouses’ retirement decisions are interrelated because of various reasons. Spouses 
may like to spend leisure time together and also share the joint household budget 
constraint. We estimate and explain the effect of incentive-induced retirement of husbands 
on their wives’ probability to retire within one year in Chapter 3. The incentives we rely on 
for inducing husbands to retire concern eligibility rules for generous early retirement 
benefits that were temporarily and unexpectedly available to the husbands. The unexpected 
nature of the availability of the early retirement benefits is important here, as individuals 
may have changed their lifestyle if they anticipated retirement. Anticipation of retirement 
is typically an issue in the literature, as many studies rely on the normal retirement age or 
changes in retirement rules announced long in advance as sources of variation in retirement 
rates. We find that early retirement opportunities of husbands increased their wives’ 
probability to retire by 19.7 percentage points. Partly, wives respond to husbands’ choices 
at ages when they are themselves likely eligible for early retirement programs.  
Retirement status as a determinant of mortality is studied in Chapter 4. It is commonly 
known that health is a determinant of retirement decisions and labor force decisions in 
general. Ill-health workers may retire or not work because of their bad health. Retirement 
and working in general may affect health as well, as working may bring along stress and 
may require heavy physical activity. We deal with the endogeneity of retirement status in a 
similar way as in Chapter 3. We use the same unexpected temporary decrease in the 
eligibility age for retirement benefits for civil servants to instrument the retirement choice 
in a model that explains the probability to die within five years. We find for men that 
induced early retirement decreased the probability to die within five years by 2.6 
percentage points. This translates into an increase in life expectancy by two months. 
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Evidence suggests an effect running through stress. We find that our result is robust to 
specification changes and changes in data selection criteria.  
Similar to Chapter 4, Chapter 5 studies the effect of job departures on mortality, but for a 
different type of job departures. Chapter 5 studies the effect of job loss on mortality. This 
is challenging, because of the selection of workers into job loss. Workers who lose their 
jobs may be less productive and have poorer health than workers who stay on their jobs. 
We try to avoid endogeneity bias by employing job loss due to sudden firm closure as the 
treatment. We drop observations on workers employed in closing firms that experienced 
large employment declines prior to firm closure, because workers employed in these firms 
may have had a poorer health than workers in firms that did not close and may have 
anticipated job loss due to firm closure. We find that job loss due to sudden firm closure 
increased the probability to die within five years by 0.50 percentage points or 28 percent. 
Importantly, this effect is estimated using a model that controls for firm-level worker 
characteristics such as firm-level average mortality rates for mortality during the four years 
prior to the year of observation and firm-level average hospitalization (at t-1) rates. On the 
mechanism driving the effect of job loss on mortality, we provide evidence for an effect 
running through stress and changes in life style.   
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Chapter 2 
Gradual retirement in the Netherlands: An 
analysis using administrative data1 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Workers retire in many ways (Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn, 2006; Maestas, 2010). The term 
gradual retirement is typically applied to an array of heterogeneous pathways out of the 
labor force at older ages whereby individuals do not leave their career jobs abruptly into 
permanent inactivity but rather in a stepwise fashion, possibly going through a number of 
stages, and taking on a number of intermittent jobs and employment positions. Workers 
may choose such paths to benefit from the possibility of intertemporally smoothing their 
marginal utility of leisure, if prompted by deteriorating health over time, or due to various 
shocks (among which unemployment or disability). A possible side effect is that gradual 
retirement allows the worker to keep working beyond an age at which he or she otherwise 
would have retired completely. Indeed, gradual retirement has been considered to be a 
suitable instrument to induce workers to retire later (Wadensjö, 2006; Van Soest, Kapteyn 
and Zissimopoulos, 2007). This aspect makes gradual retirement interesting from a policy 
perspective when public finances are strained due to the impact of worsening dependency 
ratios on pay-as-you-go pension systems (Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2008). 
Gradual retirement has become a widespread phenomenon across OECD countries 
(Kantarci and van Soest, 2008, provide an overview), although most of the empirical 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is joint work with Hans Bloemen and Stefan Hochguertel. It will also appear as 
Bloemen, Hochguertel and Zweerink (2015a). We thank Tunga Kantarci, Michael Visser and  
seminar audiences at the Netspar Pension Day 2013 and the Netspar PIL 6 meeting on “Labor 
Force Participation of the Elderly” for useful comments.  
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evidence to date comes from the United States.
2
 In this chapter we study gradual retirement 
in the Netherlands. We limit ourselves to two salient forms of stepwise withdrawal, phased 
and partial retirement. These are the main forms of gradual retirement that are relevant in 
the country under study. Phased retirement involves a continued employment relationship 
with the career employer, albeit working fewer hours; partial retirement requires taking on 
an often less demanding and usually lower paid bridge job with a different employer. We 
also consider workers that re-enter the labor market after a spell of absence or retirement 
(sometimes dubbed ‘unretirement’; Maestas, 2010); this phenomenon is intimately related 
to partial retirement. We shall, partly owing to space limitations, not touch upon other 
interesting aspects that have been discussed in the literature, among which self-
employment choices at older ages (Sappleton and Lourenço, 2015) and re-careering late in 
working life (Johnson, Kawachi and Lewis, 2009). 
The Netherlands is an interesting country in the context of gradual retirement. First, part-
time work prevalence in the Netherlands is the highest among OECD countries. With part-
time jobs being ubiquitous there is somewhat of a "part-time culture". This is important 
because part-time employment is a defining feature of gradual retirement (OECD, 2013). 
Second, the country has a strong duality in the labor market with highly protected 
permanent jobs on the one hand and a substantial and strongly increasing share of low 
protected flexible employment relations on the other hand (Van Den Berge et al., 2014). 
This fact may explain why, despite the high incidence of part-time jobs, gradual retirement 
is somewhat limited to date, but may also lead one to expect a possible future shift in the 
cultural norm away from traditional complete withdrawal after the career job ends. 
This study contributes in important ways. First, we study gradual retirement using 
administrative data that cover the entire population. This is unusual, and for the 
Netherlands it has not been done before. The vast majority of papers instead employs 
retrospective survey data covering a single cross-section or short panel data with often a 
two year spacing between survey waves. Our administrative panel contains precise spell 
data for individual employment and non-(wage)employment episodes. We use this 
information to define long-tenure career jobs as point of departure, avoiding measurement 
issues associated with respondents’ recall error. We can also be very precise in our 
definition of the onset of a post-career spell, such as commencement of a bridge job as 
                                                          
2
 Early important contributions include papers by Quinn (1981) and Ruhm (1990). We shall review 
a number of subsequent studies, including some that cover international data in Section 2.2. 
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opposed to re-entry behavior that is characterized by an intermittent spell of non-
(wage)employment. 
Second, in this study we distinguish twelve different industries in our analysis of gradual 
retirement patterns. Industry differences are important as different industries show 
distinctly different patterns of gradual retirement, an aspect that has found little resonance 
in the empirical literature. The implication is that pre-retirement career choice determines 
gradual retirement pathways through state or path dependence. 
Third, we discuss that in the past early retirement pensions may have induced full 
retirement before the normal retirement age, and may so have restricted the scope for 
gradual retirement before the normal retirement age within the Dutch institutional context. 
In other countries studied in the gradual retirement literature, including the United States, 
early retirement pensions were less frequent and/or much less generous than in the 
Netherlands.  
 
2.2  Literature review   
2.2.1 Concepts 
Gradual retirement is the family name for phased and partial retirement, indicating gradual 
withdrawal from the labor force. The concepts of phased and partial retirement do not have 
established definitions and are not consistently used in the literature. For the purposes of 
this short review, we follow Ruhm (1990), Scott (2003), Kantarci and Van Soest (2008), 
and others. Kantarci and Van Soest (2008) provide a detailed discussion on the 
measurement of the different concepts. Phased and partial retirement involve the stage 
between working in the career job (which we define to be a job with the same employer 
with more than ten years of tenure) and full retirement. Phased retirement is staying in the 
career job with the same employer but working fewer hours. Partial retirement is the 
transition from the career job to a usually less demanding bridge job or to self-
employment. By less demanding we mean reduced work load or number of hours worked. 
Transitioning from the career job to a bridge job may involve a change of industry or a 
change of occupation (Ruhm, 1990).  
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2.2.2 Incidence of gradual retirement 
Gradual retirement enjoys high popularity in the United States, and is becoming more 
frequent in Europe. Kantarci and Van Soest (2008) explore partial retirement in Europe 
and the United States, using data for workers in the age category 51-65 from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
for the 1994-2000 period. They show that the prevalence of gradual retirement varied 
largely across European countries. The authors find that the two-year transition rate from 
full-time to part-time work was highest in the Netherlands (9.7%). The United States had a 
relatively modest two-year transition rate from full-time to part-time (6.5%). This is due to 
gradual retirement in the United States involving mainly workers in their mid-60s and 
older. Henkens and Van Solinge (2014) find that between 15 and 35 percent of career job 
workers entered bridge jobs, using data for workers born in the 1931-1941 period from 
three waves (2001, 2006, and 2011) of the Dutch NIDI Work and Retirement Panel. Cahill, 
Giandrea and Quinn (2015) study gradual retirement using data for workers born in the 
1931-1953 period from the first ten waves (1992-2010, biennial) of the U.S. Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS). They find that between 30 and 39 percent of the men employed 
in full-time career jobs moved to bridge job employment and that between 36 and 41 
percent of the women employed in full-time career jobs moved to bridge job employment. 
Similar percentages have been reported as well in other papers using similar data. Cahill, 
Giandrea and Quinn (2015) also find that between 11 and 13 percent of the men employed 
in full-time career jobs entered phased retirement and that between 6 and 10 percent of the 
women employed in full-time career jobs entered phased retirement.  
 
2.2.3 Gradual retirement and hours worked 
The relation between gradual retirement and hours worked has found some echo in the 
literature. Ghent, Allen and Clark (2001) study the impact of the introduction of a phased 
retirement program on retirement behavior and hours worked at each of the 15 campuses of 
the University of North Carolina. They report descriptive evidence for the hypothesis that 
workers who retired part-time were mainly people who would have continued to work full-
time if they had not had the phased retirement option. Wadensjö (2006) comes to a 
different conclusion. He studies the impact of a gradual abolition of a part-time pension 
arrangement in Sweden on retirement behavior and hours worked. Under that scheme, 
workers could receive partial pension benefits while continuing part-time employment with 
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their current employer. The descriptive analysis shows that the abolition of the part-time 
pension arrangement mainly prevented phased retirement among workers who were 
planning to retire fully. Fouarge, De Grip and Montizaan (2012) study the effect of 
introducing flexibilities in the pension system on hours worked. They use survey data on 
retirement expectations of workers who accumulate pensions at a large Dutch pension 
fund. They find that the introduction of flexibility into the pension system has no effect on 
labor supply. The direction of the impact of gradual retirement on hours worked differs 
across the various studies. Kantarci and Van Soest (2008) point out that the differences in 
results are partly due to differences in the generosity of pension arrangements across 
studies.  
 
2.2.4 Related empirical estimates    
Gradual retirement decisions have been studied extensively in the literature. Many studies 
model gradual retirement decisions using multinomial logit models. Thomson (2007) 
estimates a multinomial logit model for gradual and full retirement. She uses data from 
four annual waves (2001-2004) of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) survey. She finds that the coefficients on various personal 
characteristics point in the same direction for gradual and full retirement, although signs of 
coefficients differ between men and women. Men were more likely to experience gradual 
retirement than women. Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn (2015) estimate a multinomial logit 
model for the first ten waves of HRS data. Their results indicate that bridge jobs were more 
common among younger respondents and respondents without defined-benefit pension 
plans. Self-employed men and women had a higher probability of continuing to work full-
time than wage-employed workers, and self-employed men had a higher probability of 
entering a bridge job in case a job transition was made. Similarly, Kim and DeVaney 
(2005) find that self-employed workers continued working longer than wage-employed 
workers, and that they had a higher probability of gradual retirement. Their multinomial 
logit model estimates on the first and fifth wave of HRS data (years 1992 and 2000) also 
show that high wages encourage workers to continue working.  
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2.3  The Dutch pension system      
The Dutch pension system (Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001; Henkens and Van Solinge, 
2014; Van Vuuren,  2011) rests on three pillars. The first pillar is the public old-age 
pension (social security), financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Contributions stem from 
workers and employers. All residents registered in the Netherlands accrue public old-age 
pension rights (levels are linked to duration of legal residence in the country). Benefits are 
flat and tied to the minimum wage. They were provided as of the normal retirement age of 
65 during the period we study and were not conditioned on work history or employment 
status. 
The second pillar consists of occupational pensions, overwhelmingly of the defined benefit 
type. They provide benefits as of the normal retirement age. Occupational pensions are 
funded pensions and are typically managed at the industry level and sometimes at the firm 
level (for large employers). About 90 percent of all workers actually participate in 
occupational pension plans. The widespread participation in occupational pension plans 
may be explained by collective labor agreements, covering about 90 percent of all workers, 
typically including a clause on compulsory participation in occupational pension plans. 
Contributions to these pension plans stem from both workers and employers. The 
aggregate of first and second pillar pension benefits provide pension benefits as of age 65 
with gross replacement rates of up to 70 percent of the previously earned wages. Net 
replacement rates could be considerably higher, but could not exceed 100 percent. Owing 
to the large number of occupational pension plans, there is considerable heterogeneity in 
pension conditions.
3
 The generosity of pension benefits is among the pension conditions 
that vary across pension plans.  
Occupational pension funds typically offered early retirement pensions to their participants 
during the period we study. Early retirement pensions allowed full retirement as of a 
specific age younger than the normal retirement age. As early retirement pensions 
promoted full retirement at ages before 65, they may have limited the scope for gradual 
retirement. Eligibility criteria and eligibility ages for early retirement benefits varied across 
pension funds. The early retirement eligibility age generally varied from 60 to 62. 
Eligibility criteria for early retirement benefits may include a minimum number of 
                                                          
3
 There are approximately 80 pension funds. About 55 of these are profession-wide or sectoral 
pension funds, while 25 are firm-specific. 
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contribution years or having contributed to the pension fund continuously during a 
minimum number of years prior to early retirement.
4
 Due to stipulations in the Dutch tax 
law, early retirement benefits were generous and favorable for the retirees.
5
 Early 
retirement benefits provided before normal retirement are higher than occupational pension 
benefits provided as of the normal retirement age to (partly) compensate early retirees for 
not receiving public old-age pension benefits before normal retirement. 
The third pillar consists of private provisions. Those include amongst others annuity 
insurance and accumulated savings.  
We study gradual retirement in the Netherlands, whereas most papers study gradual 
retirement in other countries, including the United States.
6
 Differences in institutional 
environments across countries may affect gradual retirement patterns. The institutional 
environment of the United States, the most frequently studied country in the literature, 
differs largely from the institutional environment of the Netherlands. In particular, in the 
United States, social security is less generous than public old-age pensions in the 
Netherlands, employers are supported but not required to offer pension arrangements to 
their workers and pension benefits are typically of the defined contribution type. In the 
Netherlands, participation in the public old-age and occupational pension schemes is 
typically compulsory, early retirement schemes were more common than in the United 
States and pensions benefits are generally of the defined benefit type. Pension benefits of 
the contribution type, as in the United States, leave retirees with a higher uncertainty on 
pension income than those of the defined benefit type, as in the Netherlands. Differences in 
                                                          
4
 For instance, early retirement arrangements of the public sector pension fund, which is the largest 
pension fund in the Netherlands, required workers to have contributed to the public pension fund 
continuously during the ten years prior to early retirement and to have contributed to the public 
sector pension system during 40 or more years, depending on the year of birth.  
5
 For individuals born before January 1, 1950, early retirement benefits were taxed, whereas 
premiums paid by workers and employers were exempted from taxation. As the income of workers 
was generally higher than that of early retirees, and as labor income was taxed at progressive rates, 
the marginal tax rate applying to the early retirement contribution by workers was often higher than 
the marginal tax rate applied to the early retirement benefits. This fact made early retirement very 
attractive for both eligible workers and employers. For individuals born on or after January 1, 1950, 
the tax advantage was abolished at the beginning of 2006 and early retirement arrangements for 
these individuals have disappeared in recent years. 
6
 We refer to Gruber and Wise (2008) for a detailed comparison of pension systems across 
countries (including the Netherlands and the United States).  
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generosity of pension benefits, participation in (early retirement) pension schemes and 
uncertainty regarding pension income may have induced workers in the United States to 
retire fully on a later age than those in the Netherlands.  
 
2.4  Gradual retirement in the Netherlands 
2.4.1 Data   
The data we use are Dutch administrative panel data on all individuals and jobs over the 
period 2001-2007. These data are administered by Statistics Netherlands and cover the 
universe of residents registered with Dutch municipalities. We have access to data on job 
and personal characteristics.
7
 The job characteristics file provides information on all jobs 
that a worker has been employed in during the year of observation. For every job, both 
start and end date, industry code, and annual wage are available. The personal 
characteristics file contains information on demographic characteristics such as nationality, 
marital status and year and month of birth. A partner identifier allows us to link data from 
spouses (and registered partners).  
 
2.4.2 Measurement of concepts 
The data structure requires that we use specific definitions of phased and partial retirement, 
that on occasion deviate from definitions used elsewhere in the literature. On the other 
hand, our data allow a much more precise measurement of transitions than what is being 
used in the papers based on (biennial) survey data (such as Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn, 
2006, or Maestas, 2010). We keep individuals in the sample for ages 52 through 64,
 8
 or 
until we observe a transition into phased retirement, partial retirement, unretirement or full 
retirement, if that occurs earlier (or until death, if that occurs earlier).  
                                                          
7
 The original file names are Zelfstandigentab (1999-2008), SSB Banen (1999-2008), SSB Personen 
(1999-2008), Doodsoorzaken (2000-2008) and PARTNERBUS (2010). Statistics Netherlands only 
provides data that come from governmental institutions. These data are rather limited in terms of 
the number of variables. Data on pension benefits, for instance, are not available. Moreover, data 
are only available for certain years. Data on financial wealth, for instance, are not available for the 
years of study.     
8
 For every of the years 2001-2007, we select observations on workers turning 52-64 in that year 
only.  
13 
 
Point of departure for every worker in our sample is a career job. This we define as a job at 
a particular employer, with a continuous job tenure at this employer of at least ten years 
(measured from the year of observation) and total earnings of at least 20,000 euros per year 
in every year of the observation period.
9
 
10
 We measure phased retirement as staying in the 
career job and experiencing a wage reduction of at least twenty percent. We measure 
partial retirement as a shift from the career job to a bridge job. We define a bridge job as a 
job that 
- starts within one month after the end of the career job;11  
- has a starting wage that is at least ten percent lower than the final wage earned 
in the career job; and  
- is with a different employer than the career job. 
We deliberately restrict the definition of bridge jobs by requiring a start very soon after 
leaving the career job. Our definition of bridge jobs ensures that partial retirement concerns 
an almost direct transition from the career to a bridge job. We define full retirement as 
complete withdrawal from the labor force without re-entering paid employment during 
later years of observation.
12
 Unretirement (or re-entry) is measured as leaving the career 
job and entering any other job starting earliest one month later. Notice that the definitions 
of partial retirement (using a bridge job) and unretirement are directly and inversely related 
to one another, and their relative incidence is driven by the window width that we allow for 
intermittent spells of non-(wage)employment. Because in essence, unretirement indicates 
that workers retire from their career jobs and re-enter paid employment later, one month of 
non-(wage)employment after departure from the career jobs may be too short a non-
(wage)employment spell to claim that workers are retired. Therefore, we shall explore the 
                                                          
9
 We do not have access to a comprehensive and consistent series of hours worked data for all years 
used (for instance, Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn (2006, 2015) condition on 1,600 or more reported 
hours per year). Our definition instead conditions on income. The income value of 20,000 Euro 
corresponds to about 125% of the annual minimum wage in 2008 at full-time employment.  
10
 We do not have access to information on self-employment at the same level of accuracy (in 
particular spell data), and we disregard the self-employed in our initial sample. When we speak of 
(non-)employment following a career job, we mean (non-wage) employment. 
11
 If multiple jobs start within one month after the end of the career job, the bridge job is the job 
that starts first. If there is a tie between jobs starting first, the bridge job is the job with the highest 
wage.  
12
 This definition may suffer from slight biases due to censoring. Alternative definitions making use 
of receipt of early retirement benefits are not possible with our data.  
14 
 
sensitivity of results to our definition of unretirement, redefining unretirement as re-
entrance of paid employment two full years after departure from the career job. The latter 
is the upper bound that may occur in many survey data papers.
13
 
14
 
 
2.4.3 Gradual retirement 
We analyze phased and partial retirement patterns at the industry level. By doing this, we 
hope to get a better view of the heterogeneity in phased and partial retirement rates across 
industries. Industry level differences in phased and partial retirement rates are particularly 
interesting because of the institutional context provided by occupational (early retirement) 
pensions in the Netherlands. We also hope to get insights on job mobility for older career 
job workers who enter partial retirement. We aim to add to the study of Johnson, Kawachi 
and Lewis (2009), who study job mobility across industries for re-careering older workers. 
We distinguish between twelve different industries in our analyses. The industries are 
grouped according to the NACE classification 1993, version 2004 (Statistics Netherlands, 
2004). In our analyses, we also distinguish between men and women. We do so, because 
retirement patterns are quite different for men and women (Thomson, 2007; Cahill, 
Giandrea and Quinn, 2015). 
 
2.4.3.1 Phased retirement   
Figure 2.1 shows phased retirement rates for the Netherlands from our register data, 
separately by  gender. Phased retirement rates were much higher for women than for men. 
Phased retirement transitions became particularly noteworthy from the age of 60 onwards. 
These patterns are thus very different from what is reported by Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn 
(2015) for the United States. Figure 2.2 shows a large heterogeneity in phased retirement 
rates across industries, and in particular for workers aged 60-64. Asset management, 
education and the public sector were the industries with the lowest phased retirement rates 
for both men and women in the age category 60-64. Phased retirement for this older age 
                                                          
13
 Maestas (2010), and other contributions using the HRS identify transitions from wave-to-wave 
changes in current labor market status.  
14
 Note that our sample starts with employees with a relatively long tenure who benefit from strong 
employment protection. These individuals will thus be less likely to make a voluntary transition 
away from their career jobs. The definition of career jobs both in terms of tenure and in terms of 
income will provide for a reasonably ‘clean’ reference group, perhaps with the exception that some 
workers may be drawing partial disability benefits with a large residual work requirement. 
15 
 
group of men and women was most frequent in health care and second most frequent in 
construction.  
Figure 2.1:  Fraction of career job workers entering phased retirement, by gender (as  
 percentage) 
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Figure 2.2: Fraction of career job workers entering phased retirement, by age group (as  
 percentage) * 
Panel a: men 
 
Panel b: women 
 
* Temporary work is not an industry. Workers doing temporary work may be engaged in any 
industry. 
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2.4.3.2 Partial retirement            
Figure 2.3 shows that partial retirement rates were much lower than those reported in other 
studies, such as Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn (2015) and Henkens and Van Solinge (2014). 
This is to an important extent due to difference in measurement of partial retirement. As 
we observe start and end dates of jobs, we can measure partial retirement transitions very 
precisely. We define partial retirement as a worker leaving the career job and entering a 
bridge job within one month. Studies that rely on biennial survey data, such as Maestas 
(2010) and Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn (2015), typically define partial retirement as 
working in a bridge job two years after having worked in the career job. Figure 2.4 shows 
that if we redefine partial retirement as commencement of a bridge job within two years 
after departure from the career job, partial retirement rates were multiple times higher than 
those for our original definition of partial retirement as used in Figure 2.3. This suggests 
that partial retirement rates are upward biased in studies using biennial data, implying that 
the demarcation with unretirement (re-entry) is not always very clear.
15
    
Figure 2.3 shows that partial retirement was more frequent among men than among 
women. This is consistent with evidence provided by Thomson (2007). Partial retirement 
rates show a similar jump at age 60 as phased retirement rates. The fraction of career job 
workers who retired partially was between 0.3% and 0.8% per year for men, and between 
0.2% and 0.7% per year for women. Partial retirement was far less frequent than phased 
retirement in the Netherlands, both for men and women. This may be due to phased 
retirement being more attractive for workers and employers than partial retirement.  
Workers may have preferred phased retirement over partial retirement for several reasons, 
in particular as phased retirement may have offered both better employment protection and 
higher wages. Phased retirement with the same employer allowed the continued benefit 
from the solid employment protection offered by the career job. In addition, when wages 
reflected the marginal product of labor and the latter increased with firm-specific human 
capital and tenure, workers who entered phased retirement may have kept benefiting from 
their firm-specific skills that employer-switching bridge job workers lost. Secondly, as 
severance pay was high and notice periods for older career job workers were long in the 
                                                          
15
 It should be mentioned, however, that some survey datasets contain self-reported information on 
retirement status, which in principle may help to distinguish periods of job search when 
unemployed from periods of non-participation. Our data do not, by design, contain such self-
reported information. 
18 
 
Netherlands, those who involuntarily left their career jobs tended to have high reservation 
wages (Euwals, De Mooij and Van Vuuren, 2009).
16
 
Employers, likewise, may not have been favorable to creating bridge job positions that 
facilitate partial retirement for older workers. In case of phased retirement, employers were 
already hiring older workers. In case of partial retirement, employers were going to hire 
older workers. In the latter case, employers could have avoided hiring older workers with 
zero cost. Employers may not have wished to hire older workers because they had negative 
stereotypes about older workers. Employers may have associated older workers with 
factors such as resistance to change and adaptation problems to technology, such as 
computer technology (McGregor and Gray, 2002).
17
 Other negative stereotypes that older 
workers may have been associated with by employers are high labor costs and high 
absenteeism (Remery et al., 2003). 
Figure 2.3: Fraction of career job workers retiring partially, by gender (as percentage)
 
                                                          
16
 Workers who were laid off due to their poor functioning did not have any employment 
protection. 
17
 Based on negative stereotypes of employers about workers with respect to willingness to learn 
and ability to use new technologies, we may expect bridge job employers for jobs in which 
willingness to learn, or ability to use new technologies, is important, to be more reluctant to have 
hired older workers than others. However, assessing or predicting in which industries willingness 
to learn or ability to learn new technologies is particularly important is not straightforward. 
Especially in the case of bridge jobs, if the job was new, workers had to learn new skills and may 
have needed to use new technologies anyway.   
0
0.2
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Table 2.1 shows the distribution of transitions from career jobs to bridge jobs across 
industries for workers in the 52-64 age category in 2001-2007. In total there were 14,221 
transitions for men and 3,339 transitions for women. The rows show the number of 
transitions from career jobs in the row industry to bridge jobs in the column industry as a 
percentage of the total number of partial retirement transitions originating from the row 
industry. Inter-industry inflow into bridge jobs, inter-industry outflow from career jobs and 
the number of career jobs in a particular industry are measured as a percentage of, 
respectively, inter-industry inflow into bridge jobs, inter-industry outflow from career jobs 
and the number of career jobs in all industries. We document a large heterogeneity in job 
mobility across industries, especially for women. For men, 25%-65% of job switches from 
career jobs to bridge jobs took place within the same industry. For women, this was 20%-
75%. The large fractions of partial retirement transitions involving job transitions between 
industries indicate that job mobility across industries was high. This is consistent with 
Johnson, Kawachi and Lewis (2009), who find that 27 percent of workers employed full-
time at age 51 to 55 change occupations by age 65 to 69. High job mobility across 
industries may suggest that workers and skills in one industry could have been properly 
applied in other industries. There were large shifts from career job workers employed in 
banking and insurance to bridge jobs in commercial services and the public sector. There 
was a large shift from career job workers employed in manufacturing to bridge jobs in 
commercial services as well. Partial retirement rates for workers employed in the female-
dominated industries education and health care were low compared to their respective 
sector sizes. The relatively low partial retirement rate for workers employed in health care 
may be explained by career job workers entering phased retirement rather than partial 
retirement. Partial retirement rates for workers employed in the male-dominated industries 
banking and insurance and commercial services were high compared to their respective 
sector sizes. 
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2.5  Retirement decision model     
In this section, we estimate a multinomial logit model for labor force status of workers who 
were initially employed in the career job. Multinomial logit models are commonly used 
(Kim and DeVaney, 2005;  Thomson, 2007) to get a better picture of the heterogeneity in 
retirement rates across job and personal characteristics of career job workers. A valuable 
feature of these models is that they allow making a good comparison between the results 
for the different retirement paths. The outcome variable in our multinomial logit model has 
five different outcomes. Workers can stay in their career jobs, enter phased retirement, 
enter partial retirement, leave the career job to re-enter paid employment (or unretire) later 
on or enter full retirement.
18
 
19
 Because the possible outcomes cannot be ranked in a 
natural way, we use a multinomial rather than an ordered choice model. We estimate the 
multinomial logit model for men and women separately. We do so, because, as previously 
mentioned, there exist large differences in retirement patterns between men and women 
(Thomson, 2007; Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn, 2015).  
 
2.5.1 Multinomial logit model 
Continuing working in the career job is the base outcome in our multinomial logit model. 
The independent variables in our model include variables on demographic, income and 
employment characteristics. Kim and DeVaney (2005) and Thomson (2007) use variables 
on the same categories, and education, health and wealth. We do not have comprehensive 
enough data on the latter three categories of variables for our sample. The demographic 
characteristics variables include age minus 52, as well as its square and third power, 
dummies for the frequent retirement ages of 60, 61, and 62 that equal one if an individual 
reached the relevant age in the year of observation and zero otherwise, a dummy that 
equals one if an individual had the Dutch nationality in the year of observation and zero 
otherwise, a dummy that equals one if an individual was married in the year of observation 
and zero otherwise, and worker’s age minus partner’s age. If an individual was not 
                                                          
18
 Staying in the career job also includes leaving the career job and enter another job within one 
month after leaving the career job if the next job pays more, equal or less than ten percent less than 
the career job.  
19
 We do not consider the alternative employment exit route of retirement through disability 
insurance (DI),  because recently tightened benefit eligibility criteria have made DI a less common 
exit route (De Vos, Kapteyn and Kalwij, 2012). 
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married, the dummy for being married equals zero and worker’s age minus worker’s 
partner’s age also equals zero. The variables on income and employment characteristics 
include worker’s one-year lagged wage income, a one-year lagged dummy that equals one 
if the partner retired in the year of observation and zero otherwise, one-year lagged wage 
income of the partner, and a set of industry dummies. If an individual was not married, the 
one-year lagged dummy for the partner being retired and the partner’s one-year lagged 
wage income equal zero. Wage income of the worker and the worker’s partner is measured 
in thousands of deflated euros.
20
 We use the public sector as the base industry. The final 
independent variables we include are year minus 2001, as well as its square and third 
power.  
 
2.5.2 Results       
Table 2.2 shows the average relative marginal effects on labor force status for a 
representative male and female worker who are aged 59, are employed in a career job in 
the public sector and are married to employed spouses. Relative marginal effects are 
marginal effects divided by the mean probability that a worker enters a particular 
retirement path. We refer to the average relative marginal effects as relative marginal 
effects in the remainder of this chapter. Estimating relative marginal effects for 
representative workers with a particular value  for dummies has the advantage that it 
provides a natural interpretation of the relative marginal effects on the dummy variables. 
We estimate the relative marginal effects for a representative worker aged 59, because 59 
is an interesting age in the presence of early retirement arrangements. In the remainder of 
this chapter, we refer to the representative male worker as men or male workers and to the 
representative female worker as women or female workers.  
Most relative marginal effects are significant at the one percent significance level. The 
relative marginal effects on phased and partial retirement are in absolute terms generally 
smallest and those on unretirement and full retirement are the largest. The relative marginal 
effect of age on full retirement indicates that the probability to retire fully jumped when 
workers turned 60. This is explained by the presence of arrangements that allowed early 
retirement as of age 60. There is a clear and significant difference between relative 
marginal effects for men and women, reflecting the differences in labor market behavior 
                                                          
20
 We include one-year lagged variables on wage income because lagged variables are 
predetermined. 
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between the two genders.
21
 The relative marginal effects of age on phased and partial 
retirement are of the size and direction we would expect them to be, given the phased and 
partial retirement rate changes between the ages of 59 and 60 in Figures 2.1 and 2.3.  
Male workers who earned more during the previous year were more likely to continue 
working full-time than to retire fully. This contradicts the finding of Kim and DeVaney 
(2005), who find an effect with the opposite sign. The relative marginal effect estimates of 
the industries show that there was a large variety in retirement behavior across industries. 
The signs of these effects on phased and partial retirement are in line with what we 
expected, given the phased and partial retirement rates in the public sector (base industry) 
compared to those in other industries as shown in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1. Partial 
retirement and unretirement rates were relatively low in female-dominated industries such 
as health care and education. Whereas it is not straightforward to lend a precise 
interpretation to the particular industry differences, the fact that industry mattered for the 
various transitions suggests the presence of career path dependency for gradual retirement 
possibilities and outcomes. 
The relative marginal effect of the age difference between the worker and his or her partner 
on full retirement is negative for both men and women. In other words, the worker’s 
probability to retire fully rather than continue working full-time increased with the 
partner’s age. The mechanism underlying this effect may be the coordination of retirement 
within couples. The older the employed partner was, the more likely the partner was to 
retire. Because the worker and the partner may have preferred to spend time together after 
retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000), the probability that the worker accepted an 
(early) retirement offer increased with age of the partner.
22
 The relative marginal effect of 
full retirement of the partner in the previous year on the probability to retire fully is 
positive for men and women. This may also indicate that couples coordinated their 
                                                          
21
 We test this by estimating our multinomial logit model on observations for men and women, 
adding a dummy for being a female interacted individually with all independent variables (and a 
constant) to the original model. The relative marginal effects of the interactions are jointly 
significant at the one percent significance level (chi-square value=3,441.90, corresponding p-
value=0.000). 
22
 The model only controls for one-year lagged retirement status of the partner, not for retirement 
status of the partner in the current year.  
 25 
 
retirement.
23
 Wage income of the partner in the previous year had a negative effect on the 
probability of entering phased retirement for men and women. It had a negative effect on 
the probability to enter partial retirement and unretirement for men and a positive effect on 
the probability to enter full retirement for women. Wives with a low wage in the previous 
year may have entered phased retirement, partial retirement or have temporarily left paid 
employment. Men may have responded to the retirement transition of their partners by also 
entering phased retirement, partial retirement or unretirement.  
                                                          
23
 Joint retirement and the joint leisure time effect have been extensively discussed in the literature, 
e.g. by Hurd (1990) and Pozzebon and Mitchell (1989). 
   
T
ab
le
 2
.2
: 
R
el
at
iv
e 
m
ar
g
in
al
 e
ff
ec
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 f
o
r 
th
e 
m
u
lt
in
o
m
ia
l 
lo
g
it
 m
o
d
el
 *
 
 
B
as
el
in
e 
d
ef
in
it
io
n
 p
ar
ti
al
 r
et
ir
em
en
t:
 b
ri
d
g
e 
jo
b
 s
ta
rt
s 
w
it
h
in
 o
n
e 
m
o
n
th
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
en
d
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
re
er
 j
o
b
 
P
an
el
 a
: 
m
en
  
 
 
B
as
e 
o
u
tc
o
m
e:
  
S
ta
y
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ca
re
er
 j
o
b
 
P
h
as
ed
 r
et
ir
em
en
t 
P
ar
ti
al
 r
et
ir
em
en
t 
U
n
re
ti
re
m
en
t 
F
u
ll
 r
et
ir
em
en
t 
 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
A
g
e 
4
2
.2
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
5
0
.5
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
9
1
.0
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
9
6
.5
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
D
u
tc
h
 
1
.7
9
 
0
.1
1
7
 
0
.3
1
 
0
.9
3
4
 
-1
.3
2
 
0
.4
4
4
 
4
.6
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
M
ar
ri
ed
 
-4
.3
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
1
0
.6
2
 
0
.0
0
1
 
1
0
.1
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-1
6
.7
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
[t
 -
 1
] 
 
0
.5
8
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.4
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-0
.4
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 
1
6
.0
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.4
2
 
0
.9
7
3
 
-5
4
.6
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-2
3
.2
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
A
ss
et
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
-3
0
.4
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-4
9
.8
8
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-6
7
.7
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-3
1
.3
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
B
an
k
in
g
/I
n
su
ra
n
ce
 
-8
.1
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
5
7
.2
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
3
2
.9
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
1
0
.2
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
C
at
er
in
g
 
2
5
.3
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
2
5
.5
0
 
0
.0
7
6
 
-3
9
.3
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-6
6
.8
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
 
-1
4
.2
8
 
0
.0
0
0
 
1
.8
1
 
0
.7
2
4
 
-5
7
.7
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-5
4
.4
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
1
4
.6
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-1
5
.0
2
 
0
.0
1
0
 
-4
4
.4
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.5
3
 
0
.7
2
0
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
-2
0
.7
8
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-5
1
.5
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-1
0
7
.5
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-6
0
.1
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
H
ea
lt
h
 C
ar
e 
1
6
.7
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-2
2
.5
3
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-6
0
.4
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-5
4
.0
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 
-9
.6
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-7
.5
1
 
0
.0
6
6
 
-1
9
.8
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-1
2
.2
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
R
et
ai
l 
-8
.1
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-2
.2
6
 
0
.6
5
2
 
-5
5
.5
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-4
7
.0
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
/C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 
-5
.2
7
 
0
.0
0
1
 
3
6
.7
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
2
6
.3
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
4
.6
5
 
0
.0
0
1
 
T
em
p
o
ra
ry
 W
o
rk
 
-1
.0
3
 
0
.8
5
0
 
-1
7
.9
0
 
0
.3
6
9
 
-1
4
.9
9
 
0
.0
5
9
 
-1
0
.9
4
 
0
.0
2
6
 
B
as
e 
in
d
u
st
ry
: 
p
u
b
li
c 
se
ct
o
r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
g
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 w
it
h
 p
ar
tn
er
 
0
.3
5
 
0
.0
4
2
 
1
.2
9
 
0
.0
2
8
 
0
.7
7
 
0
.0
0
3
 
-1
.0
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
P
ar
tn
er
 r
et
ir
es
 [
t 
- 
1
] 
1
0
.4
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
7
.2
4
 
0
.2
7
9
 
9
.2
9
 
0
.0
0
1
 
2
5
.7
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
p
ar
tn
er
 [
t 
- 
1
] 
-1
.1
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-2
.5
0
 
0
.0
1
4
 
-3
.6
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-0
.0
5
 
0
.8
7
7
 
M
ea
n
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 t
o
 e
n
te
r 
re
ti
re
m
en
t 
p
h
as
e
 
3
.5
1
 
 
0
.5
0
 
 
2
.3
6
 
 
7
.3
4
 
26 
 
 
   
T
ab
le
 2
.2
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
P
an
el
 b
: 
w
o
m
en
 
B
as
e 
o
u
tc
o
m
e:
  
S
ta
y
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ca
re
er
 j
o
b
 
P
h
as
ed
 r
et
ir
em
en
t 
P
ar
ti
al
 r
et
ir
em
en
t 
U
n
re
ti
re
m
en
t 
F
u
ll
 r
et
ir
em
en
t 
 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
R
el
. 
m
ar
g
. 
ef
f.
 
P
 v
al
u
e 
A
g
e 
8
0
.8
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
2
5
.0
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
8
3
.1
8
 
0
.0
0
0
 
8
4
.6
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
D
u
tc
h
 
4
.5
1
 
0
.0
0
2
 
-0
.5
2
 
0
.7
9
9
 
-0
.3
6
 
0
.8
6
9
 
0
.2
3
 
0
.8
4
9
 
M
ar
ri
ed
 
4
.7
0
 
0
.0
0
1
 
2
.0
2
 
0
.2
5
7
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.9
9
9
 
-1
.0
4
 
0
.3
3
1
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
[t
 -
 1
] 
1
.2
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.4
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.5
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-0
.1
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 
8
.6
8
 
0
.3
7
6
 
1
.2
6
 
0
.9
3
5
 
-5
.7
4
 
0
.6
9
4
 
-1
6
.3
5
 
0
.0
4
8
 
A
ss
et
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
-1
3
.5
6
 
0
.0
1
9
 
1
.8
6
 
0
.8
1
4
 
-3
4
.7
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-1
2
.3
2
 
0
.0
0
2
 
B
an
k
in
g
/I
n
su
ra
n
ce
 
4
.9
3
 
0
.0
9
6
 
3
0
.1
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
4
8
.8
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
1
8
.4
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
C
at
er
in
g
 
1
9
.1
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
3
5
.0
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-9
.5
0
 
0
.2
2
6
 
-1
9
.9
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
 
-8
.6
6
 
0
.0
0
3
 
1
7
.8
3
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-1
6
.5
4
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-2
3
.9
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
1
7
.6
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
1
1
.1
0
 
0
.1
2
5
 
-1
0
.3
6
 
0
.1
9
9
 
-7
.2
3
 
0
.0
8
2
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
-2
1
.9
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
0
.4
6
 
0
.8
7
7
 
-4
5
.9
8
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-3
5
.0
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
H
ea
lt
h
 C
ar
e 
3
1
.5
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
5
.8
7
 
0
.0
1
6
 
-2
3
.0
3
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-3
7
.0
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 
0
.2
5
 
0
.9
1
8
 
6
.1
1
 
0
.0
7
5
 
5
.2
8
 
0
.0
9
0
 
4
.2
0
 
0
.0
1
4
 
R
et
ai
l 
3
.6
9
 
0
.1
3
1
 
1
0
.8
4
 
0
.0
0
1
 
-2
1
.9
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-1
2
.6
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
/ 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 
7
.5
5
 
0
.0
2
0
 
1
9
.6
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
3
3
.8
9
 
0
.0
0
0
 
1
1
.9
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
T
em
p
o
ra
ry
 W
o
rk
 
-1
1
.5
7
 
0
.3
0
6
 
3
0
.9
6
 
0
.0
0
4
 
2
.4
9
 
0
.8
5
8
 
1
7
.3
5
 
0
.0
0
9
 
B
as
e 
in
d
u
st
ry
: 
p
u
b
li
c 
se
ct
o
r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
g
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 w
it
h
 p
ar
tn
er
 
-1
.0
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-0
.2
5
 
0
.4
7
2
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.9
3
5
 
-1
.4
5
 
0
.0
0
0
 
P
ar
tn
er
 r
et
ir
es
 [
t 
- 
1
] 
1
0
.9
6
 
0
.0
0
0
 
1
2
.1
6
 
0
.0
0
2
 
1
0
.8
4
 
0
.0
0
9
 
3
2
.1
0
 
0
.0
0
0
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
p
ar
tn
er
 [
t 
- 
1
] 
-0
.4
8
 
0
.0
1
6
 
0
.2
0
 
0
.2
3
0
 
-0
.3
7
 
0
.2
6
8
 
0
.4
2
 
0
.0
0
0
 
M
ea
n
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 t
o
 e
n
te
r 
re
ti
re
m
en
t 
p
h
as
e 
 
2
.9
1
 
 
0
.7
4
 
 
1
.9
8
 
 
9
.2
1
 
27 
 
 
 28 
 
* N=1,690,471 for men and N=819,197 for women. The average relative marginal effects 
are estimated for individuals aged 59 who are Dutch, employed in the career job as a civil 
servant at the start of the observation period, and have a spouse who is employed. The 
relative marginal effects are computed by dividing the marginal effects by the fraction of 
workers with the characteristics as just mentioned entering a retirement trajectory. The p-
values are based on the standard errors of the marginal effects. The multinomial logit 
model includes all independent variables listed as well as year. Age and year enter the 
model in a nonlinear way.    
 
2.5.3  Sensitivity check 
For comparison, we estimate the multinomial logit model on labor force status with partial 
retirement and unretirement being measured in alternative ways. The length of the non-
(wage)employment spell after departure from the career job as used in the definitions of 
partial retirement and unretirement is lengthened from one month to two years. Hence, 
partial retirement is now defined as a bridge job starting within two years rather than one 
month after departure from the career job. Unretirement is redefined as re-entry in paid 
employment that occurs more than two years rather than one month after departure from 
the career job. The alternative definition of unretirement may be more appropriate than its 
baseline definition, because it may capture less unemployment and other non-retirement 
spells than the alternative definition of unretirement.   
As Figure 2.4 shows, the alternative definitions of partial retirement and unretirement 
imply that a large share of transitions that were previously considered as unretirement are 
now considered as partial retirement. Table 2.3 shows the relative marginal effects 
estimated using the multinomial logit model on labor force status that uses the alternative 
definitions of partial retirement and unretirement. The relative marginal effects on partial 
retirement are much larger than those based on the baseline definitions of partial retirement 
and unretirement (that are displayed in Table 2.2). The relative marginal effects on 
unretirement are much smaller than those in Table 2.2. This indicates that the way partial 
retirement and unretirement are measured can make a large difference in the results.  
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Figure 2.4: Fraction of career job workers retiring partially, by definition of partial  
retirement (as percentage)  
definition partial retirement: bridge job starts within one month (baseline) or two 
years after the end of the career job 
Panel a: men 
 
Panel b: women 
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* N=1,690,471 for men and N=819,197 for women. The average relative marginal effects 
are estimated for individuals aged 59 who are Dutch, employed in the career job as a civil 
servant at the start of the observation period, and have a spouse who is employed. The 
relative marginal effects are computed by dividing the marginal effects by the fraction of 
workers with the characteristics as just mentioned entering a retirement trajectory. The p-
values are based on the standard errors of the marginal effects. The multinomial logit 
model includes all independent variables listed as well as year. Age and year enter the 
model in a nonlinear way.    
 
2.6  Conclusions    
Gradual retirement involves a slow or step-wise transition from working life into 
retirement, allowing workers to smooth leisure and the marginal utility of leisure. Phased 
retirement allows employers to keep workers who are productive, or workers with firm-
specific human capital, that would otherwise have retired fully.  
We analyze gradual retirement in the Netherlands, using administrative data. We find that 
phased retirement is widespread in the Netherlands, but we find that partial retirement has 
a limited prevalence. The latter is inconsistent with evidence on the United States provided 
by Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn (2015) and evidence on OECD countries provided by 
Kantarci and Van Soest (2008), who use biennial data and find that partial retirement is 
widespread. Differences in findings between our study and existing studies can arguably be 
attributed to definitions in partial retirement. We define partial retirement as leaving the 
career job and entering a bridge job within one month. Studies using biennial data may 
define partial retirement as working in the career job in one particular year, and working in 
the bridge job two years later. This definition potentially captures a lot of unretirement, i.e. 
workers who subsequent to leaving their career job were out of the labor force for a while, 
and got re-employed later on. This causes a strong upward bias of partial retirement rates. 
When we use a definition that is similar to the one used in studies using biennial data, we 
find that partial retirement is multiple times more frequent than it was when we measure 
partial retirement more precisely.  
We argue that gradual retirement, and in particular, phased retirement, may have clear 
advantages for both workers and employers over full retirement. Yet, there are factors that 
may have limited the frequency of gradual retirement. During the period studied, early 
retirement arrangements provided incentives to retire fully at relatively young ages, 
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limiting the scope for gradual retirement for workers on these ages. Employers not willing 
to offer part-time work may also have had a negative effect on gradual retirement rates.  
Partial retirement rates were lower than phased retirement rates. We observe that 
transitions from career jobs to bridge jobs in other industries were frequent, suggesting that 
the job mobility across industries was high. The multinomial logit marginal effect 
estimates show that there was substantial heterogeneity in partial retirement across 
industries. Phased retirement rates varied substantially across industries as well.   
Most papers in the literature study gradual retirement in countries other than the 
Netherlands, including the United States. Gradual retirement is more frequent in the United 
States than in the Netherlands. Early retirement arrangements In the Netherlands during the 
period studied limited the scope of gradual retirement. In the Netherlands, most individuals 
have accumulated enough pension rights to be ensured of a stable income after normal 
retirement with net replacement rates of up to 100 percent. In the United States, many 
workers do not have this luxury and have to continue working to prevent large income 
drops. Gradual retirement facilitates this, as workers at older ages may not need, want 
and/or be able to continue working full-time. 
Further research is needed to find out to what extent particular measures promote gradual 
retirement and what the net effect of the introduction of such measures on the economy 
would be. Future research is also needed to bring clarity on whether workers prefer or 
become happier of retiring gradually rather than full-time at once.  
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Chapter 3 
The effect of incentive-induced retirement 
on spousal retirement rates: Evidence from 
a natural experiment24 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Large changes across OECD countries are being observed in terms of labor force 
participation of older workers and retirement patterns. In particular, older workers retire 
later now than they used to in previous decades, although strong inter-country differences 
remain (Schirle, 2008; Blundell, Bozio and Laroque, 2013). These changing patterns have 
partly been ascribed to changes in institutions such as restricted access to early retirement 
(ER). Understanding the way individuals make labor supply and retirement decisions is 
crucial for designing effective policies that are meant to change behavior. Traditional 
microeconomic retirement models that can guide policy makers in policy choice typically 
focus on individual decisions in isolation and study the decision process as a function of 
age, income, health, wealth, and financial or tax incentives (Gustman and Steinmeier, 
1986; Berkovec and Stern, 1991; Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise, 1992; Rust and Phelan, 
1997). As a recent strand of literature has emphasized, however, labor force decisions of 
spouses are interrelated through various channels. Ignoring such effects on labor supply of 
policy-targeted individuals’ spouses may have direct implications for the evaluation of 
such policy measures (Blau and Gilleskie, 2006; Van Der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008). 
                                                          
24
 This chapter is joint work with Hans Bloemen and Stefan Hochguertel. We thank Marianna 
Brunetti, Adriaan Kalwij, Owen O’Donnell, Elena Stancanelli and seminar audiences of the 
“Pensions, retirement, and the financial position of the elderly” theme meeting of Netspar, the 
International Pension Workshop of Netspar, the 3
rd
 IZA@DC Young Scholar Program and the City 
University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Centre for helpful and constructive comments. 
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Using Dutch administrative micro data at the population level and relying on identification 
through a quasi-natural experiment, we find robust evidence for an effect of unanticipated 
induced retirement of the husband on his wife’s retirement status emanating from his 
changed financial incentives to retire early. The policy change that we exploit became 
effective in 2005 for certain birth cohorts of civil servants employed for more than ten 
years by the Dutch central government. These individuals were offered the opportunity to 
retire during the year 2005, by a temporary reduction of the ER eligibility age. For our 
empirical work, we focus on stable dual-earner couples in which the husband did and the 
wife did not work in the public sector, such as to rule out coincidental treatment of wives 
through the same reform. Both husbands and wives in our sample had a strong labor force 
attachment.  
The wife’s probability to retire is the dependent variable in our model. We employ the 
mentioned policy change as an instrument for husband’s retirement status, providing 
variation in husband’s retirement rates across age and time. We control for both observable 
characteristics and unobservables. We use an individual fixed effects specification for the 
latter. Fixed effects also control non-parametrically for cohort effects that may arguably be 
important. In addition, we control for year fixed effects and nonlinear age effects. Since 
couples were stable dyads in our sample, we identify an effect over and above fixed 
differences in ages. According to our central estimates, retirement of male civil servants 
led to a jump in the probability of their wives to retire within one year by 19.7 percentage 
points. This is a strong effect, given that those wives pursued their own careers and had a 
strong labor market attachment. We verify whether our result is robust to changes in data 
selection criteria and changes in functional form specification. We find that our result is 
robust. On the mechanism driving the effect, we find a strong effect for husbands whose 
wives may have been eligible for regular early retirement benefits themselves.  
There are two related literatures that our work speaks to. One focuses on joint retirement 
using structural models. These models assume that husbands and wives make separate 
retirement decisions and have their own preferences. Appropriate modelling of the relevant 
financial incentives and suitable parameterization of individual preferences are some of the 
main challenges in this literature. Papers such as Blau and Gilleskie (2006) and Van Der 
Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) carefully model the incentives provided by social security 
rules, and specify stochastic processes for wages, health and survival. The main effect of 
husbands’ on wives’ retirement choices runs through the household budget constraint in 
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those papers. The household budget constraint is not the only channel inducing 
dependence, however. Spouses enjoy spending time together, i.e. spousal preferences 
directly depend on one another. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), studying retirement 
choices assuming absence of uncertainty, find that spouses coordinate retirement decisions 
and that coordination of retirement decisions is motivated by leisure complementarities 
rather than financial incentives provided by the household budget constraint. Casanova 
Rivas (2010) does take into account uncertainty regarding future income, health and 
survival. In line with Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), she finds evidence for leisure 
complementarities.   
We directly contribute to a second strand of a very recent empirical literature that estimates 
the effect of incentive-induced retirement of one partner on retirement status of the 
spouse.
25
 The identification methods used in this literature do not rely on distributional 
assumptions, but rather on the relevant incentives being exogenous sources of variation in 
the retirement rates. Hospido and Zamarro (2014) and Banks, Blundell and Casanova 
Rivas (2010) are the studies most comparable to ours, based on survey data, however. 
They both find that spousal decisions can be influenced by retirement shifts of their 
partners. They use variation in eligibility ages for early retirement benefits between 
countries as source of variation in the probability to retire. We add to this by exploiting 
variation in retirement rates across age and time. A remaining objection with approaches 
that rely on fixed age rules is that retirement induced by reaching the eligibility age for 
early retirement benefits could be anticipated long in advance. Workers may then have 
reduced the number of hours worked or may have started to live healthier, so that they 
would have been better able to continue working, for instance. Such anticipation effects 
could bias the estimated treatment effect toward zero. Our research design relying on a 
shock to eligibility conditions avoids this in principle.  
Our first contribution is to use strong instruments that provide exogenous (unanticipated) 
variation in retirement rates of husbands, as explained above. Second, we use 
administrative data that include end dates of jobs and that allow us to observe the precise 
within-couple sequencing of retirement. This is critical in order to rule out that our 
estimates are influenced by behavior of wives that actually retired earlier than their 
                                                          
25
 There is a literature that studies the coordination of labor force participation of spouses. 
Lundberg (1988) and Goux, Maurin and Petrongolo (2014) are two of the main papers in that 
literature.  
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husbands. The latter effect cannot necessarily be ruled out in studies that are based on 
biennial survey data, posing a potential threat to identification. Third, as we have access to 
data covering the entire population, we can focus on a sample of particular interest, namely 
individuals from a very narrow age range and where we can (to some degree) control for 
historical labor market attachment. 
The rest of this chapter is set up as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant related 
literature and Section 3.3 describes the institutional environment, including the policy 
change that we exploit. Section 3.4 explains and describes the data. Section 3.5 delineates 
the identification strategy we use for estimating the causal effect of husband’s retirement 
on wife’s retirement status. Section 3.6 discusses the results and Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2  Literature review 
Hospido and Zamarro (2014) employ a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design using the 
eligibility age for early retirement benefits as discontinuity in the probability to retire. They 
use data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) covering 
eleven European countries and find that  induced retirement of husbands increased the 
probability that their wives retired in the same two-year interval between survey waves by 
16-18 percentage points. Banks et al. (2010) employ a difference-in-difference approach, 
exploiting the difference in eligibility ages for early retirement benefits between the UK 
and the US as a source of variation in retirement status. They use data from the 2002 and 
2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the US and from the English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) for the UK. The eligibility age for early retirement 
benefits was 62 in the US and 60 in the UK. Conditioning on couples in which the wife 
turned 60 between two survey waves, American husbands form the control group, and 
British men constitute the treatment group. The authors find that men in the UK were 14-
20 percentage points more likely to retire when their wives reached the early retirement 
age than comparable men in the US. This effect is found for men who were as old as or one 
or two years older than their wives. The authors do not find an effect for men with any age 
difference with their wives. They obtain similar results after employing instrumental 
variable estimation, using the early retirement age as a source of exogenous variation for 
retirement status of the wives.  
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Stancanelli (2012) employs a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design, using age 60, the 
youngest early retirement age in France, as the discontinuity in the probability to retire. 
She uses data from the French Labour Force Surveys (LFS). She finds a negative effect of 
retirement on the partner’s hours worked, both for male and female partners. Zweimueller, 
Winter-Ebmer and Falkinger (1996) estimate a bivariate probit model, where the 
dependent variables are the retirement statuses of the husband and the wife. The retirement 
status of each of the partners depends on the social security variables of both spouses. 
Using data from the Austrian Microzensus, the authors find that husbands responded to a 
change in the minimum retirement age of their wives whereas wives did not respond to a 
change in minimum retirement age of their husbands. Baker (2002) estimates the effect of 
a decrease in the eligibility age for age-related income security benefits for workers who 
were younger than their spouses on labor force participation of spouses in Canada. He uses 
data from the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances. The author finds that eligibility for 
the age-related benefits for wives was associated with a six to seven percentage point 
decrease in labor force participation of husbands. He does not find an association between 
eligibility for the age-related benefits of husbands and labor force participation of wives.  
 
3.3  Institutional background and policy change    
We study the case of the Netherlands. We exploit temporary age-specific retirement 
incentives for civil servants as a source of exogenous variation in retirement rates. At the 
time of the policy change in 2005, the normal (or, statutory) retirement age was 65, for 
both men and women. Actual retirement ages have been substantially lower, due to the use 
of early retirement arrangements being widespread in almost all sectors. The average age at 
which workers aged 55 and older retired in 2005 was 61 for both men and women 
(Statistics Netherlands, 2014).
26
  
The Netherlands has a pension system that rests on three pillars (Bovenberg and Meijdam, 
2001). The first pillar consists of universal flat-rate public old-age pensions, financed on a 
pay-as-you-go basis. The second pillar concerns occupational pensions. These are funded. 
Coverage rates are in the order of magnitude of 90 percent for employees. The third pillar 
                                                          
26
 A detailed description of the Dutch pension system and early retirement arrangements 
specifically available to civil servants can be found in the Appendix Chapter 3 at the end of this 
document.  
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includes private provisions. During the period 2000-2005, most occupational pension funds 
offered early retirement arrangements. These early retirement arrangements typically made 
it possible to retire as of the ages 60, 61 or 62 with replacement rates of up to 70 percent.
27
 
The early retirement arrangements of the public sector pension fund typically made it 
possible to retire as of the ages 61 or 62. We exploit a temporary decrease in the ER 
eligibility age for civil servants as a source of exogenous variation in husbands’ retirement 
probability to estimate the impact of incentive-induced early retirement of husbands on 
their wives’ probability to retire within one year.28   
The Dutch central government announced a temporary decrease in ER eligibility age for its 
workers in April 2004. This decrease is referred to as `the early retirement window’ in the 
remainder of this chapter. As a part of a reorganization of the central government, certain 
civil servants employed at central government organizations were allowed to be offered 
possibilities for early retirement in the year 2005 at lower than common ages.
29
 Central 
government organizations only had permission to offer early retirement if this would save 
existing jobs of younger civil servants at the level of the organization.
30
 In practice, each of 
the central government organizations offered early retirement collectively to its eligible 
workers, so to either all or none of them (Dutch Government, 2004). This aspect prevented 
that the early retirement window was targeted at workers whose wives had a relatively low 
or high probability to retire in the year to come.
31
 Accumulated early retirement pension 
wealth was supplemented in case of the early retirement window, so that the gross 
retirement benefits were actuarially unfair compared to the early retirement benefits 
provided by regular early retirement arrangements. For the older workers entering the early 
retirement window, early retirement benefits had the same or only slightly lower 
replacement rates than workers would obtain if they retired at the regular early retirement 
                                                          
27
 Eligibility criteria for early retirement benefits may include a minimum number of contribution 
years or having contributed to the pension fund continuously during a minimum number of years 
prior to early retirement. 
28
 We consider a 12 month period, not a calendar year. 
29
 It was stated clearly from the beginning that entrance of the early retirement window was 
possible only in 2005, so there was no possible extension of this opportunity to later years.  
30
 Saving existing jobs refers to preventing forced layoff due to reorganization. 
31
 If early retirement would have been offered to workers individually, employers may have offered 
it only to ill-health workers or to workers with a low productivity due to having a poor health. This 
might bias the estimate of the treatment effect of interest upwards. 
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age. Replacement rates for the younger workers entering the early retirement window were 
typically significantly lower than those obtained if they had retired at the regular early 
retirement age. Replacement rates of early retirement benefits provided by the early 
retirement window could have been up to 70 percent of workers’ average gross wages.32 
Civil servants could only enter the early retirement window if they met several eligibility 
criteria (Dutch Government, 2004, 2005). First, civil servants had to be 55 or older on the 
day of early retirement. Second, they were required to have had a continuous employment 
tenure as a civil servant of at least ten years prior to early retirement. Third, they needed to 
have contributed to the public sector pension fund continuously during the ten years prior 
to early retirement. The second and third requirement are important for our identification 
strategy, because they prevented self-selection into the public sector of workers who 
planned to benefit from the extra ER incentive. Central government employers had to 
decide before 1 January 2005 whether to open the early retirement window and entering 
civil servants had to retire on or before 1 December 2005. The early retirement window 
offered early retirement benefits to workers until they reached the age of 65 and with a 
duration of no longer than eight years. This implies that civil servants aged 57 or older at 
the day of early retirement were entitled to retirement benefits for the full period until their 
normal retirement at age 65. Civil servants who were born before 1 January 1948 could let 
the employer pay for 50 percent of the pension accrual for at most four years, paying 
themselves for the other 50 percent. Civil servants who were born 1 January 1948 or later 
paid the whole pension accrual themselves. The differences in self-pay pension 
contributions across birth cohorts and the differences in replacement rates across birth 
cohorts made the early retirement window for civil servants provide strong incentives to 
retire for those aged 58 or older in 2005, slightly weaker incentives for those aged 57
33
 in 
2005 and much weaker incentives for those aged 55 or 56 in 2005. 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Net replacement rates could have been higher than 70 percent of workers’ mid-career salaries. 
Replacement rates depended among others on the birth dates of individuals. The early retirement 
window was not actuarially fair, but rather quite advantageous for workers. 
33
 The early retirement window thus was “an offer they could not refuse” for workers aged 57 and 
older.  
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3.4  Data 
We use administrative data collected and prepared for research purposes by Statistics 
Netherlands. The main data we use cover the period 2000-2005 and include variables on 
job and personal characteristics.
34
 The job characteristics data provide information on all 
jobs any individual registered in the Netherlands has been employed in. The job 
information includes job spells (precise start and end dates per job), the industry code and 
the annual wage. The personal characteristics data contain information on demographic 
characteristics for the whole Dutch population. The demographic characteristics include 
nationality, marital status, birth year and birth month. The personal characteristics data also 
include a partner identifier that allows us to link partners to each other.  
We make a baseline selection of observations and perform many robustness checks on the 
data selection criteria used for this baseline selection in Section 3.6.4.3. In general, we find 
that our result is robust to changing the various data selection criteria. Our baseline 
selection includes observations on opposite-sex couples for which husbands were in the 
age category 52-60 on December 31
st
 of the year of observation.
35
 Wives in the selected 
couples were as old as or up to five years younger than the husband.
36
 We do not select 
couples with larger age differences, because we do not expect wives to retire already in 
their late thirties, early or mid-forties. Couples with wives being older than husbands are 
not selected because especially for the older husbands in our sample, wives who were older 
than their husbands may have retired using regular (early) retirement arrangements, 
irrespective of whether their husbands were induced to retire. We select observations on 
couples who had been married for at least five years on December 31
st
 of the year of 
observation. We do so, because couples who had a stable marriage may have been more 
likely to plan the future together and may therefore have been more likely to coordinate 
                                                          
34
 The original file names are Doodsoorzaken (2000-2005), Landelijke Medische Registratie (LMR, 
1999-2004), SSB Banen (1999-2008), SSB Personen (2000-2005) and PARTNERBUS (2010). 
Unfortunately, for the years we are interested in, there are no data available on e.g. financial 
wealth.   
35
 Being married includes having a registered partnership. Registered partnership refers to 
partnerships enjoying legal status similar to marriage. Being married excludes cohabitation without 
being married or without having a registered partnership.  
36
 0-5 years were the six most frequent husband-wife age differences. Observations for these 
husband-wife age differences cover about 75 percent of the total population of observations 
matching all our data selection criteria except the husband-wife age difference criterion. 
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retirement than couples who had been married for a relatively short time. We exclude 
observations on couples in which at least one of the spouses did not possess the Dutch 
citizenship during the year of observation. The motivation for this exclusion is that workers 
who did not have the Dutch citizenship may have had an increased probability to have 
resided and worked outside the Netherlands for a longer period during their working lives. 
Workers did not accumulate public old-age pension rights when residing abroad and 
typically did not accumulate early retirement pension rights when working abroad. This 
may have negatively affected accumulated public old-age pension rights, and accumulated 
early retirement pension rights for the affected wives in particular, possibly making early 
retirement financially unattractive.  
We exclude observations for which the husband had not been continuously employed as a 
civil servant for the ten years prior to January 1
st
 of the year of observation. We do also 
exclude observations for which the wife had not been continuously employed outside the 
public sector for the ten years prior to January 1
st
 of the year of observation. We make 
these selections for the following reasons. First, because one of the eligibility criteria for 
making use of the early retirement window was that husbands had been continuously 
employed as civil servants for the ten years prior to commencing early retirement. Our 
selection ensures that husbands in the dataset could have been eligible for entering the 
early retirement window for civil servants, and wives could not have been. Second, 
because workers with a continuous employment tenure of at least ten years had a strong 
labor force attachment. Wives and husbands who had a weak labor force attachment may 
not have engaged in career planning and may so not have planned retirement or 
coordinated retirement with their spouses. As an additional measure to ensure that the 
workers we study had a strong labor force attachment, we exclude observations on workers 
who earned less than 15,000 euros in the year prior to the year of observation.  
Observations on couples where at least one spouse died in the year of observation or had 
been hospitalized somewhere between 1999 and the final year of observation are also 
excluded from the sample. By making this selection we aim to limit the potential 
endogeneity of retirement status to health. We use retirement of the first retiring member 
of the couple as an absorbing state. This implies that we do not use observations for years 
after a member of the couple had retired. By doing so, we ensure that all observations on 
retirement in our dataset concern transitions into retirement rather than retirement spells 
that started in previous years. We use about 8,800 observations for our (descriptive) cross-
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sectional analysis and about 7,800 observations for our panel analysis. The difference 
between these two numbers of observations is caused by individuals that appear only once 
in our dataset. Observations on these individuals are not used when estimating panel data 
models, but are used in our cross-sectional analysis.  
Our analysis focuses on the effect of retirement of the husband on retirement status of the 
wife. We do not estimate the reverse relationship because of a lack of observations. There 
were too few wives induced to retire by the introduction of the early retirement 
arrangement we use. This may have to do with the fact that labor market attachment of 
women in the Netherlands was not uniformly strong.
37
   
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for couples where the wife was employed outside the 
public sector, i.e. the wife was employed, but not as a civil servant. Wife’s and husband’s 
age are measured on December 31
st
 of the respective year. Wife’s and husband’s wage 
income (at t-1) indicate the total wage income the wife and her husband earned in the year 
prior to the year of observation. The wage income variables are measured in thousands of 
deflated euros.  
The control group in our instrumental variable model consists of wives whose husbands 
were employed as civil servants in 2005 and were in the age category 52-54 on December 
31
st
, 2005, i.e. wives with husbands who were ineligible to withdraw from the labor force 
through the special early retirement window. The treatment group consists of wives whose 
husbands were employed as civil servants in 2005 and were in the age category 55-60 on 
December, 31
st
, 2005, i.e. women partnered with those civil servants who could have been 
offered early retirement. Table 3.1 shows that husbands and wives in the control group had 
a slightly lower wage income in the year prior to the year of observation than husbands and 
wives in the treatment group. The husband-wife age differences are similar for couples in 
the control and treatment group. Husbands and wives in the control and treatment group on 
one side and similarly selected husbands and wives in 2000-2004 on the other side are 
almost identical in terms of wage income (at t-1) and age. For the external validity of our 
study, it is important to notice that couples where the husband was employed as a civil 
                                                          
37
 Labor force participation of women in the Netherlands was on average 65-75 percent for those in 
the age category 45-49, 55-65 percent for those in the age category 50-54 and 35-45 percent for 
those in the age category 54-59 in the period 2000-2005. This was low by OECD standards 
(OECD, 2016).   
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servant were in general comparable, in terms of observables, to couples where the husband 
was employed outside the public sector.
38
   
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for husband-wife couples in which the wife was  
 employed outside the public sector  
 Husbands were employed as civil servants 
 Control group  Control group  
 Husbands’ ages 52-54 Husbands’ ages 52-54 
 Year 2005 Year 2005 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Wife’s age 50.70 1.70 54.71 2.25 
Husband’s age 52.94 0.81 56.99 1.60 
Wife’s wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
26.68 
 
10.22 
 
27.00 
 
11.31 
 
Husband’s wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
38.15 
 
12.17 
 
40.17 
 
13.38 
 
N 1,114  1,176  
 Husbands were employed as civil servants 
 Husbands’ ages 52-54 Husband’s ages 55-60 
 Years 2000-2004 Years 2000-2004 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Wife’s age 50.63 1.69 54.63 2.16 
Husband’s age 52.92 0.81 56.95 1.64 
Wife’s wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
26.36 
 
11.11 
 
26.72 
 
11.76 
 
Husband’s wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
38.15 
 
11.72 
 
40.12 
 
12.48 
 
N 3,215  3,301  
 Husbands were not employed as civil servants 
 Husbands’ ages 55-60 Husbands’ ages 55-60 
 Years 2000-2005 Years 2000-2005 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Wife’s age 50.52 1.75 54.58 2.24 
Husband’s age 52.94 0.81 56.98 1.62 
Wife’s wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
26.80 
 
11.06 
 
26.94 
 
11.89 
 
Husband’s wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
37.98 
 
17.06 
 
39.86 
 
18.45 
 
N 26,925  29,578  
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 We impose comparable selection criteria on husbands employed outside the public sector as for 
the treatment group. 
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The early retirement window was opened for civil servants employed by certain central 
government organizations. We do not directly observe early retirement window offers at 
the level of individual workers. This implies that we cannot observe whether a civil servant 
who did not retire rejected the early retirement offer or simply was not offered the early 
retirement window. Hence the “treatment” group as defined in our data is larger than the 
“true” treatment group.39 Important to notice is that the early retirement window was 
offered to workers in departments or organizations within the central government 
collectively rather than to individual workers. This makes it unlikely that there was 
individual selection in offering the early retirement window.  
 
3.5  Methodology 
We employ an instrumental variable approach to estimate the impact of incentive-induced 
early retirement of the husband on the wife’s probability to retire within one year. We 
instrument the retirement choice of the husband using dummy variables for the ages at 
which husbands were eligible for entering the early retirement window, interacted with a 
dummy variable for the year 2005, i.e. the year of the policy change.
40
 We estimate our 
model using only observations on wives employed outside the public sector whose 
husbands were employed as civil servants. We use wives whose husbands were in the age 
category 52-54 in 2005 as the control group and wives whose husbands were in the age 
category 55-60 in 2005 as the treatment group.
41
 We assume that, conditional on the 
covariates and treatment status, wives whose husbands were in the age category 52-54 in 
2005 were similar in terms of the probability to retire to those who had husbands in the age 
category 55-60 in 2005. We think this is reasonable, as factors influencing the probability 
to retire across the lifecycle such as age, age of the husband, wage income and health are 
controlled for. The model controls for time-invariant heterogeneity as well. The treatment 
effect we estimate is a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), i.e. the effect of 
                                                          
39
 We do not know how much smaller the “true” treatment group is than the observed treatment 
group.  
40
 Bloemen, Hochguertel and Zweerink (2013) employ a similar identification strategy to estimate 
the effect of retirement on the probability to die within five years.  
41
 We do not use wives with husbands employed in a particular industry other than the public sector 
and in the age category 55-60 as the control group, because there was no industry whose workers 
were similar in terms of observables and faced similar pension incentives as civil servants.   
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husband’s early retirement on the wife’s probability to retire within one year for those 
couples for whom the husband was induced to retire early by variation in the eligibility 
conditions.  
 
3.5.1  Instrument validity 
The validity of our instruments hinges on the satisfaction of two conditions. First, the 
instruments have an impact on the probability that husbands retired. Second, the 
instruments do not correlate with unobserved factors having an impact on the probability 
that wives retired. 
Figure 3.1 shows retirement rates for husbands who were employed as civil servants with 
wives employed outside the public sector. We see some very pronounced patterns. 
Husbands in the age category 55-60 had higher retirement rates in 2005 than in earlier 
years. The difference in retirement rates between 2005 and earlier years was especially 
large for husbands in the age category 57-60. Husbands in the age category 52-54 had 
similar retirement rates in 2005 as in earlier years. This is all in line with the age-specific 
incentives as provided by the temporary decrease in eligibility age in early retirement 
benefits, as discussed in Section 3.3. This supports our hypothesis that our instruments are 
relevant.  
To our knowledge, there were in 2005 no similar early retirement windows in sectors other 
than the public sector. We thus do not expect the opening of the early retirement window 
to have had a direct impact on the probability that the wives in our sample retired. We are 
also not aware of any event other than the opening of the early retirement window that may 
have affected the probability to retire for husbands employed as civil servants and in the 
age category 55-60 in 2005. We expect that our instruments are not correlated with 
unobserved factors that influenced the wives’ probability to retire. Wives’ unobserved 
health, number of hours worked or stress levels associated with work are among the 
unobserved factors that may have influenced wives’ probability to retire. These factors 
may be affected if retirement of the husband could have been anticipated. Correlation due 
to anticipation of the opening of the early retirement window, however, is not expected to 
be an issue. This is because the opening of the early retirement window was only 
announced by the government in April 2004 and central government employers only 
decided after that time whether and to whom they would actually open the early retirement 
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window. Selection into public sector jobs by husbands or wives after the announcement of 
the policy change is not an issue either. The reason for this is that eligibility for entering 
the early retirement window required individuals to have been employed as civil servants 
continuously for the ten years prior to early retirement and to have contributed to the 
public sector pension fund during the ten years prior to early retirement.  
Figure 3.1: Retirement rates for husbands employed as civil servants with wives employed  
         outside the public sector, by husbands’ birth cohort (percentages) * 
 
* Husbands’ age on December 31st, 2005 is indicated behind each birth cohort. This figure is based 
on data for the period 2000-2005. 
Another possible threat to the exogeneity of our instruments is that factors other than the 
opening of the early retirement window may have boosted retirement rates for civil 
servants in 2005. Changes in disability insurance may, for instance, have affected 
retirement rates of civil servants.
42
 Figure 3.2 shows that retirement rates for husbands 
employed outside the public sector and in the age category 55-60 with wives employed 
outside the public sector as well were not higher in 2005 than in other years. This indicates 
that there were no factors affecting retirement rates of husbands in general in 2005. It could 
also be that retirement rates for wives with husbands in the age category 55-60 were higher 
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 Disability insurance (DI) and its relation to early retirement are discussed in the Appendix 
Chapter 3 at the end of this document. DI is a universal social insurance scheme and not sector-
specific. 
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in 2005 than in earlier years, irrespective of the sector the husbands were employed in. The 
introduction of a policy that provided wives with an incentive to retire in 2005 if their 
husbands were born in certain years, for instance, may have caused such a deviation. 
Figure 3.3 shows that retirement rates for wives employed outside the public sector with 
husbands employed outside the public sector and in the age category 55-60 were not higher 
in 2005 than in earlier years.  
Figure 3.2: Retirement rates for husbands employed outside the public sector with wives  
         employed outside the public sector as well, by husbands’ birth cohort (percentages) * 
 
* Husbands’ age on December 31st, 2005 is indicated behind each birth cohort. This figure is based 
on data for the period 2000-2005. 
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Figure 3.3: Retirement rates for wives employed outside the public sector with husbands  
         employed outside the public sector as well, by husbands’ birth cohort (percentages) * 
 
* Husbands’ age on December 31st, 2005 is indicated behind each husbands’ birth cohort. This 
figure is based on data for the period 2000-2005. 
Figure 3.4 shows that retirement rates for wives with husbands aged 60 in 2005 were 
higher than for wives with younger husbands in 2005 and for wives with husbands aged 60 
in previous years. This may suggest that if we find an effect of retirement of the husband 
on retirement status of the wife, this effect may be driven by wives whose husbands were 
aged 60 in 2005.  
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Figure 3.4: Retirement rates for wives employed outside the public sector with husbands  
         employed as civil servants, by husbands’ birth cohort (percentages) * 
 
* Husbands’ age on December 31st, 2005 is indicated behind each husbands’ birth cohort. This 
figure is based on data for the period 2000-2005. 
 
3.5.2 Model specification 
We employ a two-stage-least-squares fixed effects (FE) instrumental variable model to 
estimate the LATE. In the first stage, retirement status of the husband is estimated and in 
the second stage, the impact of predicted retirement of the husband on the wife’s 
probability to retire within one year is estimated. As we use a fixed effects model, our 
model has the advantage that it controls for effects of time-invariant individual 
characteristics and allows individual fixed effects and observed characteristics to be 
correlated with each other. We control for year effects and for differences in wife’s and 
husband’s probability to retire across age. We specify the first stage of our model as 
follows: 
(3.1) 𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑗=2004
𝑗=2000 + ∑ 𝑐𝑘𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘=3
𝑘=2 + ∑ 𝑐𝑘𝑝𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑘=3
𝑘=2  + 
∑ 𝑑05𝑙𝑝𝐷05,𝑡𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑙=60
𝑙=55 + 𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝑚 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
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where 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is a dummy that is 1 if the husband of couple i retired in year t.
43
 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is 0 
otherwise. 𝐷𝑗𝑡 is a year dummy that is 1 in year j and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
difference between the age of the wife in couple i on December 31
st
 of year t and 47, taken 
to the kth power.
44
 Similarly, 𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑝 denotes the difference between the age the husband in 
couple i reached in year t and 52, taken to the kth power.
 45
 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡 is an age dummy that is 1 if 
the husband in couple i reached age l in year t and 0 otherwise. 𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 includes wage 
income of the wife (at t-1) and wage income of the husband (at t-1). 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝑒𝑖 
is an individual fixed effect that is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with all covariates.  
The second stage is specified as follows: 
(3.2) 𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑗=2004
𝑗=2000 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘=3
𝑘=2  + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑝𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑝
𝑘=3
𝑘=2  + 𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝜑 + 𝜔?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a dummy that is 1 if the wife in couple i retired in year t and 0 otherwise. All 
other variables are as specified above for the first stage. 𝜔, the coefficient on the predicted 
retirement indicator of the husband, indicates the LATE. Fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 are allowed to be 
correlated with all covariates. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖 are also allowed to be correlated with one another. 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 are allowed to be correlated with each other as well. We verify whether our 
result is robust to changes in the functional form specification in Section 3.6.4.2 and find 
that our result is robust. 
 
3.6  Results 
3.6.1  The uninstrumented case 
Without accounting for the two-way causality between retirement status of the husband 
and retirement status of the wife, estimates of the effect of husband’s retirement on 
retirement status of the wife may be biased. This may, for instance, be due to correlation of 
                                                          
43
 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is a dummy that is 1 if the husband of couple i retired in year t only if the husband retired 
before the wife. This is because we use retirement of the first retiring member of the couple as an 
absorbing state.  
44
 The youngest wives in the sample were aged 47 on December 31
st
 of the year of observation.  
45
 We do not include 𝐴1𝑖𝑡 and/or 𝐴1𝑖𝑡𝑝 in our models. Including 𝐴1𝑖𝑡 and/or 𝐴1𝑖𝑡𝑝 is not possible 
due to multicollinearity caused by the presence of the year dummies. 
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preferences of the husband and wife. For comparison, we first estimate the functional form 
as specified in (3.2) without correcting for potential endogeneity of husband’s retirement, 
so with husband’s retirement status rather than predicted retirement status as the key 
independent variable. Table 3.2 shows that the coefficient estimate on husband’s actual 
retirement is not significant at the ten percent level. If the coefficient estimate on actual 
retirement without instrumenting husband’s retirement differs from the instrumental 
variable coefficient estimate, this may indicate that husband’s retirement behavior is 
endogenous to wife’s retirement behavior. Bias may be upwards or downwards. 
Downward bias may arise if the husband retires because of ill-health and the wife decides 
to postpone retirement to prevent drops in household income. Upward bias may arise if 
spouses coordinate retirement decisions and the husband retires because he wife retires.  
Table 3.2: Fixed effects uninstrumented estimates for the wife’s probability to retire within  
 one year * 
 Retirement status of the wife 
 
Coefficient Std. err. P-value 
Wife’s wage income [t-1] -0.0003 0.0006 0.563 
Husband’s wage income [t-1] -0.001 0.001 0.096 
Year=2000 -0.156 0.040 0.000 
Year=2001 -0.116 0.032 0.000 
Year=2002 -0.079 0.024 0.001 
Year=2003 -0.062 0.016 0.000 
Year=2004 -0.033 0.009 0.000 
(Wife′s age − 47)2 -0.001 0.001 0.363 
(Wife′s age − 47)3 0.0002 0.0001 0.217 
(Husband′s age − 52)2 -0.006 0.002 0.000 
(Husband′s age − 52)3 0.0004 0.0001 0.000 
Retirement status husband -0.002 0.015 0.920 
Fraction of total variation 
explained by individual fixed 
effects 0.541   
N 7,825   
* Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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3.6.2  Instrumental variable estimates 
Table 3.3 shows the instrumental variable fixed effects estimate. The coefficient estimate 
on retirement of the husband indicates that retirement of husbands induced by the opening 
of the early retirement window actually increased their wives’ probability to retire within 
one year by 19.7 percentage points. This effect is significant at the ten percent level. 
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on retirement of the husband is positive and 
significant, though it was not significant in the uninstrumented case. This may suggest that 
the coefficient on retirement status of the husband is biased downwards if the endogeneity 
of retirement status of the husband to retirement status of the wife is not accounted for. The 
coefficient estimate on instrumented retirement of the husband, which indicates the LATE, 
is similar to the effects found by Hospido and Zamarro (2014) and Banks et al. (2010). 
They, respectively, find a positive effect of 16-18 percentage points and 14-20 percentage 
points of incentive-induced retirement of the husband on wives’ probability to retire within 
the same two-year time interval. The F-statistic in the first stage shows that our 
instruments are jointly relevant at the one percent level.  
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3.6.3   Reduced form estimates  
The coefficient estimates on the instruments in the reduced form model can show us how 
old the husbands are that drive the effect of incentive-induced husband’s retirement on the 
wife’s probability to retire within one year. Table 3.4 shows the reduced form estimates, 
based on the functional form as specified in (3.2) with the instruments included instead of 
predicted husband’s retirement probability. The effects of most instruments are not 
significant at the ten percent level. The coefficient on husband’s age 60 interacted with the 
dummy for the year 2005 is the only instrument being positive and significant, indicating 
that the effect of incentive-induced retirement of the husband on the wife’s probability to 
retire in the next year is driven by wives with husbands aged 60. This is interesting, 
because wives of husbands aged 60 were the only wives who may have reached age 60, the 
eligibility age for regular early retirement benefits for workers employed in a large number 
of sectors.
46
 Incentive-induced retirement of husbands may thus have caused women to 
retire using regular early retirement arrangements. Banks et al. (2010) also find such an 
interaction effect of retirement incentives. 
Table 3.5 shows the coefficient estimates of a simple linear regression model with wife’s 
retirement status as the dependent variable and wife’s age dummies, husband’s age 
dummies and wife’s age dummies interacted with the dummy for the year 2005 as 
independent variables. The coefficients on almost all variables are small in size, except for 
those on two key variables of interest. First, the coefficient estimate on wife’s age 60 is 
large and positive, reflecting that regular early retirement arrangements in many sectors 
offer early retirement at age 60. Second, the coefficient on the interaction of wife’s age 60 
and the dummy for the year 2005 is large and positive as well. This indicates that wives 
aged 60 in 2005 had a much larger probability to retire within one year than wives aged 60 
in earlier years. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of husbands retiring in 
2005 on wife’s probability to retire within one year runs through wives aged 60 in 2005.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 The husband-wife age difference for couples in our sample was 0-5 years. This implies that 
wives of husbands aged 60 were in the age category 55-60. 
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Table 3.4: Reduced form estimates for the wife’s probability to retire within one year * 
 Retirement status of the wife 
 
Coefficient Std. err. P-value 
Wife’s wage income [t-1] -0.0003 0.0006 0.574 
Husband’s wage income [t-1] -0.001 0.001 0.078 
Year=2000 -0.145 0.037 0.000 
Year=2001 -0.104 0.030 0.000 
Year=2002 -0.067 0.022 0.002 
Year=2003 -0.052 0.015 0.000 
Year=2004 -0.024 0.007 0.000 
(Wife′s age − 47)2 0.0002 0.0014 0.990 
(Wife′s age − 47)3 -0.0001 0.0001 0.938 
(Husband′s age − 52)2 -0.006 0.002 0.000 
(Husband′s age − 52)3 0.0004 0.0001 0.000 
Year=2005*Age husband=55 0.005 0.005 0.361 
Year=2005*Age husband=56 0.003 0.006 0.647 
Year=2005*Age husband=57 0.012 0.012 0.345 
Year=2005*Age husband=58 -0.006 0.012 0.622 
Year=2005*Age husband=59 0.023 0.021 0.272 
Year=2005*Age husband=60 0.084 0.041 0.039 
F statistic instruments 1.29   
Fraction of total variation 
explained by individual fixed 
effects 0.531   
N 7,825   
* Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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3.6.4  Robustness checks 
3.6.4.1 Placebo instruments   
We use dummies for the husband’s age (55-60) interacted with the dummy for the year 
2005 as the instruments for husband’s retirement status, exploiting incentive-induced 
variation in husbands’ retirement rates across age and time. As a robustness check, we 
verify whether the variation in retirement rates of husbands in the age category 55-60 in 
2005 is due to the opening of the early retirement window and not by another event that 
occurred in 2005. We estimate an instrumental variable model on a dataset including not 
only observations on husbands employed as civil servants, but observations on husbands 
employed outside the public sector as well. We apply the same data selection criteria as in 
the previous analyses, so wives of both types of husbands are employed outside the public 
sector. The functional form for the instrumental variable model looks similar as the 
baseline functional form in (3.1) and (3.2). Table 3.6 lists the control variables and 
instruments included. The most important deviation from our baseline model is that the 
instruments here are dummies for the husband’s age (55-60) interacted with a dummy for 
the year 2005 interacted with a dummy for the husband not being employed as a civil 
servant. Some control variables are added compared to the baseline functional form as well 
to control for differences in effects between civil servants and workers employed outside 
the public sector. Table 3.6 shows that there is no effect of placebo incentive-induced 
retirement of the husband on retirement status of the wife. The first stage coefficient 
estimates on the instruments show that some of the instruments do significantly affect 
retirement status of the husband, both positively and negatively. The coefficients on the 
relevant instruments are in absolute terms small in size though. This suggests that the 
jumps in retirement rates for husbands employed as civil servants are induced by the 
opening of the early retirement window rather than a shock that shifted the retirement rates 
of all employed husbands upwards. 
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3.6.4.2 Robustness checks on the model specification 
Functional form specification: Age dummies and nonlinear age and year terms 
Our statements concerning the probability to retire are to be understood conditional on 
wife’s and husband’s age. Wife’s age is an important determinant of retirement status of 
the wife, as is husband’s age an important determinant of retirement status of the husband. 
This may make our result sensitive to the specification of the age function used in our 
model. We control for polynomial second and third order wife’s and husband’s age effects 
in our instrumental variable model. As a robustness check, we estimate the instrumental 
variable model once controlling for second order wife’s and husband’s age effects only and 
once controlling for a fourth-degree polynomial in wife’s and husband’s age. Table 3.7 
(variations a-d) shows that the LATE estimates for the alternative models are similar to the 
LATE estimate for the baseline model. This indicates that our instrumental variable result 
is robust to controlling for wife’s and husband’s age effects of one order lower or one order 
higher (variations a and b). Our instrumental variable result is robust to controlling for 
wife’s and husband’s age fixed effects rather than nonlinear age effects (variation c) and 
non-linear year effects rather than year fixed effects (variation d) as well.
47
  
 
Individual effects: random effects and no individual effects 
We also estimate the instrumental variable model with individual random effects (RE). 
Variation in estimates may point to individual effects being correlated with covariates. We 
estimate the RE instrumental variable model using the baseline specification as in (3.1) and 
(3.2). We add husbands’ and wives’ birth year dummies to the existing set of independent 
variables to control for birth year fixed effects for both spouses. Table 3.7, variation e, 
shows that the LATE estimated using the RE model is significant at the one percent level 
and that it is almost identical to the LATE estimated using the FE model. This suggests 
that individual effects and covariates are only weakly correlated with each other. Lastly, 
we estimate the instrumental variable model without individual effects but with the 
husband’s and wife’s birth year dummies to verify how sensitive our result is to not 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The LATE estimated using the model without 
individual effects is similar to the baseline LATE (variation f).  
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 Husband’s/wife’s age fixed effects enter the model through husband’s/wife’s age dummies for all 
ages except the reference age and the non-linear year effects are controlled for in the model by 
including the terms (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 2000)2 and (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 2000)3. 
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3.6.4.3 Robustness checks on data selection  
Selection on wife’s age 
Our dataset includes observations on husbands in the age category 52-60 with wives who 
were as old or up to five years younger. We exclude observations on wives who were more 
than five years younger than their husbands because we do not expect such young wives to 
retire. Wives older than age 60 may retire using early retirement arrangements, irrespective 
of their husbands’ retirement choices. So we may not expect an effect of incentive-induced 
husband’s retirement on the probability to retire for these wives too. Table 3.8, variation a, 
shows that we indeed find no effect if we add observations on wives with any age.  
 
Selection on Dutch citizenship 
Workers without Dutch citizenship and their spouses may have resided and worked a 
shorter part of their working lives in the Netherlands than couples consisting only of 
workers with Dutch citizenship.  Dutch pension rules may have made working and residing 
abroad have a negative effect on accumulated (early retirement) pension rights, which may 
have provided affected wives in particular with a disincentive to retire early. We selected 
observations on workers with Dutch citizenship for our analysis, because wives provided 
with a disincentive to retire early may have been unlikely to be induced to retire by 
retirement of their husbands. Table 3.8, variation b, shows that the LATE estimated for the 
dataset including observations on workers without Dutch citizenship is similar to the 
baseline LATE, however.  
 
Selection on wage income 
We selected observations on workers who had a wage income during the year prior to the 
year of observation of at least 15,000 euros. Not having recourse to information on hours 
worked, we did so to make sure that husbands and wives in our sample had a strong labor 
force attachment. Workers with a weak labor force attachment may not have done career 
planning and may not have planned or coordinated retirement with their spouses. We may 
therefore not expect there to be an effect for this group of workers. Table 3.8 shows that 
the LATE estimate is slightly lower than the baseline LATE estimate if observations on 
workers with a wage income (at t-1) of at least 10,000 euros are included (variation c) and 
similar if observations on workers with a wage income (at t-1) lower than 20,000 euros are 
excluded (variation d). This provides weak evidence for the hypothesis that workers with a 
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stronger labor force attachment were indeed more likely to coordinate retirement with their 
spouses.  
 
Selection on hospitalization 
Ill-health workers may have had a higher probability to retire early than healthy workers. 
Workers with ill-health partners may also have had a higher probability to retire early than 
workers with healthy partners (possibly to provide spousal care). We have tried to limit the 
potential bias due to the endogeneity of retirement status of the husband and wife to both 
spouses’ ill-health. We did so by dropping observations on couples including at least one 
spouse who died in the year of observation or had been hospitalized between 1999 and the 
final year of observation. Table 3.8, variation e, shows that the LATE is insignificant if it is 
estimated on a sample that also includes couples where at least one member was 
hospitalized between 1999 and the final year of observation. The intuition for this finding 
is that adverse health shocks trigger retirement irrespective of any financial incentives 
provided. This drives the LATE towards zero.  
 
Selection on marriage duration 
Couples who had a stable marriage may have been more likely to plan the future together 
and may  therefore have been more likely to coordinate retirement than couples who had 
been married for a relatively short time. We have estimated the LATE for observations on 
husbands and wives who had been married for at least five years on December 31
st
 of the 
year of observation. Table 3.8, variation f, shows that the LATE is smaller than but similar 
to the baseline estimate if it is estimated for observations on couples who had been married 
for at least one year on December 31
st
 of the year of observation. This suggests that 
couples with shorter or less stable marriages were hardly less likely to coordinate 
retirement. Consistent with this finding, the LATE estimated for observations on couples 
who had been married for at least ten years on December 31
st
 of the year of observation 
(variation g) is slightly larger than but similar to the baseline LATE.  
 
Selection on husband’s occupation 
We selected observations on wives with husbands who were employed as civil servants. 
Workers employed as civil servants may have had different retirement patterns than 
workers employed outside the public sector. This may have affected our result. As a 
robustness check, we estimate the LATE using data on wives with husbands who were 
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either employed as civil servants or employed outside the public sector. The husbands 
employed outside the public sector are selected in a similar way as the husbands employed 
as civil servants. The model we estimate is the model specified in (1) and (2), except that 
the instruments, i.e. the interactions between the dummy for the year 2005 and the 
dummies for the husband’s age (55-60), are multiplied by a dummy for the husband being 
employed as a civil servant. Table 3.8, variation h, shows that our result is robust to 
correcting for civil servant-specific retirement patterns.  
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*The model estimated here controls for wage income [t-1] of the husband and wife, year fixed 
effects, nonlinear husband’s and wife’s age effects and individual fixed effects. The LATEs refer to 
the coefficient estimates for retirement status of the husband (?̂?). Standard errors are clustered at 
the individual level.  
For variation h), we control for differences in age and year effects between husbands employed as 
civil servants and those employed outside the public sector. The instruments are dummies for the 
ages 55-60 interacted with a dummy for the year 2005 interacted with a dummy for the husband 
being employed as a civil servant. 
 
3.7  Conclusions 
We investigate interactions between individuals’ retirements by using a quasi-natural 
experiment where policy variation induces the husband to retire early. We then estimate 
the chance that the wife responds to the incentive-induced retirement transition of the 
husband. In order for our exercise to be meaningful, we focus on couples where only the 
male, but not the female, was subject to specific early retirement incentives, where both 
spouses can be characterized as having a strong labor market attachment, and where the 
couple forms a stable dyad, so as to make it plausible that joint planning of retirement is 
likely. 
We benefit from having administrative data from the Netherlands and having a strong and 
exogenous source of variation in retirement status of the husband at our disposal. We find 
that incentive-induced retirement of husbands increases the probability that the wife retires 
within one year by 19.7 percentage points. It indicates that the temporary decrease of the 
eligibility age for early retirement benefits for male civil servants has a strong (indirect) 
effect on retirement status of their spouse. Our result is robust to changes in functional 
form specification and in general robust to changes in data selection criteria as well. On the 
mechanism driving the effect, we find a strong effect for husbands aged 60 with wives 
aged 60. As age 60 was the eligibility age for regular early retirement benefits in many 
sectors, our result suggests that retirement of husbands induced by the opening of the early 
retirement window may have caused wives to retire using regular early retirement benefits. 
Such interaction effects of the early retirement window under review and regular early 
retirement arrangements in other sectors would be consistent with the evidence for 
interaction effects for early retirement arrangements for spouses provided by Banks et al. 
(2010).  
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The findings suggest that policy makers ought to take into account that changes in pension 
and retirement system parameters may not only affect the individuals that reforms aim at, 
but also their associated spouses. To the extent that the underlying mechanisms 
symmetrically apply to increases in retirement age, a double dividend of increasing 
retirement ages is conceivable. This is relevant, also when considering the spillovers of the 
introduction or abolition of age-specific retirement incentives to retirement status of 
spouses in contexts and countries other than the ones currently studied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
The causal effect of retirement on mortality: 
Evidence from targeted incentives to 
retire early
48
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Understanding the nexus between life cycle labor supply, retirement, and morbidity and 
mortality is of core interest to policy makers, given observed imbalances in current pension 
systems in the aging societies of OECD countries. In pension systems that are of the 
defined benefit type, or that rely on pay-as-you-go social security, ceteris paribus, an 
increase (decrease) in effective retirement age triggers either higher (lower) aggregate 
pension contributions or lower (higher) aggregate payouts, if the system is to be held 
sustainable. The ceteris paribus clause in this statement is important, however, as the 
discussion held in the academic literature on morbidity and mortality effects of the 
retirement decision forcefully demonstrates. If longer working lives or later retirement lead 
to adverse effects on health and even increase the likelihood of dying within a certain 
horizon, the positive effect of increasing the normal retirement age on the sustainability of 
                                                          
48 This chapter is joint work with Hans Bloemen and Stefan Hochguertel. We thank Maarten 
Lindeboom, David Neumark, Owen O’Donnell, Jennifer Roberts, Elena Stancanelli, Ola Vestad 
and seminar audiences at VU University Amsterdam, the IZA Workshop on Labor Markets and 
Labor Market Policies for Older Workers, the International Pension Workshop of Netspar, the 
European Economic Association (EEA) meeting, the Workshop of Health Economics and 
Econometrics and the European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) meeting for helpful 
and constructive comments. 
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pensions is amplified.
49
  We find evidence from the Netherlands that is consistent with 
such an adverse health or positive mortality effect, albeit from a policy measure that 
reduced the effective retirement age.  
The policy change that we rely on became effective in 2005 for certain birth cohorts of 
civil servants employed by the Dutch central government for more than ten years. These 
individuals were offered the opportunity to retire during the year 2005, by a temporary 
reduction of the early retirement (ER) eligibility age. Because of the generosity and the 
large number of individuals that were offered this early retirement opportunity, the policy 
change was a strong shifter of the probability to retire. Using administrative data, we find 
that retirement led to a drop in the probability of men dying within five years after 
retirement by 42.9 percent, or by 2.6 percentage points. This is equivalent to an increase in 
life expectancy by two months. When we shift the horizon, we find the largest impact of 
retirement on survival within the first year. Further analysis by primary cause of death 
suggests that one plausible mechanism may work through the removal of stress-related 
factors associated with demanding work as we find significant effects on dying from 
diseases of the arteries, arterioles and capillaries (mainly aneurysm diseases). 
Identifying the causal impact of retirement on morbidity or mortality is challenging, in 
particular as the only research design that allows doing so has to rely on observational data 
on health and life outcomes. The latter, in turn, calls for an approach that helps controlling 
the selection into retirement since bad health typically triggers retirement and subsequently 
mortality. Our approach uses the described policy variation as an instrument for retirement 
status in explaining the probability of dying from both observable characteristics and 
unobservables. We use an individual fixed effects specification for the latter. We control 
for year fixed effects and nonlinear age effects. The probability to die within five years is 
the dependent variable in our model. We choose the time horizon of five years since we are 
interested in the effect of early retirement on mortality in the relatively short run. We do 
not want to estimate the effect of early retirement on mortality in too short a run, because 
retirement may affect the probability to have diseases that may lead to death within several 
years. The choice of evaluation horizon several years ahead for the probability to die is 
limited by the time length of our panel data.  
                                                          
49
 Though a positive effect of later retirement on mortality would be good for the viability of 
pension systems, it would not be so good for population health.   
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There is a range of related papers that investigate the effect of retirement on morbidity or 
health. These papers provide very inconclusive findings, however. Charles (2004), Coe and 
Lindeboom (2008), Neuman (2008), Coe and Zamarro (2011), Insler (2014), Elbich (2015) 
and Kämpfen and Maurer (2016) all find that retirement has a positive impact on health. 
Dave et al. (2008), Kuhn et al. (2010) and Behncke (2012), conversely, find a negative 
impact of retirement on health. What is not entirely understood in this literature is the way 
in which retirement changes morbidity and mortality outcomes. In particular, direct 
evidence on the mechanisms at work is scarce. Most papers listed use age or year specific 
retirement rules and/or institutions that induce retirement. Examples of these rules and 
institutions are the eligibility age for public pension benefits and decreases in generosity of 
retirement benefits that are announced years ahead. Retirement could in these cases be 
anticipated long in advance.
50
 Workers may, for instance, start to live healthier in case they 
get to know that they still have to work quite a few years until retirement. They may do so 
to make themselves physically better able to continue working until retirement. 
Anticipation may have biased the treatment effect towards zero. Our research design 
relying on a shock to eligibility conditions avoids this in principle.  
Our contribution to this literature is fourfold. First, our policy variation delivers a natural 
experiment that we exploit to construct a strong instrument providing unanticipated 
variation in the probability to retire. Second, the literature has been inconclusive on the 
direction of the effect of retirement on health and mortality. We add to the literature by 
providing evidence for a negative effect of retirement on mortality. Third, we use 
administrative data covering the entire population, and thus follow a large number of 
individuals over a number of years. As the mortality register essentially provides complete 
and measurement error-free information, we do not need to worry about selective attrition 
as an alternative reason for not being recorded in the data anymore. Fourth, the 
comprehensive database puts us in a position to split the analysis by cause of death at a 
very detailed level and we can thus obtain additional insights into the channels through 
which the positive effect of retirement on survival (health) comes about.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related literature. 
Section 4.3 describes the institutional setting, including the policy shift decreasing the ER 
eligibility age. Section 4.4 discusses the data and provides insightful descriptives. Section 
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 Induced retirement may not have been anticipated long in advance in the cases of Coe and 
Lindeboom (2008), Insler (2014) and Kuhn et al. (2010).  
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4.5 delineates the research design we use to identify the causal effect of retirement on 
mortality outcomes, and Section 4.6 presents the empirical results. Section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2  Literature review 
The theoretical impact of retirement on mortality is not clear-cut. Early retirement can have 
an impact on health through several mechanisms. Grossman (1972) provides the standard 
framework for analyzing the causal relation between retirement and health. He models 
health as a dual investment and consumption good. A healthy individual with fewer sick 
days is more productive and more able to work than a less healthy individual. As health 
raises an individual’s productivity and ability to work, the agent has an incentive to invest 
in his or her health. Health is also a consumption good and directly features as an argument 
in the utility function. When the individual retires, costs and benefits from health change. 
On the benefits side, the incentive to invest in health to raise productivity and ability to 
work disappears after retirement.
51
 The utility that is derived from health in a direct way 
may change after retirement. On the costs side, incentives to invest in health may be 
different after retirement than before retirement. As an individual has more leisure time 
after retirement, the time cost of investing in health is lower. As a result, an individual 
may, for instance, physically exercise more frequently or go to the doctor sooner and be 
diagnosed and receive medical treatment when he or she has some physical or mental 
complaints.
52
 The sign of the net effect of retirement on health in the Grossman model is 
unclear and depends on how retirement changes the personal valuation of the costs of 
investment in health and the benefits from health (Dave et al., 2008).  
In empirical research, of course, health may act as a confounding variable. For instance, 
early studies by Bazolli (1985) and Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) find that relatively healthy 
individuals retire later than relatively unhealthy individuals. The literature on the impact of 
retirement on health addresses the endogeneity of retirement status to health and mortality 
                                                          
51
 Grossman does not consider productivity in household production. Individuals may value being 
productive in household production before and after retirement, giving an incentive to invest in 
health before and after retirement.  
52
 Midanik et al. (1995) find that workers physically practice more once they retire. Boaz and 
Muller (1989) and Shapiro and Roos (1982) do not find evidence for workers receiving more 
ambulatory services from physicians once they retire. 
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outcomes using a range of different identification strategies.
53
 The focus in the literature 
has shifted in recent years to studies that employ policy variation in order to measure the 
effect of interest in a natural experiment setting. Charles (2004), Neuman (2008), Coe and 
Lindeboom (2008) and Kuhn et al. (2010) instrument retirement status by retirement 
incentives that are age and/or year specific. Coe and Zamarro (2011), Behncke (2012), 
Elbich (2015), Godard (2016) and Kämpfen and Maurer (2016) address the endogeneity of 
retirement status by using institutions as an exogenous shifter of the probability to retire. 
Many of these studies rely on subjective survey information from the U.S. Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) or similar survey datasets.  
Coe and Lindeboom (2008) is an interesting paper in the context of our study, because it 
uses early retirement windows as shifters in retirement rates. Early retirement windows are 
incentives that promote retirement at a specific time. Employers determine to whom these 
incentives are offered. With HRS data for men, Coe and Lindeboom (2008) find that 
retirement improves self-reported physical and mental health temporarily. They also find 
that retirement improves health of highly educated workers. The authors find no effect of 
retirement on mortality. As early retirement windows may have been offered to workers 
with certain health characteristics, the results may be biased. The policy change we exploit 
does not suffer from such endogeneity, because employers offered early retirement to all 
eligible workers in a department or organization.   
Behncke (2012) and Insler (2014) use expectations on retirement age to avoid bias due to 
anticipation of retirement. Behncke (2012) uses the eligibility age for public old-age 
pension benefits as the shifter of retirement status. She controls for anticipation of 
retirement by adding survey expectations about future work and health as control variables 
to her models. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), she 
finds that retirement increases the probability of being diagnosed with a chronic condition 
such as a heart disease or cancer for men and women. She also finds a positive effect of 
retirement on being overweight and blood pressure. Insler (2014) uses self-reported 
                                                          
53
 The literature on the effect of retirement on health is closely related to the literature on the 
effect of job displacement on health. In that literature, job displacement is considered to be a 
stressful event, and the effect of job displacement on health or mortality is considered to run 
partly through stress (Bloemen, Hochguertel and Zweerink, 2015). Sullivan and von Wachter 
(2009), Eliason and Storrie (2009), Browning and Heinesen (2012) and Bloemen, 
Hochguertel and Zweerink (2015) find that job displacement has a strong and positive effect 
on mortality.    
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probabilities of working past ages 62 and 65, parents’ age and initial health status as 
exogenous shifters of the probabilities of working past ages 62 and 65. The first two 
instruments account for retirement due to anticipated health declines, the latter two 
instruments account for retirement due to unanticipated health declines. Using HRS data, 
he finds that retirement has a positive effect on self-reported health changes for men and 
women. He finds evidence for an effect through smoking and exercising. One possible 
concern with this paper is that parents’ age and initial health status do not account 
sufficiently for retirement due to unanticipated health declines. This would bias the result. 
Behncke (2012) and Insler (2014) are also among the papers in the recent literature that 
investigate whether the effect of job loss on health runs through lifestyle. Other studies that 
do so are Elbich (2015), Godard (2016) and Kämpfen and Maurer (2016). Elbich (2015) 
finds that retirement improves subjective health status and mental health, while also 
reducing outpatient care utilization. Relief from work-related stress and strain, increased 
sleep duration as well as more frequent physical exercise seem to be key mechanisms 
through which retirement affects health. Godard (2016) finds that retirement induced by 
reaching a country’s earliest retirement age, i.e. the youngest age individuals are eligible 
for (partial) pension benefits, causes a 12-percentage point increase in the probability of 
being obese among men within a two- to four-year period. Kämpfen and Maurer (2016) 
find a positive effect of retirement on meeting the federal government's 2008 Physical 
Activity Guidelines for Americans. 
 
4.3  Institutional background and policy change 
We shall focus on targeted incentives to retire early that became available to a group of 
civil servants in the Netherlands. The Dutch retirement system foresees in retirement at the 
standard age (for both men and women) of 65. Actual average ages of entering retirement 
have been considerably lower, however, due to the widespread use of early retirement 
arrangements in virtually all sectors of the economy.
54
 
The Dutch pension system rests on three pillars (Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001). The first 
pillar is the public old-age pension, which is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. The 
second pillar consists of occupational pensions, which are funded. The third pillar consists 
                                                          
54
 A concise description of the Dutch pension system and existing early retirement arrangements 
for civil servants can be found in the Appendix Chapter 4 at the end of this document.  
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of private provisions. We study the period around 2005. At that time, most occupational 
pension funds offered early retirement arrangements. The public sector pension fund 
offered arrangements for early retirement as of the ages 61 or 62 onwards. We use a 
temporary decrease in the ER eligibility age for civil servants as a source of exogenous 
variation to estimate the impact of early retirement on the probability to die within five 
years.   
In April 2004, a temporary decrease in ER eligibility age for civil servants was announced. 
We refer to the temporary decrease in the ER eligibility age for civil servants as ‘the early 
retirement window’ in the sequel. Due to a reorganization of the central government, 
employers being part of the central government were allowed to offer certain civil servants 
additional possibilities for early retirement in the year 2005. Employers were only allowed 
to offer early retirement if this would prevent the forced layoff of younger civil servants.
55
 
In practice, this was implemented by offering early retirement collectively to workers, so 
to either all or none of the eligible civil servants within a department (Dutch Government, 
2004). This aspect is vital for the validity of our identification strategy, because if early 
retirement would have been offered in particular to workers with a relatively low or high 
probability to die within five years, the opening of the early retirement window would be 
endogenous to mortality.
56
 The early retirement window offered gross retirement benefits 
that could be up to 70 percent of workers’ average pay (mid-career salary), which 
corresponds to the benefit level in other ER programs.
57
    
Civil servants faced several eligibility criteria for entering the early retirement window 
(Dutch Government, 2004, 2005). First, they had to be at least 55 years old at the moment 
of early retirement. Second, they had to have been employed as civil servants continuously 
during the ten years prior to early retirement. Importantly, this requirement prevents self-
selection into the public sector of workers who would like to retire early. Civil servants 
were required to have contributed to the public sector pension fund continuously during the 
                                                          
55
 Forced layoff refers to forced layoff due to reorganization. 
56
 If early retirement would have been offered to workers individually, employers may have 
targeted ill-health workers or workers with a low productivity due to having a poor health. This 
might bias the estimate of the treatment effect of interest upwards. 
57
 The replacement rate depended among others on the birth date of an individual. 
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ten years prior to early retirement.
58
 Employers had to decide whether to open the early 
retirement window before 1 January 2005 and entering civil servants were not allowed to 
retire later than 1 December 2005. Participating civil servants were entitled to early 
retirement benefits until age 65 with a maximum duration of eight years. Civil servants 
aged 57 or older at the moment of early retirement were thus entitled to retirement benefits 
for the whole period until normal retirement at age 65. Civil servants born before 1 January 
1948 could continue accruing pension claims at a rate of 50 percent at the expense of the 
employer for a maximum of four years. Civil servants born on or later than 1 January 1948, 
i.e. civil servants who were in the age category 55-57 in 2005, did not have this 
opportunity. The early retirement window was thus very attractive for civil servants aged 
58 and older,
59
 somewhat less attractive for civil servants aged 57 but substantially less 
attractive for civil servants aged 55 or 56. 
 
4.4  Data 
We use Dutch administrative data at the population level for the period 2000-2010. The 
data are administered by Statistics Netherlands. We have access to data on mortality, 
hospital stays, and job and personal characteristics originating from various administrative 
sources that can be linked with a personal identifier.
60
 The mortality file provides 
information such as month, year and primary (and secondary) cause(s) of death. The 
hospital stay file provides for every hospital stay information such as the start and end date 
of the stay, the reason for the stay and where the patient went after being released from the 
hospital. The job characteristics file provides information on all jobs any individual has 
                                                          
58
 Interruption of employment and pension contribution of at most two months was allowed, 
although interruption of employment and pension contribution in the half year prior to early 
retirement would have led to loss of eligibility. 
59
 The offer of early retirement through the particular ER window was “an offer they could not 
refuse” for this group of individuals (in particular, 58 and older).  
60
 The original file names are Doodsoorzaken (1999-2010), Landelijke Medische Registratie (LMR, 
1999-2004), SSB Banen (1999-2008), SSB Personen (1999-2005) and PARTNERBUS (2010). 
Statistics Netherlands only provides data that are administered by governmental institutions. These 
data provide only limited information. Moreover, the data that are administered are not always 
administered for the years we are interested in. Data on financial wealth, for instance, are not 
available for the years of study. Hospital stays data are incomplete after 2005, so that it is not 
possible to estimate the effect of early retirement on alternative health measures created from 
hospital data.  
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been employed in during 2000-2005. For every job, both start and end date, the industry 
code and the annual wage are available. The personal characteristics file contains 
information on demographic characteristics such as nationality, marital status, birth year 
and birth month. The personal characteristics file also includes a partner identifier that 
allows us to link partners to each other.   
For our analysis we select observations on male civil servants in the age category 53-60 
during 2000-2005.
61
 We exclude observations on civil servants without a Dutch citizenship 
during 2000-2005. We also exclude observations for which the relevant civil servant had 
not been continuously employed as a civil servant for the ten years prior to January 1
st
 of 
the year of observation. We make this selection, as one of the eligibility criteria for 
entering the early retirement window for civil servants was that civil servants had to have 
been continuously employed as civil servants for the ten years prior to early retirement. 
Observations on workers who stayed in the hospital somewhere between 1999 and 
retirement are also excluded from our analysis.
62
 If observations on hospitalized 
individuals would not be dropped, this could bias our treatment effect estimate downwards. 
This is because hospitalized individuals may be more likely to be induced to retire early 
due to having a bad health and may so have a higher probability to die within five years. 
We also drop observations for retirees for the years after the year they have transitioned 
into retirement.
63
 We use about 141,000 observations for our (descriptive) cross-sectional 
analysis and about 133,000 for our panel analysis. The difference between these numbers 
of observations is caused by individuals that appear only once in our dataset. Observations 
on these individuals are used in our cross-sectional analysis, but are not used when 
estimating panel data models. 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for male civil servants and male workers employed 
outside the public sector. Age is measured on December 31
st
 of the respective year. The 
                                                          
61
 We do not estimate the effect of retirement on the probability to die within five years for women, 
because the policy change induced too few women to become eligible for retirement benefits and 
so to retire early. This is due to the eligibility criterion of having been employed continuously as a 
civil servant for the ten years prior to early retirement. Not many women met this criterion.  
62
 If a worker was hospitalized but did not retire in 2000-2005, all observations on this worker are 
dropped. In Section 4.6.5.3, we show that our results are insensitive to including observations on 
hospitalized workers. 
63
 We assume that individuals do not work after retirement, though we can only observe 
employment state until January 1
st
, 2009. This is discussed in more detail later in this section.  
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variable married takes value 1 if a worker was married in the year of observation, 0 
otherwise.
64
 Lagged wage income indicates the total wage income a worker earned in the 
year prior to the year of observation. Lagged wage income is measured in thousands of 
deflated Euros. We only have a limited number of variables at our disposal that we can use 
as controls. Because of this, the individual fixed effects that we control for in our 
instrumental variable model are expected to be important in explaining retirement status 
and the probability to die within five years. One might think in the first place of effects due 
to year of birth, education, or chronic health conditions. In addition, the fixed effects also 
correct for time-invariant heterogeneity that remains unobserved in administrative data, 
such as preference parameters determining choices.  
Table 4.1 shows that workers in the control group were similar in marital status and lagged 
wage income to workers in the treatment group. The control group consists of male civil 
servants aged 53-54 in 2005, i.e. those civil servants who could not be offered early 
retirement. The treatment group includes male civil servants aged 55-60 in 2005, i.e. those 
civil servants who could be offered early retirement. For the external validity of our study, 
it is important to notice that male civil servants in the treatment group were in general 
comparable, in terms of observables, to male workers employed in other sectors.
65
 We do 
not observe to which civil servants early retirement was offered. This is no threat to the 
validity of our approach, because there was no selection in offering early retirement to 
workers. This was the case as early retirement was offered to workers collectively rather 
than individually (see Section 4.3). We define retirement as being observed to have exited 
a job and not having started working again before January 1
st
, 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64
 Being married includes not only being married, but also having a registered partnership. 
Registered partnership refers to partnerships enjoying legal status similar to marriage. Being 
married excludes cohabitation without being married or without having a registered partnership. 
65
 The group of workers employed outside the public sector is selected in a similar way as the 
group of civil servants. I.e. workers were included only if they had been employed continuously 
outside the public sector for the ten years preceding January 1
st
 of the year of observation, were not 
hospitalized between 1999 and  retirement, etcetera. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
 All workers 
 Civil servants, 2000-2005 Other workers, 2000-2005 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age 55.92 2.20 56.03 2.18 
Married 0.85 0.36 0.84 0.37 
Wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
37.59 
 
13.35 
 
37.50 
 
22.40 
 
N 141,205  1,042,814  
  
 Civil servants 
 Control group, 2005 Treatment group, 2005 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Age 53.47 0.50 57.18 1.63 
Married 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.37 
Wage income [t-1] 
(in 1000s of Euros) 
37.40 
 
12.77 
 
38.18 
 
14.10 
 
N 9,062  19,813  
Figure 4.1 shows for male civil servants that the probability to die within five years 
increased across age for several birth cohorts. There were birth cohorts that followed 
different patterns as well. Male civil servants who were born relatively long ago had in 
general a higher probability to die within five years than male civil servants with the same 
age who were born relatively recently. The observed profiles are not smooth and do not 
show consistent patterns for all birth cohorts. 
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Figure 4.1: Probability to die within five years, civil servants, by birth cohort (percentages)  
 * 
 
* Age on December 31
st
, 2005 is indicated behind each birth cohort. This figure is based on data 
for 2000-2005.  
 
4.5  Methodology 
We employ an instrumental variable approach to estimate the impact of early retirement on 
the probability to die within five years. We instrument the retirement choice using dummy 
variables for the ages for which civil servants were eligible for entering the early 
retirement window interacted with a dummy variable for the year 2005, i.e. the year of the 
policy change.
66
 We estimate our model for male civil servants only.
67
 We use civil 
servants aged 53 or 54 in 2005 as the control group and civil servants in the age category 
55-60 in 2005 as the treatment group.
 68
 The model controls for individual fixed effects.
69
 
                                                          
66
 Age in 2005 determined eligibility for the ER arrangement, see Section 4.3.  
67
 In Section 4.6.5.3, we estimate an alternative model for a dataset also including observations on 
male workers employed outside the public sector. 
68
 As we estimate a fixed effects model, observations on individuals that we observe for only one 
year are not used. This implies that our control group consists effectively only of civil servants 
aged 54 in 2005 (civil servants aged 53 in 2005 are observed for only one year). 
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The treatment effect we estimate has an interpretation of a Local Average Treatment Effect 
(LATE), i.e. the effect of early retirement on the probability to die within five years for 
those who were induced to retire early by variation in the eligibility conditions.  
 
4.5.1  Instrument validity 
The instruments we use are valid if two conditions are satisfied. First, the instruments have 
an impact on retirement status. Second, the instruments do not correlate with unobserved 
factors having an impact on the probability to die within five years. The instruments we 
use are dummies for eligibility for retirement benefits due to the temporary decrease in the 
ER eligibility age for civil servants in 2005.  
Figure 4.2 shows that retirement rates for male civil servants in the age category 58-60 
were substantially higher in 2005 than in other years. Retirement rates for male civil 
servants aged 56 or 57 were higher in 2005 than in other years as well. Retirement rates for 
male civil servants aged 53 or 54 were similar in 2005 to those in other years. This is in 
line with the age-specific incentives provided by the opening of the early retirement 
window, as discussed in Section 4.3, and thus strongly suggests that it induced civil 
servants to retire early.
70
   
We do not have reasons to expect that the opening of the early retirement window had a 
direct impact on the probability to die within five years. To our knowledge, there were no 
events other than the reform we study, that in 2005 or in the five years to follow may have 
shocked the probability to die within five years for civil servants aged 55-60 in 2005. We 
also do not have reasons to expect that our instruments are correlated with unobserved 
factors that influenced the probability to die within five years. Unobserved factors that are 
expected to have influenced the probability to die within five years may include the 
unobserved level of health, health-related behavior,
71
 the number of hours worked and 
associated stress levels. If retirement induced by the opening of the early retirement 
                                                                                                                                                                                
69
 Our instrumental variable model with individual fixed effects has a linear probability 
specification.  
70
 There were several other pension related policy changes around the period under review. These 
policy changes and their possible effects on retirement rates are discussed in the Appendix Chapter 
4 at the end of this document.  
71
 Including getting diagnosed and treated. 
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window was anticipated, the number of hours worked and health-related behavior may be 
correlated with the early retirement window opening. However, the possibility to open the 
early retirement window was only announced in April 2004 and employers decided only 
later in 2004 whether they would open the early retirement window for civil servants. As 
civil servants were only informed late during 2004 whether they would receive an early 
retirement window offer, we do not expect anticipation of early retirement to be an issue.  
Figure 4.2: Retirement rates for civil servants, by birth cohort (percentages)* 
 
* Age on December 31
st
, 2005 is indicated behind each birth cohort. This figure is based on data 
for 2000-2005. 
Selection into public sector jobs after the announcement of the early retirement window 
opening is also not an issue. This is because one of the eligibility criteria for entering the 
early retirement window was that civil servants had to have been employed as civil 
servants continuously during the ten years prior to early retirement. Another possible 
concern is that the jump in retirement rates for civil servants in 2005 was driven by factors 
other than the opening of the early retirement window for civil servants in 2005. One of the 
factors that could have shifted retirement rates is a change in disability insurance.
72
 Figure 
4.3 shows that retirement rates for male workers aged 55-60 employed outside the public 
sector were not higher in 2005 than in other years. This indicates that the difference in 
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 Disability insurance and its relation to early retirement are discussed in the Appendix Chapter 4 
at the end of this document. 
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retirement rates for civil servants aged 55-60 between 2005 and other years was not caused 
by factors that shifted retirement rates of the entire workforce in 2005.  
Figure 4.3: Retirement rates for employees outside the public sector, by birth cohort  
 (percentages) * 
 
* Age on December 31
st
, 2005 is indicated behind each birth cohort. This figure is based on data 
for 2000-2005. 
 
4.5.2  Model specification 
We estimate the LATE using a two-stage-least-squares fixed effects instrumental variable 
model.
73
 In the first stage, retirement status is estimated and in the second stage, the impact 
of predicted retirement on the probability to die within five years is estimated. Our 
instrumental variable model has the advantage that it controls for time-invariant individual 
effects and allows the individual fixed effects to be correlated with observed 
characteristics. The time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity controlled for concerns 
differences in year of birth, education and (stable) preferences for leisure, for instance. We 
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 As Figure 4.2 shows, there is no appropriate discontinuity in age that can be exploited to estimate 
the effect of retirement on mortality using regression discontinuity design. This is because the 
generosity of the early retirement benefits provided by the early retirement window varied largely 
across the ages 55-60.  
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control for year fixed effects and nonlinear age effects as well.
74
 The first stage of our 
model is specified as follows: 
(4.1) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑗=2004
𝑗=2000 + ∑ 𝑐𝑘𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘=3
𝑘=2 + ∑ 𝑑05,𝑙𝐷05,𝑡𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑙=60
𝑙=55 + ℎ𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝜗 + 𝑒𝑖 + 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is a dummy that is 1 if individual i was aged 55 or older in year t and individual i 
retired in year t. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝑗𝑡 is a year dummy that is 1 for year j and 0 otherwise. 
𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡 denotes the difference between the age of individual i in year t and 53, taken to the kth 
power.
75
 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡 is an age dummy that is 1 if individual i reached age l in year t and 0 
otherwise. ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 includes lagged wage income. 𝑒𝑖 is an individual fixed effect. 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is an 
error term. 𝑒𝑖 is allowed to be correlated with all covariates.  
The second stage is specified as follows: 
(4.2) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑗=2004
𝑗=2000 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘=3
𝑘=2 +  ℎ𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝜑 + 𝜔?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a dummy that is 1 if individual i died within five years after year t and 0 
otherwise. 𝜔 indicates the LATE. 𝛼𝑖 is again an individual-level fixed effect and allowed 
to be freely correlated with all covariates as well as with 𝑒𝑖. The error terms 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 are 
allowed to be correlated as well.  
 
4.6  Results 
4.6.1  The uninstrumented case   
We instrument retirement status because of the potential endogeneity of retirement status 
to mortality. For comparison, Table 4.2 shows the coefficient estimate on retirement status 
for the model as specified in (4.2) for the case in which retirement status 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is not 
instrumented. The coefficient estimate on retirement is positive and significant at the one 
percent level. Retirement is associated with a 0.6 percentage point, or 13.4 percent, higher 
probability to die within five years. If retirement status would not be endogenous to 
                                                          
74
 In Section 4.6.5, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the model specification and find that our 
result is robust to the way age and year enter our model.   
75
 We do not include 𝐴1𝑖𝑡 in our model. Including 𝐴1𝑖𝑡 is not possible due to multicollinearity 
caused by the presence of the year dummies.  
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mortality, we would expect the coefficient estimate on retirement status in this 
uninstrumented fixed effects model to be similar to the one in the instrumental variable 
model with fixed effects.  
Table 4.2: Uninstrumented fixed effects estimates for the probability to die within five  
 years * 
N 133,379 
 
Coefficient estimate 
retirement (?̂?) 
P-value 
 
 
0.006  
0.001   
 
Fraction of total variation 
explained by individual 
fixed effects  
 
0.805 
* The model estimated here controls for lagged wage income, marital status, year fixed effects, 
nonlinear age effects and individual fixed effects. We use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the individual level.  
 
4.6.2  Instrumental variable estimates 
Table 4.3 shows the instrumental variable fixed effects estimate.
76
 The estimate shows that 
retirement induced by the early retirement window opening decreased the probability to die 
within five years by 2.6 percentage points, or 42.9 percent. Hallberg et al. (2014) find an 
effect of the same sign and a similar magnitude as we do.
77
 Kuhn et al. (2010) also find 
large effects for blue-collar workers, however of the opposite sign.
78
 Interestingly, Coe and 
Zamarro (2010) and Insler (2014) find an effect that has the same sign as the effect we 
                                                          
76
 The first and second stage estimates are presented in the Appendix Chapter 4, Table A4.1, at the 
end of this document. 
77
 They find that the opportunity to retire decreased mortality by 0.36 percentage points or 26 
percent annually. This implies a reduction by 5.4 percentage points over the 15 year period they 
study.  
78
 Kuhn et al. (2010) find that for every year a male worker retires earlier, the probability to die 
before age 67 increases by 2.4 percentages points or 13 percent. The size of the mortality effect of 
retirement we find is very similar in size to the mortality effects of job loss found by Browning and 
Heinesen (2012) and Eliason and Storrie (2009), who find that job loss increased the probability to 
die within four years by respectively 36 and 44 percent. This suggests that the size of the effect we 
find is not particularly striking.    
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find, and they also find, like we do, an effect that runs in the opposite direction when 
retirement status is not instrumented. 
The F statistics for the relevance of the instruments in the first stage show that our 
instruments are relevant at the one percent significance level. The coefficients on the 
instruments in the first stage are positive, indicating that the opening of the early retirement 
window did induce eligible civil servants to retire.  
Table 4.3: Fixed effects instrumental variable estimates for the probability to die within  
five years * 
N 133,379 
  
Coefficient estimate 
retirement (?̂?) -0.026 
P-value 0.056 
  
F statistic on instruments 
in first stage 144.63 
P-value  0.000 
  
Fraction of total variation 
explained by individual 
fixed effects in first stage 0.296 
 
Fraction of total variation 
explained by individual 
fixed effects in second 
stage 0.805 
* The model estimated here controls for lagged wage income, marital status, year fixed effects, 
nonlinear age effects and individual fixed effects. The p-values on the coefficients are based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are clustered at the individual level.  
 
4.6.3  Causes of death  
Specific causes of death may be related to working or being retired. For instance, if 
working induces high stress levels, the effect of retirement on mortality may run through, 
amongst others, diseases of the circulatory system. This mechanism would then be 
revealed by considering mortality rates due to mortality due to diseases of the circulatory 
system. To get more insight into the mechanism through which early retirement affects 
mortality, we estimate the instrumental variable model in (4.1)-(4.2) using a dummy 
variable for dying within five years due to a specific cause as the dependent variable in 
(4.2). The causes of death for which we estimate our model are grouped according to the 
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10
th
 Revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (ICD). The ICD is a health care classification system by the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2010). The ICD provides diagnostic codes for classifying diseases. 
The diseases are grouped into categories, so called chapters. We separately estimate the 
model for each chapter, or, in case of the frequent causes of death cancer and diseases of 
the circulatory system, subchapter, so called block. Chapters counting less than twenty 
unique fatalities are merged in the chapter “Other diseases”. Blocks on cancer counting 
less than twenty unique fatalities are merged into the block “Other malignant neoplasms” 
and blocks on diseases of the circulatory system counting less than twenty unique fatalities 
are added to the block “Other forms of heart disease”. 
Table 4.4 shows that the effects of early retirement on mortality due to diseases of the 
arteries, arterioles and capillaries and diseases of the digestive system are negative and 
significant at, respectively, the five and one percent level. The significance of the 
retirement coefficients for the two causes of death should be interpreted with caution. This 
is because we test the significance of the retirement coefficients on 21 causes of death, so 
we expect the coefficient on retirement for one cause to be significant at the five percent 
level just by chance. 
Having said this, early retirement decreased the probability to die within five years due to 
diseases of the arteries, arterioles and capillaries by 0.3 percentage point. This implies that 
retirement induced by the opening of the early retirement window reduced the number of 
fatalities within five years due to diseases of the arteries, arterioles and capillaries by six. 
This is a large number as there were only 2,373 workers induced to retire early. Diseases of 
the arteries, arterioles and capillaries as causes of death are interesting in the context of this 
study, since lifestyle can have a significant impact on the probability of dying from these 
diseases. Aneurysmal diseases such as aortic dissection and aortic aneurysm are the 
diseases that cause most fatalities within the block “Diseases of the arteries, arterioles and 
capillaries”. Hypertension and smoking are among the modifiable risk factors for 
aneurysmal diseases (Reed et al., 1992, Suzuki et al., 2003).
79
 Among the risk factors for 
aneurysmal diseases, hypertension is the most important modifiable risk factor. Risk 
factors for hypertension include obesity, smoking, alcohol consumption, lack of physical 
exercise and stress (Kaplan and Nunes, 2003, Appel et al., 2006, Truelsen, Begg and 
                                                          
79
 Risk factor indicates a factor that is correlated with the prevalence of a disease. There is not 
necessarily a causal relation between a risk factor and the prevalence of a disease. 
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Mathers, 2006). Most of these risk factors can be affected by retirement, either through 
reduced costs of investment in health as suggested by the Grossman model, or through 
stress.   
Early retirement induced by the opening of the early retirement window negatively 
affected the probability to die within five years due to diseases of the digestive system by 
0.7 percentage point. This translates into a reduction of the number of diseases of the 
digestive system related fatalities by sixteen. This is a large effect. Liver diseases are 
responsible for most fatalities in the chapter “Diseases of the digestive system”. Alcohol 
use and obesity are among the modifiable risk factors for liver diseases (Funnell et al., 
1993 and Bellentani et al., 2000).  
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* The model estimated here controls for lagged wage income, marital status, year fixed effects, 
nonlinear age effects and individual fixed effects. The p-values on the coefficients are based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are clustered at the individual level. The final column 
indicates the number of unique fatalities in our dataset by cause of death. Our dataset includes 
observations on 33,391 unique civil servants.  
 
4.6.4 Distribution of treatment effects across time horizons  
So far, we have focused on the probability to die within five years as the outcome variable. 
Table 4.5 also shows the estimates for the effect of early retirement on the probability to 
die within fewer years. We find that early retirement decreased the probability to die 
within one year by 80 percent.  This suggests that retirement has an almost immediate 
effect on mortality. This may be consistent with the effect of retirement on mortality 
running through stress and the relief from work, lowering mortality due to (acute) diseases 
of the arteries, arterioles and capillaries. We are actually not the first to find that job 
departures have a large and almost immediate effect on mortality. In the literature on the 
effect of job displacement on mortality, Browning and Heinesen (2012) find that job 
displacement increases the probability to die within one year by 84 percent and Bloemen, 
Hochguertel and Zweerink (2015) find that job displacement increases the probability to 
die within one year by 86 percent. These effects are in relative terms of a similar size as the 
effect we find. The relative effects of retirement on mortality are smaller when the time 
horizon for mortality is lengthened. The differences between the effects of early retirement 
on the probabilities to die within two and three years, and four and five years are negative, 
indicating that early retirement has a positive impact on the probability to die during the 
third year and the fifth year. The change of the sign of the effect of early retirement on the 
probability to die in the fifth year may illustrate that the effect of early retirement on 
mortality dies out when the time horizon for the probability to die is lengthened. Since all 
considered workers will die eventually, irrespective of whether they retire or not, the effect 
of early retirement on the probability to die within, say, a hundred years, is zero. If the 
effect of early retirement on mortality within four years is negative, the effect of early 
retirement on mortality in at least one of the later years will mechanically have to be 
positive.  
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Table 4.5: Fixed effects instrumental variable estimates for the probability to die within  
 one to five years * 
The probability to die within  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years  
Coefficient estimate  
retirement (?̂?) 
-0.022 -0.029 -0.020 -0.026 -0.026 
P-value 0.015 0.009 0.098 0.037 0.056 
      
Coefficient estimate  
retirement (%) 
-80.2 -70.2 -47.1 -47.2 -42.9 
* The model estimated here controls for lagged wage income, marital status, year fixed effects, 
nonlinear age effects and individual fixed effects. The p-values on the coefficients are based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are clustered at the individual level.  
 
4.6.5  Robustness checks 
4.6.5.1 Placebo instruments  
The validity of our approach relies on the opening of the early retirement window for civil 
servants as an exogenous shifter of retirement rates. As a robustness check, we verify 
whether the variation in retirement rates of civil servants in the age category 55-60 in 2005 
is due to the opening of the early retirement window and not by another event that occurred 
in 2005. We estimate an instrumental variable model on a dataset including not only 
observations on civil servants, but observations on workers employed outside the public 
sector as well. Except for the criterion on being employed as a civil servant, we apply the 
same data selection criteria as in the previous analyses. The functional form for the 
instrumental variable model looks similar as the baseline functional form in (4.1) and (4.2). 
Table 4.6 lists the control variables and instruments included. The most important 
deviation from our baseline model is that the instruments here are dummies for the ages 
55-60 interacted with a dummy for the year 2005 interacted with a dummy for the worker 
not being employed as a civil servant. Table 4.6 shows that the coefficient on predicted 
retirement in the second stage of the model is not significant. The coefficients on the 
instruments in the first stage show that some of the instruments do significantly affect 
retirement status of workers employed outside the public sector, both positively and 
negatively. The coefficients on the instruments are in absolute terms small in size though. 
This suggests that the jumps in retirement rates for civil servants are induced by the 
opening of the early retirement window rather than a shock that shifted the retirement rates 
of all workers upwards. 
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4.6.5.2 Robustness checks on functional form 
Age dummies and nonlinear age and year terms 
Our statements concerning the probability to die within five years are to be understood 
conditional on age. Age is an important determinant of both retirement status and the 
probability to die within five years. This may make our result sensitive to the way age 
enters our model. We control for second and third order age effects in our instrumental 
variable model. This baseline estimate is redisplayed as variation a in Table 4.7. As a 
robustness check, we estimate the instrumental variable model once controlling for second 
order age effects only and once controlling for second, third and fourth order age effects. 
Table 4.7 shows that the LATE estimates for the alternative models are similar to the 
LATE estimate for the baseline model. This indicates that our instrumental variable result 
is robust to controlling for age effects of one order lower or one order higher (variations b 
and c). Our instrumental variable result is robust to controlling for age fixed effects for the 
ages 55-60 rather than nonlinear age effects (variation d) and non-linear year effects rather 
than year fixed effects (variation e).
80
  
 
Wage income (t-1) 
We control for lagged wage income in our model. Lagged wage income may capture some 
of the effects of financial wealth and hours worked on retirement status and the probability 
to die within five years. Table 4.7, variation f, shows that our LATE estimate is insensitive 
to not controlling for lagged wage income.  
 
Random effects  
We estimated the LATE using an instrumental variable model with individual fixed 
effects. We estimate the instrumental variable model with random effects to verify whether 
our individual fixed effects LATE estimate is sensitive to imposing the assumption that 
individual effects are uncorrelated with all covariates. We estimate the random effects 
instrumental variable model using the specification as in (4.1) and (4.2). Table 4.7, 
variation g, shows that the LATE estimated using the random effects model is significant 
                                                          
80
 The age fixed effects enter the model through age dummies and the non-linear year effects enter 
the model through the terms (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 2000)2 and (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 2000)3. 
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at the five percent level.
81
 The effect is similar to the one of the LATE estimated using the 
fixed effects model, but there exist significant differences between the coefficient estimates 
for the two models. The significant differences between the fixed effects and random 
effects coefficient estimates indicate that individual effects are correlated with at least 
some covariates. Individual effects may, for instance, be correlated with lagged wage 
income. Workers with a higher wage income in the previous year may have time-invariant 
characteristics that make them more or less likely to retire or more or less likely to die 
within five years. As individual effects and at least some covariates are correlated, the 
instrumental variable model with individual fixed effects is preferred over the instrumental 
variable model with random effects.  
 
No individual effects     
We estimate the instrumental variable model without individual effects to verify how 
sensitive our result is to not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Compared to the 
specification as in (4.1) and (4.2), we exclude the terms accounting for the individual 
effects. We also add dummies for all birth year cohorts except one and marital status as 
independent variables to both (4.1) and (4.2). We do so to control for some time-invariant 
characteristics. Table 4.7, variation h, shows that the LATE estimate without individual 
fixed effects is in absolute terms larger than the one with individual fixed effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
81
 We have conducted a formal Hausman test on the differences in estimated coefficients between 
the fixed effects and random effects instrumental variable model. The Hausman test statistic shows 
that the differences in estimated coefficients are significant at the one percent level. 
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Table 4.7: Robustness checks on functional form* 
Variation  LATE         P-value F test 
statistic 
a.  Baseline (Table 4.3): 
FE IV; control variables: 2nd, 3rd 
order age effects, year fixed effects, 
lagged wage income, marital status 
-0.026      0.056 144.63 
b. FE IV 2nd order age effects  -0.029      0.071 101.36 
c. FE IV 2nd, 3rd, 4th order age effects  -0.025      0.068 138.06 
d. FE IV dummies ages 55-60 -0.024 0.080 128.27 
e. FE IV nonlinear year effects -0.023 0.116 105.87 
f. FE IV excl. lagged wage income -0.026 0.056 146.40 
g. Random effects IV  -0.029 0.015 2,073.14   
h. Simple IV (2SLS, cross-sectional)  -0.035 0.039 204.35 
* The p-values on the coefficients are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the individual level. For variation g, we show the 𝜒2 test statistics instead of the F test 
statistic. Variation h is a cross-sectional model that also uses observations on individuals that 
appear  in our dataset for only one year. For variation h, the number of observations is 141,205. 
The number of observations is 133,379 for variations a-g.  
 
4.6.5.3 Robustness checks on data selection 
Marital status 
Our dataset includes observations on married men and unmarried men. The coefficient 
estimate on retirement status for this baseline dataset is redisplayed in Table 4.8 as 
variation a. Married men may make retirement decisions in a different way than unmarried 
men.
82
 Married men may, for instance, take into account whether their spouses are retired 
or whether there are grandchildren present that need attention. As marital status may affect 
lifestyle, it may indirectly affect the probability to die within five years as well. This may 
make the coefficients on, for instance, age, in the first and second stage of the instrumental 
variable model being different for married men than for single men. We check whether 
differences in coefficients between married men and unmarried men affect our LATE 
estimate. Table 4.8, variation b, shows that the coefficient estimate on retirement based on 
                                                          
82
 Unmarried men may be single or may have a partner without being married and without having a 
registered partnership.  
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observations for married men only does not differ much from the estimate based on the 
baseline dataset.   
 
Wage income (t-1) 
We do not select observations based on lagged wage income. It may be that the effect of 
retirement on mortality is smaller for workers who have low wages than for workers who 
have higher wages. This may be, for instance, because workers who have higher wages 
may work more hours, so that retirement would imply a larger relief from work for these 
workers than for workers who have lower wages and work fewer hours. Table 4.8, 
variation c, shows that our result is robust to excluding observations on workers who were 
paid less than 15,000 euros during the previous year.
83
 Interestingly, the number of 
observations does not change much if this criterion on lagged wage income is imposed. 
This may reflect that workers in our dataset, who have a continuous employment tenure of 
at least ten years, have a strong labor force attachment. 
 
Extended control group: workers aged 52-54 in 2005 
Our control group consists of civil servants who were either 53 or 54 in 2005. Because we 
use a fixed effects model, the control group effectively consists of civil servants aged 54 in 
2005 only. We include observations on workers aged 52 for all years and extend our 
control group to workers in the age category 52-54 in 2005 to verify whether our result is 
not driven by particular characteristics of civil servants aged 54 in 2005. Table 4.8, 
variation d, shows that our result is robust to including workers aged 52 in our dataset.  
 
Extended dataset: hospitalized workers 
Ill-health workers may have a higher probability to retire early than healthy workers and 
may have a higher probability to die within five years than healthy workers. We have tried 
to limit the bias due to the potential endogeneity of retirement status to mortality by 
dropping observations on workers who have not been hospitalized between 1999 and 
retirement. We refer to this group of workers as hospitalized workers. Table 4.8, variation 
e, shows that the LATE estimated using observations on hospitalized workers only is much 
larger in magnitude than the LATE estimated using observations on nonhospitalized 
workers only. The intuition for this finding is that hospitalized workers have a higher 
                                                          
83
 The income value of 15,000 Euro corresponds to the annual minimum wage in 2005 at full-time 
employment. 
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probability to die within five years than nonhospitalized workers. This makes hospitalized 
workers have more space for health improvement from retirement than nonhospitalized 
workers. Table 4.8, variation f, shows that the LATE based on observations of hospitalized 
and nonhospitalized workers differs only slightly from the LATE based on observations of 
nonhospitalized workers only.     
 
Extended dataset: workers employed outside the public sector 
The dataset used for the estimation of the LATE consists of observations on civil servants 
only. Our result may depend on civil servant-specific retirement and mortality rates across 
age and years. As a robustness check, we estimate a modified version of the model using 
data on civil servants and workers employed outside the public sector. The model we 
estimate is the model specified in (4.1) and (4.2), except that the instruments, i.e. the 
interactions between the dummy for the year 2005 and the dummies for the ages 55-60, are 
multiplied by a dummy for being a civil servant. Table 4.8, variation g, shows that our 
LATE estimate is robust to correcting for civil servant specific mortality and retirement 
patterns.  
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Table 4.8: Robustness checks on data selection* 
Variation  LATE         P-value F test 
statistic 
N 
a.  Baseline (Table 4.3): 
FE IV; data selection: males civil 
servants in the age category 53-60, 
with the Dutch citizenship, who were 
employed as civil servants 
continuously during the ten years 
prior to the year of observation, who 
have not been hospitalized between 
1999 and the year of observation, for 
the years 2000-2005 
-0.026      0.056 144.63 133,379 
b. FE IV for dataset excl. unmarried 
men 
-0.021 0.014 123.28 112,799 
c. FE IV for dataset excl. workers with a 
wage income [t-1] lower than 15,000 
euros 
-0.028 0.038 144.20 131,565 
d. FE IV for dataset incl. workers aged 
52  
-0.022      0.078 154.74 172,971 
e. FE IV for workers hospitalized before 
retirement only 
-0.058 0.079 48.87 42,213 
f. FE IV for dataset incl. workers 
hospitalized before retirement  
-0.028 0.024 204.87 175,592 
g.  FE IV for dataset incl. workers 
employed outside the public sector 
-0.026 0.056 146.00 1,121,586 
* The model estimated here controls for lagged wage income, marital status, year fixed effects, 
nonlinear age effects and individual fixed effects. The p-values on the coefficients are based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors that are clustered at the individual level.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
We study the impact of early retirement on mortality. We find that retirement induced by a 
temporary decrease in the ER eligibility age for civil servants in the Netherlands decreased 
the probability to die within five years for men by 42.9 percent.  
 101 
 
The impact of early retirement on mortality is sizable, indicating that civil servants’ 
probability to survive is sensitive to early retirement. In the context of the Grossman 
model, the negative impact of early retirement through health on mortality could be 
explained by a decrease in the opportunity costs to invest in health after retirement. Such a 
price effect may induce retirees to invest more in health, reducing their probability to die 
within five years. An alternative explanation would be that working brings about stress. 
After retirement, workers’ body and mind are possibly discharged, reducing the probability 
to die within five years. Results using primary causes of death point to the possibility that 
stress-related conditions are important in explaining the number of lives lost due to work. 
Our main result is that early retirement induced by the decrease in the ER eligibility age 
has a negative impact on mortality. This result has at least two policy implications. First, in 
times of crisis, companies may consider reducing their workforce by offering early 
retirement to workers. If employers will let their older workers retire early, this would 
decrease mortality and enlarge the longevity risk borne by pension funds. Pension funds 
would need to anticipate on this to prevent sustainability problems. Second, the ER 
eligibility age is increasing in many countries. If an increase in the ER eligibility age were 
to have the opposite effect on mortality of our estimated effect of a reduction in ER 
eligibility age, one might expect a positive impact on mortality. Increased mortality would 
limit the longevity risk borne by pension funds. This may allow pension funds to make 
their pension arrangements more generous. 
Using our findings, we simulate the amount of pension benefits that were paid extra due to 
retired civil servants living longer than civil servants who were not induced to retire by the 
opening of the early retirement window.
84
 We assume that the effect of early retirement on 
the probability to die within one to five years is given by the LATE estimates. Because we 
have data on mortality up to five years ahead only, we impute the effect of early retirement 
on the probability to die within six years or more. Table 4.9 shows the hypothesized 
LATEs. From these hypothesized LATEs we can calculate that the opening of the early 
retirement window induced early retirees to live 56 days, or almost two months, longer 
than their equivalents who did not retire. During these 56 days, the early retirees received 
pension benefits. When retirement benefits minus pension accrual costs equal 20,000 
                                                          
84
 We do thus not take into account the effect of early retirement on social welfare through 
increased longevity, changed health costs, improved employment opportunities of young civil 
servants and other channels.  
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Euros per year, the cost of the retirement benefits paid to the 2,373 workers who were 
induced to retire during the 56 days with which their life was extended by early retirement 
amounts about 7 million Euros. This is a substantial amount, especially given the small 
number of workers affected by the early retirement window opening.  
Table 4.9: Hypothesized LATEs * 
Probability to 
die within  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years  
(Hypothesized) 
coefficient 
retirement (?̂?) -0.022 -0.029 -0.020 -0.026 -0.026 -0.020 -0.010 
 
Probability to 
die within  8 years 
(Hypothesized) 
coefficient 
retirement (?̂?) 0.000 
* These hypothesized LATES are used to gauge the amount of pension benefits that were paid 
extra due to retired civil servants living longer than civil servants who were not induced to retire by 
the introduction of the early retirement arrangement.    
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Chapter 5 
Job loss, firm-level heterogeneity and 
mortality: Evidence from administrative 
data85 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Job loss is a frequent event that many individuals experience in their lives. In the United 
States alone, there were about 850,000 private sector job separations due to mass layoffs in 
2012 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).
86
 First-order effects on workers’ economic 
circumstances may be expected due to the associated income loss that can have long-
lasting, permanent effects (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Couch and Placzek, 
2010). Job loss, and in particular, layoffs, can be associated with strong effects on people’s 
lives in general and health in particular, through a variety of channels. Workers may get 
surprised by a sudden career disruption, experience subsequent job instability (Stevens, 
1997), have difficulties coping with the change and experience detrimental effects on their 
life style (Deb et al., 2011; Falba et al., 2005), financial situation (Jacobson, LaLonde and 
Sullivan, 1993; Couch and Placzek, 2010), physical (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2015) 
and mental health (Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimueller, 2009). In the extreme, involuntary job 
loss may result in death (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Eliason and Storrie, 2009; 
Browning and Heinesen, 2012).
87
 We reinvestigate the effect of job loss on mortality, 
                                                          
85 This chapter is joint work with Hans Bloemen and Stefan Hochguertel. We thank Mathilde 
Godard, Eva Mörk, Francis Vella, Till Von Wachter and the seminar audiences of the Uppsala 
Centre for Fiscal Studies (UCFS) workshop and the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) 
workshop on firm exit and job displacement for helpful and constructive comments and 
suggestions.  
86
 Excluding farm job separations and separations due to seasonal work or vacation periods. 
87
 The general economic circumstances that may cause job loss, such as a recession, may have an 
effect on health as well (Ruhm, 2000). 
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using administrative data from the Netherlands. We find evidence of a sizable positive 
effect.  
Estimating the effect of job loss on mortality is challenging, as job loss is likely to be 
endogenous to mortality. Studies in the literature estimate the mortality effects of job loss 
due to firm closure (Eliason and Storrie, 2009; Browning and Heinesen, 2012; Michaud, 
Crimmins and Hurd,2014) and job loss in firms experiencing large firm-level employment 
declines (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009). They use workers employed in firms that stay 
open as the control group and workers laid off in closing firms or firms experiencing large 
employment declines as the treatment group. Workers employed in closing firms and firms 
experiencing large employment declines may have poorer health than those employed in 
firms that do not close, however. These pre-existing differences in firm-level worker health 
and mortality rates may exist due to selective hiring or worker outflow prior to firm closure 
or large firm-level employment declines. If these pre-existing differences in firm-level 
worker health and mortality rates are not controlled for, the estimate of the effect of job 
loss on mortality may be biased upwards. We control for pre-existing differences in firm-
level worker health and mortality rates and other firm-level worker characteristics. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study in the literature to do so.  
We use employee-employer matched Dutch administrative data for the period 2003-2010. 
We estimate the effect of job loss on the probability to die within five years. There are a 
number of reasons why mortality is an outcome variable of core interest. First, length of 
life is directly relevant to the experienced welfare of consumers. Second, mortality is an 
event which is distinctly and objectively observed in our data and does not raise issues of 
interpretation or subjectivity, unlike, say, self-reported health as available in surveys. We 
use job loss due to sudden firm closure as the treatment. The sudden nature of firm 
closures is imposed by the way we select observations. Job loss due to sudden firm closure 
is a clean treatment, not suffering from selectivity of job loss and unlikely to suffer from 
anticipation of job loss. The control group in our approach includes observations on 
workers who stayed on their jobs in the year of observation. The treatment group consists 
of observations on workers who were laid off in the year of observation specifically 
because of firm closure. For male workers with strong labor force attachment, we find that 
job loss due to firm closure increased the probability to die in the first five years after job 
loss by 0.60 percentage points or 34 percent. This result is in relative terms similar to what 
Eliason and Storrie (2009) and Browning and Heinesen (2012) find, who do not control for 
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firm-level worker characteristics. We find that without controlling for firm-level worker 
characteristics, job loss increased the probability to die within five years by 0.83 
percentage points or 46 percent. This suggests that not controlling for pre-existing 
differences in worker characteristics such as mortality rates between workers employed in 
closing firms and those employed in firms that stayed open indeed biases the estimate of 
the mortality effect of job loss upwards. Cause-specific mortality analysis shows that 
cerebrovascular diseases and smoking-related cancers are important drivers of the effect.  
A limited number of earlier studies find a positive effect of job loss on mortality as well 
(Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Eliason and Storrie, 2009; Browning and Heinesen, 
2012; Michaud, Crimmins and Hurd, 2014). Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimueller (2009), 
Browning and Heinesen (2012) and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2015) find that job loss 
has a positive effect on hospitalization and a negative effect on health. Browning, Danø 
and Heinesen (2006) and Salm (2009), conversely, do not find an effect of job loss on 
hospitalization or health, however.  
What is still not clear in the literature is how job loss affects health and mortality. There is 
evidence that job loss increases self-harm (Keefe et al., 2002; Browning and Heinesen, 
2012), mental illness (Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimueller, 2009; Browning and Heinesen, 
2012), traffic accidents (Browning and Heinesen, 2012), smoking (Black, Devereux and 
Salvanes, 2015), drinking (Eliason and Storrie, 2009; Deb et al., 2011; Browning and 
Heinesen, 2012) and induces having an unhealthier BMI (Deb et al., 2011). There is 
evidence that job loss affects mortality via reduced lifetime earnings (Sullivan and Von 
Wachter, 2009) as well.   
This study makes several contributions to this recent literature. First, we use employer-
employee matched administrative data that allow us to construct workers’ characteristics at 
the firm-level, such as firm-level average mortality rates and firm-level average 
hospitalization rates. Controlling for these and other firm-level worker characteristics when 
estimating the effect of job loss on mortality avoids bias of our result due to workers 
employed in closing firms having had poorer health than those employed in firms that 
stayed open.  
Second, there is debate about the mechanisms driving the effect of job loss on mortality. 
We provide new evidence on the health mechanism driving the effect of job loss on 
mortality as we are explicitly able to exploit information from cause of death registers. 
 108 
 
These pieces of evidence are complemented by estimates of the effect of job loss on 
mortality for time horizons of one until five years.     
Third, as we have end dates of jobs and month and year of death available, we can  
measure the time period between the date of job loss and the date of mortality more 
precisely than studies that have only the year of job loss and the year of death available. 
This avoids bias of the effect of job loss on mortality due to differences in time horizons 
whereon mortality is considered.     
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly reviews related 
literature. Section 5.3 provides background on the data and furnishes insightful 
descriptives. Section 5.4 discusses the institutional setting. Section 5.5 explains the 
identification strategy and Section 5.6 presents the empirical results. Section 5.7 concludes.  
 
5.2  Literature review    
The main point of discussion in the existing literature is how job loss affects health and 
mortality. Several papers provide evidence for the positive sign of the effect of job loss on 
mortality, but especially cause-specific (mortality) analyses do not give consistent 
evidence on a mechanism that is at work. It is not clear why this is the case. We observe 
considerable differences between studies in terms of data selection, estimation methods, 
definitions of job loss, definitions and classifications of causes of death and time horizons 
on which the effects of job loss on mortality are measured. These differences between 
studies may arguably explain at least part of the differences in results.  
Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009), Eliason and Storrie (2009), Browning and Heinesen 
(2012) and Michaud, Crimmins and Hurd (2014) all study the effect of job loss on 
mortality. Similar to us, the first three articles study the effect for workers with strong 
labor force attachment. They do not focus on older workers, though. Michaud, Crimmins 
and Hurd (2014) do focus on older workers, yet not selecting workers based on having 
strong labor force attachment.   
Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) study the effect of job loss in plants experiencing large 
employment declines on mortality of high-tenure male workers. They estimate a logit 
model on administrative quarterly data for workers in Pennsylvania born in any of the 
years 1920-1959 for the period 1974-2006. They find a 10-15 percent increase in the 
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probability to die for the next 20 years. This implies that the life expectancy of a worker 
displaced at age forty decreased by one to one and a half years compared to a nondisplaced 
counterpart if the increases in mortality hazard were sustained indefinitely. The authors 
find that the positive effect of job loss on mortality was larger for workers with larger 
predicted earnings declines, suggesting that the effect of job loss on mortality runs through 
persistent losses in earnings. This is consistent with the authors’ finding that the effect of 
job loss on mortality was smaller for older workers. As unemployment insurance (UI) 
benefits were generous in the Netherlands and most laid off workers in closing firms 
received severance pay, we do not expect job loss to have had a large effect on (lifetime) 
income and to have had a large effect on mortality through income for in particular the 
older workers we study.  
Eliason and Storrie (2009) and Browning and Heinesen (2012) study the effect of job loss 
due to plant closure on overall and cause-specific mortality on time horizons that are 
somewhat similar to ours. They use the same definitions of cause-specific mortality 
categories, except those for the categories alcohol-related mortality and suicide mortality. 
Eliason and Storrie (2009) employ a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the effect 
of job loss due to plant closure in 1987/88 on mortality. They use administrative data for 
male workers aged 25-64 from Sweden for the years 1983-1999. They find that job loss 
increased the probability to die within four years by 44 percent for men. The authors do not 
find an effect for women. Their analysis by cause of death shows that the increase in the 
mortality probability was driven by suicides and alcohol-related causes of death.  
Browning and Heinesen (2012) study the effect of job loss due to plant closure on 
mortality and hospitalization for male workers with strong labor market attachment. They 
employ propensity score weighting combined with nonparametric duration analysis on 
Danish administrative data for male workers aged 20-60 for the years 1980-2006. They 
find that job loss increased overall mortality, mortality due to diseases of the circulatory 
system, suicide mortality and mortality and hospitalization due to traffic accidents, 
alcohol-related diseases and mental illness. They find that job loss increased the risk of 
overall mortality by 84 percent in the first year after displacement, 36 percent in the first 
four years after displacement, 17 percent in the first ten years after displacement and 10 
percent during the first 20 years after displacement.     
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The study by Michaud, Crimmins and Hurd (2014) focusses on older workers and 
compares the effects of layoffs and job terminations due to plant closure on self-reported 
health and mortality.
88
 Layoffs here include mass layoffs and more individualized layoffs. 
The authors use biennial survey data for older workers from the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) waves 1992-2008 and HRS biomarker data from the waves 2006 and 2008 
for workers who were in the age category 59-70 in 2006-2008. Their study is based on a 
relatively small number of observations. This does not allow them to estimate the effect of 
job termination on mortality directly. Instead, in a first step they estimate the effect of job 
termination on the count of high-risk biomarkers using Poisson models, and next they 
employ a Poisson model to estimate the effects of the predicted count of high-risk markers, 
incorporating age and socio-economic characteristics on the probability to die within two 
years. They find no effect of self-reported job termination due to plant closure on mortality 
and a positive 9.4 percent long run effect of self-reported layoff on mortality.  
Browning, Danø and Heinesen (2006), Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimueller (2009), Salm (2009) 
and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2015) study the effect of job loss on health, using 
different health outcomes. Browning, Danø and Heinesen (2006) match workers who lost 
their jobs due to plant closure or mass layoff to those who did not lose their jobs but had 
the same expected probability to lose their jobs. They use a 10 percent sample of the full-
time employed Danish male population aged 20-63 for the period 1981-1999. They find no 
effect of job loss on hospitalization for diseases of the circulatory system and diseases of 
the digestive system during the four years after displacement.  
Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimueller (2009) and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2015) estimate 
the effect of job loss on health for workers who were slightly younger than those we study. 
Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimueller (2009) employ propensity score matching to compare the 
health of workers who were employed at closing plants to the health of those who were 
employed at continuing plants. Using Austrian health insurance data on private sector 
employment linked with social security data for prime aged male workers for the period 
1998-2002, they find that job loss increased hospitalization for mental health reasons.  
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2015) employ a difference-in-difference approach to study 
how job displacement due to plant closure or plant-level employment downsizing affects 
                                                          
88
 Schröder (2013) also distinguishes between the effects of job termination due to layoff and job 
termination due to plant closure on subjective health.  
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cardiovascular health. They use a Norwegian sample of full-time employed men and 
women predominantly aged in their early forties. The data are repeated cross-section data 
for the period 1986-1999, including survey data on health and health behaviors and linked 
administrative data on person and firm characteristics. They find that job displacement had 
a negative effect on health seven years ahead, for both men and women. They find 
evidence that the effect was driven by an increase in the probability of smoking on a daily 
basis.  
Salm (2009) uses a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the effect of job loss due 
to plant closure on health. He uses HRS data for the waves 1994-2002. He does not find an 
effect of self-reported job loss on various self-reported measures of physical and mental 
health.  
 
5.3  Data   
We use Dutch administrative micro panel data for the period 2003-2010. The data are 
administered by Statistics Netherlands and cover the entire Dutch population. We have 
access to data on job and personal characteristics, mortality and hospital stays. These data 
can be linked through a personal identifier.
89
 The data on job characteristics can also be 
linked through a job and employer identifier. The personal characteristics file contains 
information on demographic characteristics such as marital status, number of children, 
country of birth, birth year and birth month. The job characteristics file provides 
information on all jobs any individual had been employed in. For every job, both start and 
end date, the industry code and the annual wage are available. The job characteristics file 
also provides information on whether job terminations were due to firm bankruptcy. The 
mortality file contains information such as month, year and primary cause of death. The 
hospital stay file provides for every hospital stay information such as the start and end date 
of the spell, the reason for the stay and where the patient went after being released from the 
hospital. We study the effect of job loss on mortality for job losses due to firm closure that 
                                                          
89
 The original file names are SSB Banen (1999-2006), BEONTTAB (2003-2005), SSB Personen 
(2002-2005), Doodsoorzaken (2003-2010) and Landelijke Medische Registratie (LMR, 2002-2004). 
Statistics Netherlands only provides data that are administered by governmental institutions. The 
data that are administered are not always administered for the years we are interested in. Hospital 
stays data, for instance, are incomplete after 2005, so that it is not possible to estimate the effect of 
job loss on alternative health measures created from hospital data. 
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occurred in the period 2003-2005. We can track subsequent mortality events up to and 
including the year 2010.  
For our analysis we make some baseline selection of observations. This is for various 
reasons discussed in this section including that we want to restrict ourselves to a group of 
workers for whom we may reasonably expect a mortality effect of job loss. In Section 
5.6.4.2, we verify whether our result is robust to changing the various data selection 
criteria. In general, we find that our result is robust. Our baseline sample is restricted to 
observations on male workers in the age category 45-59 who had the Dutch nationality and 
who had stable employment relationships.
90
 We define stable employment as having 
continuous job tenure of at least five years at the same firm on January 1
st
 of the year of 
observation and having a wage income of at least 20,000 Euros in the year prior to the year 
of observation.
91
 Following Browning and Heinesen (2012), we exclude observations on 
workers employed in firms that had less than five workers on January 1
st
 of the year of 
observation. We do so in order to remove self-employed and their employees from the 
sample. Those small firms may be inherently unstable. We also exclude observations on 
workers employed in large firms that had 400 workers or more on January 1
st
 of the year of 
observation, because large firms may be older, more stable and less likely to close, so they 
predominantly end up in the control group without having a counterpart in the treatment 
group. We exclude observations on job departures other than layoffs due to firm closure 
from our sample, because workers departing their jobs for other reasons than firm closure 
receive a treatment, but a different one than the one we are primarily interested in.  
We exclude observations on workers who were laid off due to firm closure if at least 40 
percent of the workforce of the closing firm got employed in one particular firm within one 
year after firm closure.
92
 We do so to rule out takeovers or restarts of firms after closure 
                                                          
90
 We do not estimate the effect of job loss on mortality for women, because there are too few 
observations on women meeting our selection criteria. Partly this has to do with the high 
prevalence of part-time employment among women in the country. 
91
 As is customary, our register data do not contain information on hours worked. The income value 
of 20,000 euro corresponds to about 130 percent of the annual minimum wage in 2004 at full-time 
employment. 
92
 On the one hand, we do not want to use too strict a definition of restarting firms or firms being 
taken over, because including observations on workers employed in such firms may bias our result. 
On the other hand, we do not want to impose too loose a definition of restarting or taken over firms 
either. We do not want to use a definition with a minimum level of re-employment that is much 
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(also see Browning and Heinesen, 2012). Lastly, closing firms may have laid off 
significant shares of their workforces prior to closure. This is a potential threat to the 
validity of our approach for various reasons. First, layoffs of co-workers and the threat of 
layoffs of workers may impose stress on workers and may possibly affect workers’ health. 
Second, prior firm-level layoffs may make workers expect that the firm goes bankrupt or 
closes in general. Especially relatively productive workers with good job prospects 
elsewhere may leave the firm and find a job elsewhere once they expect the firm to shut 
down (Henningsen and Hægeland, 2008;  Schwerdt, 2011). Third, prior firm-level layoffs 
may be selective, as the least productive workers may be fired when the firm experiences 
hard times (Pfann, 2006). Ill-health workers may be among the least productive workers. 
Whether the aggregate outflow of workers from the firm prior to closure is positively or 
negatively selected on workers’ health is unclear. We exclude observations on workers 
employed in firms that reduced their workforce by at least 20 percent during the four years 
prior to the year of observation.  
Table 5.1 compares workers that stayed on the job (our control group) with workers who 
were laid off due to firm closure (our treatment group). It shows that workers who were 
laid off due to firm closure were on average similar in terms of age, country of birth, 
marital status, number of children, hospitalization status (at t-1) and wage income (at t-1) 
to those who stayed on their jobs.
93
 Workers who lost their jobs involuntarily in closing 
firms had on average lower job tenure and were employed in smaller firms than workers 
who stayed in their jobs. The relatively low job tenure and low firm size may indicate that 
                                                                                                                                                                                
lower than 40 percent. This is because if the lower bound would be, say, 20 percent, this would 
imply that we consider a closing firm that counted, say, five workers in the year of closure, as 
having made a restart if any of the five workers got employed somewhere within one year after 
closure.  
93
 Age is measured on December 31
st
 of the year of observation and is measured in years. Country 
of birth is measured by a dummy that equals one if the worker and worker’s parents were born in 
the Netherlands and zero otherwise. Hospitalization status (at t-1) is a dummy that is one if an 
individual was hospitalized during the previous year of observation and zero otherwise. Wage 
income is measured in thousands of euros. Job tenure is measured on January 1
st
 of the year of 
observation and is measured in years. Marital status is a dummy that is one if an individual was 
married on January 1
st
 of the year of observation and zero otherwise. Being married also includes 
having a registered partnership. A registered partnership is a partnership that has a legal status 
similar to marriage. Cohabiting without being married or without having a registered partnership is 
not included in our definition of being married. Firm size is measured in number of workers 
employed at the firm on January 1
st
 of the year of observation. Year indicates the year of 
observation.  
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closing firms were in general younger than firms that did not shut down. This would be 
consistent with the evidence from the US on most firms dying young, at least in 
manufacturing (e.g. Evans, 1987; Dunne,  Roberts and Samuelson, 1988). Job loss due to 
firm closure was relatively frequent in commercial services. In transportation and 
communication and construction, relatively few workers lost their jobs.  
Firm-level averages of worker characteristics are annual averages based on observations 
from the whole population of workers for the period 2003-2005, so not only on the sample 
of male workers we study in this chapter. Firm-level means of most worker characteristics 
were on average similar for workers employed in closing firms as for workers employed in 
firms that stayed open. Firm-level fractions of workers having died during the four years 
preceding the year of observation were on average higher for closing firms than for firms 
that stayed open. This suggests that workers employed in closing firms had on average 
poorer health than those employed in firms that did not close. Average firm-level mean job 
tenure was half as low for closing firms than for firms that stayed open, reflecting that 
closing firms were typically younger than firms that stayed open.  
Figure 5.1 shows that the fraction of workers dying within five years was larger for 
workers who were laid off due to firm closure than for workers who stayed on their jobs 
for workers of all ages.
94
 The fraction of laid off workers dying within five years was quite 
volatile, because the number of mortality cases involved was small.
95
   
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics  
Workers who stayed in their jobs in 
the year of observation (control 
group) 
 Workers who lost their jobs due to 
closure of firms in the year of 
observation (treatment group) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Age 51.74 4.27  Age 52.33 4.39 
Born in the 
Netherlands 
0.90 0.30  Born in the 
Netherlands 
0.89 0.32 
Married 0.82 0.39  Married 0.81 0.39 
 
 
                                                          
94
 The five year mortality rate was significantly larger for workers who were laid off due to firm 
closure than for those workers who were not laid off due to firm closure at the one percent level.   
95
 The total number of (unique) fatalities underlying the graph for workers who were laid off due to 
firm closure is 232.  
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
Workers who stayed in their jobs in the 
year of observation (control group) 
 Workers who lost their jobs due to 
closure of firms in the year of 
observation (treatment group) 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Number of children 1.92 1.21  Number of children 1.89 1.20 
Hospitalized [t-1] 0.050 0.218  Hospitalized [t-1] 0.050 0.217 
Wage income [t-1] 44.65 23.60  Wage income [t-1] 45.57 24.80 
Job tenure 16.18 8.02  Job tenure 14.12 7.99 
Firm size 126.68 109.97  Firm size 121.71 103.47 
Year 2004.00 0.81  Year 2004.04 0.84 
       
Industry    Industry   
Agriculture 0.018 0.131  Agriculture 0.009 0.093 
Asset Management 0.028 0.164  Asset Management 0.023 0.149 
Banking/Insurance 0.013 0.115  Banking/Insurance 0.026 0.160 
Catering 0.006 0.079  Catering 0.006 0.076 
Commercial 
Services 
0.073 0.261  Commercial 
Services 
0.164 0.370 
Construction 0.159 0.366  Construction 0.113 0.316 
Education 0.074 0.261  Education 0.081 0.273 
Health Care 0.015 0.121  Health Care 0.022 0.147 
Manufacturing 0.283 0.450  Manufacturing 0.268 0.443 
Other Care 0.056 0.231  Other Care 0.056 0.229 
Public Sector 0.062 0.240  Public Sector 0.063 0.243 
Retail 0.126 0.332  Retail 0.101 0.301 
Transportation/ 
Communication 
0.082 0.274  Transportation/ 
Communication 
0.049 0.217 
Temporary work 0.005 0.069  Temporary work 0.019 0.136 
       
Firm-level worker 
characteristics 
   Firm-level worker 
characteristics 
  
Died [t-4 until t-1] 0.0088 0.0141  Died [t-4 until t-1] 0.0105 0.0168 
Age 40.99 3.72  Age 41.92 4.28 
Female 0.25 0.22  Female 0.26 0.23 
Born in the 
Netherlands 
0.87 0.11  Born in the  
Netherlands 
0.86 0.13 
Married 0.59 0.13  Married 0.60 0.13 
Number of children 1.21 0.43  Number of children 1.21 0.44 
Hospitalized [t-1] 0.024 0.024  Hospitalized [t-1] 0.025 0.025 
Wage income [t-1] 32.66 14.99  Wage income [t-1] 34.94 15.26 
Job tenure 8.08 3.27  Job tenure 8.49 3.97 
       
N 840,915   N 8,394  
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Figure 5.1: Probability to die within five years for men (percentages), by labor force state  
 
 
5.4  Institutional setting 
The institutional setting that accommodates job loss due to firm closure may affect the 
effect of job loss on (lifetime) earnings. Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) find that the 
effect of job loss on mortality runs through (lifetime) earnings. This implies that the 
institutional setting may affect the size and direction of the effect of job loss due to firm 
closure on mortality as well. 
Laid-off workers with employment tenures as the ones in our dataset were eligible for UI 
benefits of up to five years, irrespective of whether the firm they were employed in closed 
down.
96
 The potential UI benefit duration depended positively on the employment tenure 
of the worker.
97
 The replacement rate was 70 percent of the final wage (Dutch government, 
2015a).
98
 So, even if workers were not re-employed soon after job loss, the short-run 
effects of job loss on income were modest.  
                                                          
96
 Eligibility was conditional on, for instance, actively looking for a job. 
97
 The data of Statistics Netherlands do not go back far enough in the past to determine the 
maximum duration for unemployment benefit per individual.  
98
 Workers did not build up occupational pension capital during unemployment. 
0
1
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In addition to UI benefits, laid off workers may have received severance pay. Workers who 
were laid off by firms that closed down but did not go bankrupt did in certain cases receive 
severance pay from their employer. Workers employed in this type of closing firms could 
generally speaking be laid off via the court (Dutch Government, 2015b) or via the 
Employee Insurance Agency (Dutch Government, 2015c). Layoffs via the former route 
typically resulted in severance pay for the laid off workers. The levels of these 
compensations depended strongly and positively on age, job tenure and wage income. 
Compensations for workers aged 45 with job tenure of five years, i.e. the youngest workers 
with the lowest job tenure in our dataset, were typically about half an annual wage. In case 
of layoffs via the Employee Insurance Agency, employers had to ask the Employee 
Insurance Agency for permission to lay off workers. If permission was granted, employers 
could typically lay off workers without giving them any compensation. Workers may in 
this case have gone to court to seek compensations from their (former) employers.   
Workers laid off due to firm bankruptcy may have received severance pay in two cases. 
First, if some inventory remained after the trustee and preferred creditors were paid. 
Second, if a board member of the employer inappropriately subtracted financial wealth 
from the firm prior to bankruptcy and he or she was held liable for this (Dutch 
Government, 2015d). Both cases were not common, however, so workers did typically not 
receive any severance pay for job loss due to firm bankruptcy (Berntsen and Mulder, 2014; 
Van Riet, 2014).
99
  
The oldest workers in our dataset may have used unemployment insurance as an alternative 
retirement path.
100
 The social security eligibility age in the Netherlands was 65 during the 
period studied. Early retirement pensions of occupational pension funds generally offered 
benefits as of age 60, 61 or 62 to the oldest workers in our dataset, depending on the 
pension fund. They typically required workers to have been employed continuously for a 
certain number of years prior to early retirement. As workers in our dataset did not reach 
the age of 60 yet, they were not eligible to retire early after job loss without getting re-
                                                          
99
 Workers may have asked the judge to get severance pay in case of firm bankruptcy. This 
severance pay was paid out of what was left of the inventory after the trustee and preferred 
creditors had been paid. However, as there was typically nothing left of the inventory, chances to 
get severance pay by making a request to the judge were very low.    
100
 Chan and Stevens (2001) find that job loss among older workers has strong and lasting effects 
on employment rates. Tatsiramos (2010) finds that older workers who are displaced in countries 
with relatively more generous UI provisions have relatively lower re-employment rates.  
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employed beforehand. However, UI benefits may have provided the opportunity to close 
part of the gap in earnings between the time of job loss and reaching the normal retirement 
age. Long-run income loss effects through career disruption may, however, have been 
important even if workers could have claimed UI benefits, especially for the somewhat 
younger workers in our sample. 
 
5.5  Identification strategy 
We use a standard treatment effect estimation framework to estimate the average treatment 
effect as specified in (5.1).  
(5.1) α =  ATE = E(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1) − E(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0)  
for individual i, i = 1, 2, … . , N and year t, t = 2003, 2004, 2005   
Y is a dummy that equals one if an individual stayed employed on the job during the whole 
year of observation and died within the five years after December 31
st
 of the year of 
observation. It equals one as well if an individual who lost his job in the year of 
observation died within five years after the exact date of job loss. Y equals zero otherwise. 
X is a vector including first, second and third order terms for age, a dummy for being born 
in the Netherlands, a dummy for being married, number of children, a dummy for 
hospitalization (at t-1), wage income (at t-1), job tenure, firm size and industry 
dummies.
101
 X also includes firm-level fractions of workers having died during the four 
years preceding the year of observation, being female, being born in the Netherlands, being 
married and having been hospitalized (at t-1). It includes firm-level averages for worker’s 
age, number of children, wage income (at t-1) and job tenure as well. We use annual firm-
level averages for worker characteristics rather than firm-level averages over the whole 
period of observations, because annual firm-level averages capture developments in firm-
level worker characteristics across time. These may be important, as they may be related to 
firm closure. 𝐷 is a dummy that equals one if an individual lost his job due to firm closure 
in the year of observation and zero otherwise.  
                                                          
101
 We use the public sector as the base industry. The first, second and third order age terms are 
defined as (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45), (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)3. The industry dummies are dummies for 
each industry as classified by Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la 
Communauté Européenne (NACE) 1993 codes (Statistics Netherlands, 2004). 
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The validity of our approach relies on the conditional independence assumption as 
specified in (5.2).  
(2) Y0,it, Y1,it ⊥ Dit|Xit  
for each individual i and year t 
The conditional independence assumption (5.2) asserts that conditional on the control 
variables included in X, the treatment job loss due to firm closure was as good as randomly 
assigned. Within closing firms, all workers were fired, so whether these workers were laid 
off did certainly not depend on workers’ health. However, it may well be that workers 
employed in closing firms differed from workers employed in firms that did not close. One 
concern is that closing firms were relatively young and that these firms may have hired a 
certain selection of workers that had relatively poor health and relatively high probability 
to die within five years. We observe that closing firms actually had on average a higher 
fraction of workers dying during the four years preceding the year of observation than 
firms that did not close. We control for pre-existing between-firm differences in health and 
mortality by including the  fractions of workers having been hospitalized (at t-1) and 
having died during the four years preceding the year of observation as control variables. 
We control for job tenure, firm size and firm-level average job tenure as well, which we 
expect to be strongly related to the firms’ age and to pick up most of the effects related to 
being employed in young firms.  
If (5.2) holds, this implies (5.3). 
(5.3) E(𝑌0,𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡) =  E(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0) and E(𝑌1,𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡) =  E(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1)  
 for each individual i and year t 
Or, in words, if the conditional independence assumption holds, the expected probability to 
die within five years, conditional on observables, is the same for those who actually 
received the treatment “job loss due to firm closure” as for those who received the 
treatment hypothetically, irrespective of whether they actually received the treatment.  
If (5.2) holds, then (5.1) is equivalent to (5.4). 
(5.4) α =  ATE =  E(𝑌1,𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡) − E(𝑌0,𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡)  
for each individual i and year t 
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The average treatment effect is defined as the difference between the expected probability 
to die within five years for individuals who were laid off due to firm closure and those who 
were not laid off due to firm closure, conditional on observables.  
We estimate the average treatment effect specified in (5.1) by estimating the linear 
probability model specified in (5.5) using the administrative data as pooled cross-section 
data.  
 (5.5) 𝑌𝑖  = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑖β1 + 𝐷𝑖α + 𝜖𝑖  
We also include year in X here. The linear probability model compares mortality outcomes 
for workers in the control group with those in the treatment group, controlling for 
differences in observables. It is important to notice that workers in the control and 
treatment group are on average similar in many respects. This takes away the need to use a 
method such as propensity score matching, that only uses those observations in the control 
group with those in the treatment group that compare best in terms of predicted probability 
to lose jobs due to firm closure. As many workers were observed in multiple years, we 
cluster standard errors at the individual level to account for serial correlation in the error 
terms. We perform sensitivity checks on our functional form specification in Section 
5.6.4.3. We find that our result is in particular sensitive to excluding age terms and firm-
level worker characteristics from X. 
  
5.6  Results 
5.6.1 Baseline estimate 
Table 5.2 shows that job loss due to firm closure increased the probability to die within 
five years by 0.60 percentage points or 34 percent. This effect is significant at the one 
percent level. We discuss in Section 5.6.3 that our results on the effects of job loss on 
mortality on alternative time horizons are similar to those of Eliason and Storrie (2009) and 
Browning and Heinesen (2012). The coefficient estimates on most control variables show 
signs and p-values as we expect them to be. The probability to die within five years is 
positively related with age and being hospitalized (at t-1) and negatively related with wage 
income (at t-1). Firm-level average probability to die during the four years preceding the 
year of observation shows a positive relation with the probability to die within five years. 
This captures firm-level mortality effects, including the mortality effects of firm-level 
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stress, work conditions, health related hiring policy and other selection of workers into 
firms. Firm-level average age and hospitalization status (at t-1) have negative coefficients. 
This is the consequence of controlling for firm-level mortality (during the period t-4 until t-
1).  
Table 5.2: Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimates for the probability to die within five  
years (in percentage points) (Ordinary Least Squares, OLS) *  
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Job loss 0.5968 0.1763 0.001 
(𝐴𝑔𝑒 − 45) 0.1512 0.0308 0.000 
(𝐴𝑔𝑒 − 45)2 -0.0051 0.0059 0.383 
(𝐴𝑔𝑒 − 45)3 0.0007 0.0003 0.018 
Born in the 
Netherlands 
0.1623 0.0720 0.024 
Married -0.7989 0.0636 0.000 
Number of children -0.1121 0.0189 0.000 
Hospitalized [t-1] 1.0749 0.0855 0.000 
Wage income [t-1] -0.0086 0.0008 0.000 
Job tenure -0.0354 0.0033 0.000 
Firm size 0.0003 0.0002 0.188 
Year 0.0150 0.0148 0.310 
    
Industry    
Agriculture 0.1302 0.1778 0.464 
Asset Management -0.0131 0.1446 0.928 
Banking/Insurance 0.3077 0.1978 0.120 
Catering -0.1409 0.2842 0.620 
Commercial Services 0.0953 0.1143 0.404 
Construction -0.1114 0.1103 0.312 
Education -0.0985 0.1116 0.378 
Health Care -0.1862 0.1594 0.243 
Manufacturing -0.0705 0.0998 0.480 
Other Care 0.0507 0.1222 0.678 
Retail -0.0349 0.1055 0.741 
Transportation/ 
Communication 
-0.0538 0.1217 0.659 
Temporary work -0.4932 0.2908 0.090 
Base industry: Public Sector    
F-test on joint significance 
industry dummies:                F = 1.26, p=0.2314 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Firm-level worker 
characteristics 
   
Died [t-4 until t-1] 0.0150 0.0003 0.000 
Hospitalized [t-1] -1.4799 0.7012 0.035 
Age -0.1437 0.0086 0.000 
Female 0.3910 0.2096 0.062 
Born in the 
Netherlands 
-0.6322 0.2077 0.002 
Married 0.9026 0.2574 0.000 
Number of children 0.0770 0.0982 0.433 
Wage income [t-1] 0.0030 0.0011 0.005 
Job tenure 0.0672 0.0092 0.000 
    
Constant -24.120 29.709 0.417 
    
N 849,309   
* Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
 
5.6.2  Effects of job loss on cause-specific mortality  
Specific causes of death may be related to working or being laid off. For instance, if job 
loss would induce high stress levels, the effect of job loss on mortality may run through, 
amongst others, diseases of the circulatory system. We estimate the linear probability 
model in (5.5) using a dummy variable for dying within five years due to a specific 
frequent cause as a dependent variable to get more insight in the mechanism through which 
job loss affects mortality.
102
 The causes of death are grouped in so called chapters, 
according to the 10
th
 Revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems (ICD-10). The ICD is a health status classification system by the 
World Health Organization (WHO, 2010). For the most frequent causes of death, cancer 
and diseases of the circulatory system, we also estimate the model for those subchapters, so 
called blocks, that frequently caused death. We estimate the model for intentional self-
harm as well, because this is an interesting cause of death in the context of this study. As 
job loss may induce workers to change their life style, we estimate the model for alcohol-
related mortality and mortality due to smoking-related cancers as well. There are no 
chapters or blocks on alcohol-related diseases and smoking-related cancers included in the 
                                                          
102
 We consider a cause to be frequent if it causes death of at least 250 individuals in our dataset.  
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ICD classification. As Eliason and Storrie (2009) do for both of these groups of diseases 
and Browning and Heinesen (2012) do for alcohol-related diseases only, we create 
categories on these causes of death ourselves. The category mortality due to smoking-
related cancers includes fatalities due to cancers of the respiratory system, with lung cancer 
being the most frequent cancer of the respiratory system. According to Albert and Samet 
(2003), 90 percent of the lung cancer cases can be attributed to active smoking. The 
category mortality due to alcohol-related diseases includes fatalities that can directly be 
attributed to alcohol use.
103
  
Table 5.3 shows that the effect of job loss on cause-specific mortality is positive and 
significant at the five percent level for mortality due to diseases of the circulatory system 
and positive and significant at the ten percent level for mortality due to neoplasms 
(cancers). The effect on mortality due to neoplasms is driven by mortality due to smoking-
related cancers and the effect on mortality due to diseases of the circulatory system is 
driven by mortality due to cerebrovascular diseases. Cerebrovascular diseases can cause 
acute mortality. Hypertension is the most important modifiable risk factor for this type of 
diseases. Other risk factors include diabetes, obesity, alcohol use, smoking, lack of 
physical exercise, high cholesterol, high blood glucose and low fruit and vegetable intake 
(WHO, 2009). Risk factors for hypertension include obesity, smoking, alcohol 
consumption, physical inactivity and stress (Kaplan and Nunes, 2003; Appel et al., 2006; 
Truelsen, Begg and Mathers, 2006). We find that job loss decreased the probability to die 
within five years due to external causes of death excluding intentional self-harm. This 
effect is significant at the five percent level and may be explained by workers who stayed 
on their jobs dying in work-related accidents, such as accidents that occur when 
commuting between home and work.   
The positive effect of job loss on mortality due to cerebrovascular diseases and mortality 
due to diseases of the circulatory system in general is consistent with Browning and 
Heinesen (2012). They suggest that the effect of job loss on mortality due to diseases of the 
circulatory system runs through stress. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2015) find that job 
loss affects health through smoking-related diseases. We find this as well.  
                                                          
103
 The causes of death classification with the corresponding ICD-10 codes is included in the 
Appendix Chapter 5, Table A5.1, at the end of this document.    
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5.6.3 Mortality effects of job loss by year since layoff  
So far, we have focused on mortality within five years as the outcome variable. Estimating 
the model specified in (5.5) with mortality within fewer years as the outcome variable may 
provide insights on how long it takes for job loss to affect mortality. Table 5.4 shows that 
job loss has a positive 0.22 percentage point or 86 percent strong effect on mortality in the 
first year after job loss. The effect of job loss on mortality in the first two years after job 
loss is 0.34 percentage point or 61 percent and the effect of job loss on mortality in the first 
three years after job loss is 0.36 percentage point or 39 percent. The effect of job loss on 
mortality in the first four years after job loss is 0.55 percentage point or 41 percent. The 
relative sizes of these effects across time horizons are consistent with Browning and 
Heinesen (2012), who find that job loss increased mortality by 84 percent in the first year 
after displacement, 36 percent in the first four years after displacement and 17 percent in 
the first ten years after displacement. The relative size of the effect estimated by Eliason 
and Storrie (2009), who find that job loss increased the probability to die within four years 
by 44 percent, is consistent with our result as well. One possible explanation for the strong 
effect in the first year after is that job loss induced stress, causing cerebrovascular diseases 
that resulted in death among some of the laid off workers. The effect of job loss on 
mortality in later years after job loss is consistent with our earlier evidence suggesting that 
the effect runs through changes in smoking behavior.    
Table 5.4: LPM estimates for the probability to die within less than five years (in  
 percentage points) (OLS) * 
The probability to die within  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Coefficient estimate job loss (?̂?) 0.2229 0.3435 0.3645 0.5471 0.5968 
Standard error 0.0812 0.1116 0.1335 0.1583 0.1763 
P-value 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.001 
Relative effect (%) 85.8 60.9 39.4 41.2 33.5 
* Each estimate is a coefficient estimate for job loss (?̂?) for the model as specified in (5) with a 
dummy for dying within the indicated number of years as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables are job loss, (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45), (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)2, (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, 
marital status, number of children, hospitalization status (at t-1), wage income (at t-1), job tenure, 
firm size, industry dummies, year and firm-level averages on the probability to die during the four 
years preceding the year of observation, age, gender, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, 
number of children, hospitalization status (at t-1), wage income (at t-1) and job tenure. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level. The relative effect is the coefficient estimate on job loss 
times 100 divided by the base fractions of workers who died within the relevant number of years 
for workers who stayed in their jobs.   
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5.6.4 Robustness checks   
5.6.4.1 Robustness checks on the type of job loss     
We estimate the mortality effects of job loss due to firm closure. There are other types of 
job loss that can be applied in the estimation of the effect of job loss on mortality as well. 
These other types of job loss include job loss in firms experiencing large employment 
declines as applied in Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009), and job loss due to firm 
bankruptcy that has to our knowledge not been applied before. The effects of job loss on 
mortality may differ across treatments and the workers receiving the treatments may differ 
in terms of characteristics. This may make between-study comparisons of the mortality 
effects of job loss using the different types unsuitable. Our data allow us to distinguish the 
three types of job loss and to compare their effects on mortality. The three types of job loss 
directly relate to each other, as job losses due to bankruptcy of firms are a subset of all job 
losses due to firm closures and job losses due to firm closures are a subset of all departures 
from firms that were experiencing employment declines of at least 40 percent compared to 
the previous year of observation.  
Table 5.5, variation a, shows that for the baseline dataset excluding observations on cases 
of job loss due to firm closure that did not involve firm bankruptcy, there is no effect of job 
loss on the probability to die within five years. For the baseline selection of observations 
including observations on workers employed in firms that experienced employment 
declines of at least 40 percent in the year of observation, we find that the effect of job loss 
on mortality is about one-third smaller than the baseline effect (variation b).
104
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104
 The same criteria for selection of these observations apply as for the observations in the baseline 
dataset, except for the criterion on the treatment the worker received.   
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Table 5.5: LPM estimates for the probability to die within five years for alternative  
definitions of job loss (in percentage points) (OLS) * 
Variation Definition of job loss Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
N treatment 
group 
 Job loss due to firm closure 
(baseline) 
0.5968 0.1763 0.001 8,394   
a. Job loss due to firm 
bankruptcy 
0.1117 0.3879 0.773 1,552 
b. Job loss due to a firm-level 
employment declines of at 
least 40% 
0.3889 0.1504 0.010 10,735 
* Each estimate is a coefficient estimate for job loss (?̂?) for the model as specified in (5) with a 
dummy for dying within five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are job 
loss, (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45), (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)2, (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, 
number of children, hospitalization status (at t-1), wage income (at t-1), job tenure, firm size, 
industry dummies, year and firm-level averages on the probability to die during the four years 
preceding the year of observation, age, gender, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, 
number of children, hospitalization status (at t-1), wage income (at t-1) and job tenure. The control 
groups are the same in variations a and b as in the baseline case. Standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level. The relative effect is the coefficient estimate on job loss times 100 divided by the 
base fractions of workers who died within five years.    
 
5.6.4.2 Robustness checks on data selection criteria     
We find an effect of job loss on mortality for a particular selection of observations that we 
believe represents a clean sample. We investigate whether our baseline result is sensitive to 
changing data selection criteria.  
Our baseline selection only includes observations on workers in the age category 45-59. 
Table 5.6, variation a shows that the mortality effect of job loss estimated on the sample 
excluding observations on workers aged 52 (median age) or older is almost identical to the 
effect estimated on the baseline sample. If observations on workers younger than age 52 
are excluded from the sample, the effect is similar to the baseline effect as well (variation 
b).
105
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 Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) find that the effect of job loss on mortality is smaller for older 
workers. We have verified whether this is also true in our case, estimating (5) with the dummy for 
job loss and the dummy for job loss interacted with age included in D. We find that the coefficient 
on job loss interacted with age is not significant at the ten percent level, however.  
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We exclude observations for workers employed in firms with fewer than five or more than 
400 workers on January 1
st
 of the year of observation. We do so to keep our control group 
and treatment group comparable. Very large firms may rarely close, making workers 
employed at these firms end up in the control group only. Firms with less than five workers 
include self-employed and may so be considered as unstable firms. Workers employed at 
these firms may end up disproportionally often in the treatment group. The effect of job 
loss on mortality for the extended sample including observations on workers employed in 
firms with less than five or more than 400 workers is larger than but similar to the baseline 
estimate (variation c).  
Similar to Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009), we exclude observations on workers with job 
tenures of less than five years to ensure that workers had stable employment relationships. 
There is no effect if we include observations on workers with job tenures of at least one 
year in our dataset as well (variation d). Excluding observations on workers with job 
tenures shorter than ten years results in an effect that is larger than the baseline effect 
(variation e). Workers with shorter job tenures may be more flexible and better able to deal 
with job loss than workers with longer job tenures. This may have resulted in a stronger 
effect of job loss on mortality for workers with longer job tenures and the absence of an 
effect of job loss on mortality for workers with shorter job tenures.   
We also only select observations with wage incomes (at t-1) of at least 20,000 euros to 
ensure that workers in our dataset had strong labor force attachment. Lowering this 
threshold by 10,000 euros hardly affects the number of observations in our dataset and has 
a negligible impact on the size of the effect (variation f). The small effect of lowering the 
income threshold on the number of observations in our dataset reflects that older male 
workers in their career jobs typically did not work only few hours. Conversely, excluding 
observations on workers who earned less than 30,000 euros (at t-1) strongly reduces the 
number of observations. The effect of job loss on mortality based on observations that had 
wage income levels above this increased threshold is smaller than the baseline estimate 
(variation g). One potential explanation is that workers who earn relatively little are more 
likely to earn just enough to break even. Job loss (slightly) decreased income for these 
workers that brought some of them in trouble paying their daily expenses. This resulted in 
stress that negatively affected their health and increased their probability to die within five 
years.  
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We exclude observations on workers employed at firms experiencing large employment 
declines or growth prior to closure to minimize the risk that job loss is endogenous to 
mortality. As a robustness check, we estimate the effect of job loss on mortality for a 
sample that includes observations on workers employed in firms that experienced any 
employment reductions or employment growth in the years preceding closure. We find that 
this effect is smaller than the baseline effect (variation h). Workers employed in firms that 
experienced prior mass layoffs may have become better able to handle layoff related stress 
by their prior experiences. This may have made the effect of job loss on mortality smaller 
for these workers.   
We exclude observations on workers who were laid off due to firm closure if at least 40 
percent of the workforce got employed in one particular firm within one year after closure. 
We do so to rule out that closing firms may have restarted or may be taken over by another 
firm, effectively keeping workers in employment. Estimating the effect of job loss on 
mortality for the dataset including these observations gives an effect that is almost identical 
to the baseline estimate (variation i).  
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Table 5.6: Robustness checks on data selection: LPM estimates for the probability to die  
 within  five years (in percentage points) (OLS) * 
Variation Robustness check Coef. Std. Err. P-val. N 
 Baseline 0.5968 0.1763 0.001 849,309   
a. Excl. workers aged 52 
(median age) or older  
0.5792 0.2200 0.008 414,931 
b. Excl. workers aged younger 
than 52 (median age) 
0.5758 0.2622 0.028 434,378 
c. Incl. workers employed in 
firms of any size 
0.9252 0.1537 0.000 2,113,677 
d. Incl. workers with job tenures 
of at least 1 year 
0.1492 0.1319 0.258 971,028 
e. Excl. workers with job tenure 
less than 10 years 
0.7450 0.2286 0.001 631,478 
f. Incl. workers with wage 
income[t-1] of at least 10,000 
euros 
0.6032 0.1746 0.001 872,120 
g. Excl. workers with wage 
income[t-1] lower than 30,000 
euros 
0.5032 0.1862 0.007 702,352 
h. Incl. firms with layoffs prior to 
the year of observation 
0.3769 0.1450 0.009 971,354 
i. Incl. cases of job loss due to 
firm closure if at least 40% of 
the workers employed in a 
closing firm got employed in 
one particular firm within one 
year after firm closure 
0.5807 0.1617 0.000 850,814 
* Our dataset (baseline) includes observations on male workers in the age category 45-59 who had 
the Dutch nationality in the year of observation, who had a continuous job tenure of at least five 
years at the same firm on January 1
st
 of the year of observation and who had a wage income of at 
least 20,000 euros in the year prior to the year of observation. We exclude observations on workers 
employed in firms that have less than five or at least 400 workers. We exclude observations on job 
departures other than forced layoffs due to firm closure. We exclude observations on job loss due 
to firm closure as well if at least 40 percent of the workers employed in a closing firm got 
employed in one particular company within one year after closure. We also exclude observations 
on closing firms that experienced workforce declines of at least 20 percent during the four years 
prior to the year of observation.  
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5.6.4.3 Robustness checks on functional form specification     
We verify whether our baseline result is sensitive to functional form specification changes. 
We estimate the treatment effect using a specification that is identical to the baseline 
specification, except that one of the independent variables or one group of independent 
variables is left out. Table 5.7, variation a, shows that the effect of job loss on mortality 
estimated using the functional form excluding firm-level worker characteristics is 0.83 
percentage points or 46 percent. This is much larger than the baseline estimate. Excluding 
individual firm-level worker characteristics from our functional form generally does not 
affect our result much (variations b-j), except for excluding firm-level mortality (during the 
period t-4 until t-1).The effect of job loss on mortality estimated using the functional form 
excluding firm-level mortality is much larger than the baseline estimate as well (variation 
b). These results suggest that our result is biased upwards if we do not control for pre-
existing differences in worker characteristics in general and pre-existing differences in 
worker mortality rates in particular.  
Our baseline result is in general robust to leaving an independent variable or group of 
independent variables out of the functional form (variations k-t). The only exceptions are 
leaving out the nonlinear age terms and job tenure, giving estimates that are larger than the 
baseline estimate (variations k and q). If we include age dummies instead of nonlinear age 
terms as independent variables in our functional form, our result is similar to the baseline 
estimate (variation u).  
Table 5.7: Robustness checks on functional form specification: LPM estimates for the  
probability to die within five years (in percentage points) (OLS) * 
Variation Robustness check Coef. Std. Err. P-val. 
Rel. effect 
(%) 
 Baseline 0.5968 0.1763 0.001   33.5 
a. Do not control for any firm-
level worker characteristic  
0.8257 0.1787 0.000 46.4 
b. Do not control for firm-level 
average mortality rates [t-4 
until t-1] 
0.7763 0.1788 0.000 43.6 
c. Do not control for firm-level 
average hospitalization rates 
[t-1] 
0.5966 0.1763 0.001 33.5 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
Variation Robustness check Coef. Std. Err. P-val. 
Rel. effect 
(%) 
d. Do not control for firm-level 
average age 
0.5649 0.1764 0.001 31.7 
e. Do not control for firm-level 
fraction of female workers 
0.5952 0.1764 0.001 33.4 
f. Do not control for firm-level 
fraction of workers born in 
the Netherlands 
0.6006 0.1763 0.001 33.7 
g. Do not control for firm-level 
fraction of married workers 
0.5943 0.1764 0.001 33.4 
h. Do not control for firm-level 
average number of children 
0.5967 0.1763 0.001 33.5 
i. Do not control for firm-level 
average wage income[t-1] 
0.5990 0.1763 0.001 33.6 
j. Do not control for firm-level 
average job tenure 
0.6358 0.1763 0.000 35.7 
      
k. Do not control for age 0.7574 0.1767 0.000 42.5 
l. Do not control for being 
born in the Netherlands 
0.5977 0.1763 0.001 33.6 
m. Do not control for marital 
status 
0.5942 0.1764 0.001 33.4 
n. Do not control for number of 
children 
0.5979 0.1764 0.001 33.6 
o. Do not control for 
hospitalization[t-1] 
0.5994 0.1764 0.001 33.7 
p. Do not control for wage 
income[t-1] 
0.6082 0.1764 0.001 34.2 
q. Do not control for job tenure 0.6816 0.1761 0.000 38.3 
r. Do not control for firm size 0.5936 0.1763 0.001 33.3 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
Variation Robustness check Coef. Std. Err. P-val. 
Rel. effect 
(%) 
s. Do not control for industry 
dummies 
0.6063 0.1763 0.001 34.0 
t. Do not control for year 0.5967 0.1764 0.001 33.5 
u. Control for age fixed effects 
instead of nonlinear age 
effects 
0.5967 0.1764 0.001 33.5 
* Each estimate is a coefficient estimate for job loss (?̂?) for the model as specified in (5) with a 
dummy for dying within five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are job 
loss, (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45), (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)2, (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, 
number of children, hospitalization status (at t-1), wage income (at t-1), job tenure, firm size, 
industry dummies, year and firm-level  averages on the probability to die during the four years 
preceding the year of observation, age, gender, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, 
number of children, hospitalization status (at t-1), wage income (at t-1) and job tenure. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level.  
 
5.7  Conclusions    
We study the effect of job loss on mortality. As ill-health workers may be more likely to 
lose their jobs than healthier workers, simply regressing job loss on mortality will result in 
a coefficient estimate on job loss that is biased upwards. Studies in the literature attempt to 
avoid such endogeneity bias by using job loss due to firm closure (Eliason and Storrie, 
2009; Browning and Heinesen, 2012; Michaud, Crimmins and Hurd, 2014) and job loss in 
firms experiencing large firm-level employment declines (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 
2009) as treatments to estimate mortality effects of job loss. These treatments may be 
endogenous to mortality as well, however. We actually find that firm-level mortality rates 
during the four years preceding the year of observation were higher in closing firms than in 
firms that did not close. These pre-existing differences in firm-level worker mortality rates 
may exist due to selective hiring or selective worker outflow prior to firm closure or large 
firm-level employment declines. We control for pre-existing differences in firm-level 
worker health and mortality rates and other firm-level worker characteristics. To our 
knowledge, we are the first study in the literature to do so.  
We study the effect of job loss due to sudden firm closure on mortality for older male 
workers with strong labor force attachment, using employee-employer matched 
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administrative data from the Netherlands. We find that job loss due to firm closure 
increased the probability to die within five years by 0.60 percentage point or 34 percent. 
This is similar to the findings of Eliason and Storrie (2009) and Browning and Heinesen 
(2012). We find that job loss increased the probability to die within five years by 0.83 
percentage point or 46 percent if we do not control for firm-level worker characteristics. 
This effect being larger than the effect we find after controlling for firm-level worker 
characteristics suggests that the coefficient estimate of job loss on mortality is biased if we 
do not control for firm-level worker characteristics.  
Taking a closer look at the mechanism driving the effect of job loss on mortality, we find 
that job loss due to firm closure may run through stress, as cause-specific mortality 
analysis shows that (acute) diseases of the circulatory system are important drivers of the 
effect. The strong effect of job loss on mortality in the first year after job loss is consistent 
with an effect running through stress and (acute) diseases of the circulatory system. Eliason 
and Storrie (2009) and Browning and Heinesen (2012) find that diseases of the circulatory 
system are important drivers of the effect of job loss on mortality as well. Changes in 
lifestyle seem to be relevant too, because smoking-related cancers account for part of the 
effect of job loss on mortality. This is consistent with Black, Devereux and Salvanes 
(2015), who find that job loss negatively affects health through smoking-related diseases.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions/Summary 
 
In this dissertation, we study various topics related to job loss, retirement and mortality. 
Chapter 2 studies gradual retirement. Gradual retirement by which individuals leave their 
career jobs and withdraw incrementally from the labor force, is an important empirical 
phenomenon in the United States. We analyze the current state of gradual retirement in the 
Netherlands using administrative data that allow much more precise tracking of labor 
market transitions than most survey panel data. We estimate multinomial transition models 
taking into account competing pathways out of career employment at older ages, and 
discuss institutional aspects that limit the scope of gradual retirement, such as financial 
incentives to retire early.  
In Chapter 3, we estimate and explain the impact of incentive-induced early retirement of 
husbands on their wives’ probability to retire within one year, using administrative data 
from the Netherlands. We employ an instrumental variable approach in which the 
retirement choice of husbands is instrumented with eligibility rules for generous early 
retirement benefits that were temporarily and unexpectedly available to them. We find that 
induced early retirement of husbands increased their wives’ probability to retire by 19.7 
percentage points. This is a strong, and robust effect. Partly, wives respond to husbands’ 
choices at ages when they may have been eligible for early retirement programs 
themselves. 
Chapter 4 identifies and estimates the impact of early retirement on the probability to die 
within five years, using Dutch administrative micro panel data. An unexpected temporary 
decrease in the eligibility age for retirement benefits for civil servants is used to instrument 
the retirement choice in a model that explains the probability to die within five years. We 
find for men that induced early retirement decreased the probability to die within five years 
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by 2.6 percentage points. This translates into an increase in life expectancy by two months. 
We find that our result is robust to specification changes and changes in data selection 
criteria. 
In Chapter 5, we estimate the effect of job loss on mortality for older male workers with 
strong labor force attachment. Using Dutch administrative data, we find that job loss due to 
sudden firm closure increased the probability to die within five years by a sizable 0.60 
percentage points. Importantly, this effect is estimated using a model that controls for firm-
level worker characteristics, such as firm-level average lagged mortality rates. On the 
mechanism driving the effect of job loss on mortality, we provide evidence for an effect 
running through stress and changes in life style.   
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Appendix 
Appendix Chapter 3 
The Dutch pension system        
The Dutch pension system rests on three pillars (Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001). The first 
pillar is the public old-age pension. The public old-age pension is financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis. Contributions stem from workers and employers. All residents registered in 
the Netherlands accrue public old-age pension rights. Public old-age pension benefits are 
flat. For couples they equal the minimum wage.
106
 Singles receive 70 percent of the 
minimum wage. For every year between the ages 15 and 65 that individuals did not reside 
in the Netherlands, public old-age benefits are cut by two percentage points.  
The second pillar consists of occupational pensions, most frequently of the defined benefit 
type. Occupational pensions are funded pensions and are typically managed at the industry 
level and sometimes at the firm level (for large employers). About 90 percent of all 
workers participate in  occupational pension plans with contributions from both workers 
and employers. Workers who participate in pension plans pay contributions over the 
difference between their wages and a nominal threshold called the “franchise”. The 
“franchise” roughly equals the public old-age benefit level for  married individuals. The 
aggregate of first and second pillar pension benefits provided pension benefits as of age 65 
with replacement rates of up to 70 percent of workers’ gross mid-career salaries. Owing to 
the large number of occupational pension plans, there is considerable heterogeneity in 
pension conditions.
107
 The age as of which workers can retire, the eligibility criteria, 
whether pension benefits are based on end-of-career or mid-career salaries, and the 
generosity of pension benefits vary substantially across pension funds.
108
 
109
 
                                                          
106
 Both spouses receive 50 percent of the minimum wage.  
107
 There are approximately 80 pension funds. About 55 of these are profession-wide or sectoral 
pension funds, while 25 are firm-specific. 
108
 Across the years of observation, a large number of pension funds switched from a regime that 
based pension benefits on end-of-career salary to a mid-career salary regime. The public sector 
pension fund was one of the earliest switchers with its conversion on January 1, 2004. 
109
 Replacement rates of the DB pension benefits depended on, amongst others, the number of 
contribution years. 
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Occupational pension funds typically offered early retirement pensions to their 
participants. Early retirement pensions allowed full retirement as of a specific age. The 
early retirement eligibility age generally varied from 60 to 62. Eligibility criteria for early 
retirement benefits may include a minimum number of contribution years or having 
contributed to the pension fund continuously during a minimum number of years prior to 
early retirement.
110
 Due to stipulations in the Dutch tax law, early retirement benefits were 
generous and actuarially unfair. Early retirement benefits provided before normal 
retirement were higher than occupational pension benefits provided as of the normal 
retirement age to (partly) compensate early retirees for not receiving public old-age 
pension benefits before normal retirement. 
 
Regular early retirement arrangements for civil servants 
As of April 1
st
, 1997, early retirement benefits for civil servants consisted of two parts. The 
first part was in general 70 percent of the “franchise” for civil servants who had worked 
full-time during their working life.
111
 The first part intended to compensate early retirees 
for the lack of old-age pension benefits for the period between early retirement and normal 
retirement. Civil servants were eligible for the first part if they satisfied two conditions. 
First, they had to have been employed as civil servants continuously during the ten years 
prior to early retirement. Second, they had to have contributed continuously to the public 
pension fund during the ten years preceding early retirement. The first part of early 
retirement benefits, which was financed on a pay-as-you-go-basis, was in general higher 
when civil servants retired at later ages. Contributions for this part came from both workers 
and employers. Part two of early retirement benefits was funded. Workers and employers 
contributed to the accrual of benefits for this part. When civil servants would have accrued 
benefits for 40 years, the sum of the first and second part would have been 70 percent of 
workers’ mid-career salaries. The replacement rate was reduced by 1.75 percentage points 
for every year civil servants would have accrued benefits less than 40 years. Civil servants 
were allowed to do paid work after early retirement. However, total income of retired civil 
                                                          
110
 For instance, early retirement arrangements of the public sector pension fund required workers 
to have contributed to the public pension fund continuously during the ten years prior to early 
retirement and to have contributed to the public sector pension system during 40 or more years, 
depending on the year of birth. We do not have access to data on occupational (early retirement) 
pensions.    
111
 This replacement rate is based on retirement at the ER eligibility age. The ER eligibility age 
depends on the birth date of an individual.   
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servants was not allowed to exceed 100 percent of the end-of-career salary. Otherwise, 
early retirement benefits were cut to bring down the total income earned to 100 percent of 
the end-of-career salary (means test).  
 
Other policy changes 
On January 1
st
, 2004, the public sector pension fund switched from an end-of-career salary 
pension system to a mid-career salary pension system. However, due to a transition 
arrangement, civil servants born before January 1
st
, 1954 were hardly affected by the 
switch.  
 
Early retirement via disability insurance  
Workers may be able to withdraw early from the labor force by starting to receive 
disability insurance (DI) benefits. Workers could start receiving DI benefits if they were 
judged to be disabled by a medical examiner of the social insurance institute. Depending 
on the extent of disability, DI benefits amounted to up to 75 percent of workers’ end-of-
career salaries. The duration of DI benefits was at least half a year with a maximum of six 
years. The DI system was financed by workers and employers. In the context of this study, 
it is important to notice that civil servants faced the same generosity of and eligibility 
criteria for DI benefits as workers employed in other sectors, and that there were no major 
changes in DI in 2005 except one on December 29th.  
From that day on, eligibility criteria for individuals starting to receive disability benefits 
have been tightened and disability benefits have been made less generous for workers who 
are only partially disabled. Two years earlier, another change in disability insurance had 
taken place. From January 1
st
, 2004, workers could only start receiving DI benefits after 
having been continuously ill for two years while employed. We hardly observe any civil 
servants who were induced to retire in 2005 and started receiving disability benefits in that 
year. Moreover, the inflow into DI for men in all ages decreased smoothly from 53,000 in 
2001 to 36,000 in 2004 and dropped to 17,000 in 2005. It is thus unlikely that the 
retirement rates in 2005 were boosted by changed incentives in DI (Statistics Netherlands, 
2006). 
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Appendix Chapter 4 
The Dutch pension system 
The Dutch pension system rests on three pillars (Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001). The first 
pillar is the public old-age pension. The public old-age pension is financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis. Contributions stem from workers and employers. All residents registered in 
the Netherland accrue public old-age pension rights. Public old-age pension benefits are 
flat. For couples they equal the minimum wage. Singles receive 70 percent of the minimum 
wage. For every year between the ages 15 and 65 that an individual does not reside in the 
Netherlands, public old-age benefits are cut by two percentage points. The second pillar 
consists of occupational pensions. Occupational pensions are funded pensions and are 
generally managed on the sector level.
112
 About 90 percent of the workers participate in an 
occupational pension plan. Occupational pension schemes receive contributions from 
workers and employers. Workers who participate in a pension plan pay contributions over 
the difference between their wage and a nominal threshold called the “franchise”. As every 
firm or sector has its own pension plan and pension conditions, there is a large 
heterogeneity among occupational pensions. At the time at which the early retirement 
window was opened, there was also a large heterogeneity in early retirement arrangements. 
The third pillar consists of private provisions. Private provisions include amongst others 
annuity insurance.  
 
Regular early retirement arrangements for civil servants 
As of April 1
st
, 1997, early retirement benefits for civil servants consisted of two parts. The 
first part was in general 70 percent of the “franchise” for civil servants who had worked 
full-time during their working life.
113
 The first part intended to compensate early retirees 
for the lack of old-age pension benefits for the period between early retirement and normal 
retirement. Civil servants were eligible for the first part if they satisfied two conditions. 
First, they had to have been employed as civil servants continuously during the ten years 
prior to early retirement. Second, they had to have contributed continuously to the public 
pension fund during the ten years preceding early retirement. The first part of early 
retirement benefits was in general higher when a civil servant retired at a later age. The 
                                                          
112
 Various large employers have their own pension fund.  
113
 This replacement rate is based on retirement at the ER eligibility age. The ER eligibility age 
depends on the birth date of an individual.   
 155 
 
first part was financed on a pay-as-you-go-basis. Workers and employers contributed to the 
early retirement benefit scheme. Part two of early retirement benefits was funded. Workers 
and employers contributed to the accrual of benefits in the second part. When a civil 
servant would have accrued benefits for 40 years, the sum of the first and second part 
would have been 70 percent of the final pay (gross end-of-career salary).
114
 The 
replacement rate was reduced by 1.75 percentage points for every year a civil servant 
would have accrued benefits less than 40 years. Civil servants were allowed to do paid 
work after early retirement. However, total income of a retired civil servant was not 
allowed to exceed 100 percent of the final pay. Otherwise, early retirement benefits were 
cut to bring the total income earned on 100 percent of the final gross wage (means test).  
 
Other policy changes 
On January 1
st
, 2004, the public sector pension fund switched from a final pay pension 
regime to an average pay (gross mid-career salary) pension regime.
115
 However, due to a 
transition arrangement, civil servants born before January 1
st
, 1954 were hardly affected by 
the switch.  
On January 1
st
, 2006, the so-called fiscal facilitation of early retirement benefits for 
individuals born January 1
st
, 1950 or later was terminated.
116
 This implied that most early 
retirement arrangements for the youngest workers in our sample disappeared. Early 
retirement among civil servants usually occurred at age 61 or 62. The disappearance of 
early retirement arrangements may have induced the affected workers to retire later. The 
termination of the fiscal facilitation of early retirement benefits could have been 
anticipated as of 2003 and may have induced anticipation effects of civil servants aged 53-
55 in 2005. Note that we consider mortality till 2010. The oldest affected workers, those 
aged 55 in 2005, did not reach the regular early retirement age of 61 yet in 2010.  
                                                          
114
 This replacement rate is based on retirement at the ER eligibility age. The ER eligibility age 
depends on the birth date of an individual.   
115
 The pension fund for the health care sector also switched from a final pay system to an average 
pay system on January 1
st
, 2004. Many other pension funds also switched in the years before or 
after January 1
st
, 2004.  
116
 The fiscal facilitation of the early retirement contributions implied that the early retirement 
benefits were taxed, and that the early retirement contributions paid by workers and employers 
were exempted from taxation. As effectively less tax was paid, the fiscal facilitation made early 
retirement very attractive for eligible workers and employers.   
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Early retirement via disability insurance  
Workers may facilitate an early withdrawal from the labor force by starting to receive 
disability insurance (DI) benefits. Workers could start receiving DI benefits if they would 
be judged to be disabled by a medical examiner of the social insurance institute. DI 
benefits amounted to up to 70 percent of the final pay. The DI system was financed by 
workers and employers. In the context of this study, it is important to notice that civil 
servants faced the same generosity of and eligibility criteria for DI benefits as workers 
employed in other sectors, and that there were no major changes in DI in 2005 except one 
on December 29th.  
From that day on, eligibility criteria for starting to receive disability benefits have been 
tightened and disability benefits have been made less generous for workers who were only 
partially disabled. One year earlier, another change in disability insurance had taken place. 
Since January 1
st
, 2004, workers could only start receiving DI benefits after having been ill 
during employment continuously for two years. We hardly observe any civil servants who 
were induced to retire in 2005 and who started receiving disability benefits soon after 
retirement. Moreover, the inflow into DI for men in all ages decreased smoothly from 
53,000 in 2001 to 36,000 in 2004 and dropped to 17,000 in 2005. It is thus unlikely that the 
retirement rates in 2005 were boosted by changed incentives in DI (Statistics Netherlands, 
2006). 
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Samenvatting  
In dit proefschrift staan baanverlies, pensionering en overlijden centraal. Hoofdstuk 2 
bestudeert deeltijdpensionering. Deeltijdpensionering bij welke individuen hun 
carrierebaan verlaten is een belangrijk fenomeen in de Verenigde Staten. Wij analyseren de 
huidige staat van deeltijdpensionering in Nederland waarbij we gebruik maken van 
administratieve data die baantransities een stuk nauwkeuriger meten dan de meeste panel 
data afkomstig uit enquêtes. We schatten een multinomiaal transitiemodel met het type 
uittredingspad uit de carrierebaan als uitkomstvariabele en bespreken de institutionele 
aspecten die het potentieel van deeltijdpensionering beperken, zoals 
vroegpensioenregelingen die prikkels voor voltijdpensionering geven.   
In hoofdstuk 3 schatten en verklaren we het effect van door financiële prikkels 
geïnduceerde vroegpensionering van echtgenoten op de kans dat hun echtgenotes binnen 
één jaar met pensioen gaan. We maken hierbij gebruik van administratieve data uit 
Nederland. We gebruiken een instrumentele variabele benadering waarbij de beslissing van 
echtgenoten om met pensioen te gaan is geïnstrumenteerd met voorwaarden voor 
genereuze vroegpensioenregelingen die tijdelijk en onverwachts voor echtgenoten 
beschikbaar waren. We vinden dat geïnduceerde vroegpensionering van echtgenoten de 
kans dat hun echtgenotes binnen een jaar met pensioen gaan met 19.7 procentpunt 
verhoogt. Dit is een sterk en robuust effect. Dit effect wordt gedeeltelijk gedreven doordat 
echtgenotes reageren op beslissingen van hun echtgenoten op leeftijden waarop zij 
mogelijk zelf in aanmerking konden komen voor vroegpensionering middels reguliere 
vroegpensioenregelingen.  
Hoofdstuk 4 identificeert en schat het effect van vroegpensionering op de kans om binnen 
vijf jaar te overlijden. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van administratieve micro panel data 
uit Nederland. Een onverwachte en tijdelijke daling in de vroegpensioenleeftijd voor 
rijksambtenaren wordt gebruikt om de beslissing om met pensioen te gaan te 
instrumenteren in een model data de kans om binnen vijf jaar te overlijden verklaart. We 
vinden voor mannen dat geïnduceerde vroegpensionering de kans om binnen vijf jaar te 
overlijden met 2.6 procentpunt doet afnemen. Dit vertaalt zich in een stijging in de 
levensverwachting met twee maanden. We vinden dat ons resultaat robuust is voor 
veranderingen van de functionele vorm en veranderingen in dataselectiecriteria.  
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In hoofdstuk 5 schatten we het effect van baanverlies op overlijdenskansen voor oudere 
werknemers met een lang dienstverband. Met behulp van Nederlandse administratieve data 
vinden we dat baanverlies door plotselinge bedrijfssluiting de kans om binnen vijf jaar te 
overlijden met maar liefst 0.6 procentpunt doet toenemen. Dit effect is geschat met een 
model dat controleert voor werknemerseigenschappen op bedrijfsniveau, zoals 
overlijdenskansen op bedrijfsniveau. Wat betreft het mechanisme dat het effect van 
baanverlies op overlijden drijft vinden we bewijs voor een effect via stress en 
veranderingen in levensstijl.  
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The Tinbergen Institute is the Institute for Economic Research, which was founded in 1987 
by the Faculties of Economics and Econometrics of the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. The Institute is named after the 
late Professor Jan Tinbergen, Dutch Nobel Prize laureate in economics in 1969. The 
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